Donald Trump wants to end the war in Iran, but he will not do it without achieving objectives that definitively prevent Tehran from building a nuclear weapon. The problem, some of his own national security officials have warned, is that the war itself may be pushing Iran in exactly the opposite direction.

In internal discussions, officials argued that the only way Tehran will believe it can prevent another attack like Operation Epic Fury is by acquiring a nuclear deterrent, "Hvylya" reports, citing a TIME investigation. "The only way they will think they can prevent something like this from happening again is to have a nuclear weapon," one White House official said. "There is more of a burden on us now to have a tangible, enforceable agreement that keeps them sufficiently blocked from crossing the nuclear threshold."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had made a similar argument - but in reverse. Over the past six months, Netanyahu repeatedly told Trump that Iran would race toward a bomb in secret regardless. An Israeli official said Tehran concluded after Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 that it had nothing left to lose - and would pursue the bomb regardless of diplomatic pressure.

Trump himself has acknowledged the difficulty. "They are very tough. They're able to withstand tremendous pain," Trump told TIME. "So I respect them for that. The fact is, I think they're better negotiators than they are fighters."

The administration now faces what one official described as a grim game of whack-a-mole, eliminating successive leaders while waiting for a viable alternative to emerge. Trump spoke early in March of being "involved in the selection" of a new Iranian leader, but in his April 1 speech he denied regime change was ever the goal. Ordinary Iranians remain largely unarmed, facing a military apparatus that has shown willingness to deploy overwhelming force against its own population - the same apparatus the U.S. air campaign has so far left largely intact on the ground.

Earlier, "Hvylya" examined how a new nuclear arms control framework proposes replacing binding treaties with flexible agreements.