No task facing NATO's European members is "more difficult and more urgent" than figuring out how to deter Russia's vast nuclear arsenal without the American nuclear umbrella, according to a major new Carnegie Endowment assessment. The warning comes as the Trump administration signals a potential retreat from extended deterrence commitments, "Hvylya" reports, citing the Carnegie analysis by Eugene Rumer.

Russia's nuclear saber-rattling during the Ukraine war has demonstrated that "nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent," Rumer writes. The Biden administration's red line against putting U.S. combat boots on the ground in Ukraine sent "a powerful message about U.S. reluctance to engage in a direct conflict with a nuclear power." If the transatlantic security link is severed, Europe would be left with only the French and British national nuclear forces while the rest of the continent "could find itself in limbo."

European officials and analysts have already begun considering options, including a pan-European nuclear deterrent, a Polish national program, and a joint German-French capability. The prospect of a nuclear arms race in Europe - with multiple new deterrents in addition to existing French and UK arsenals - "is certain to be deeply worrying to the Kremlin," Rumer argues, as it would undo decades of Russian efforts to secure the homeland.

Russia's updated nuclear doctrine, published in 2024, has only raised the stakes. It elaborates scenarios for escalation, including receiving "reliable data" of launches of nuclear or conventional weapons against Russia or Belarus. While framed as defensive, the doctrine has what Rumer calls "ominous offensive implications" in a landscape where Russia's depleted conventional forces push Moscow toward greater nuclear reliance.

The irony is that Moscow spent decades trying to break the transatlantic security link and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe as a precondition for arms control talks. But a severed link, Rumer warns, "could end up over time as a threat multiplier for the Kremlin," replacing the predictability of U.S. presence with "an unregulated, unpredictable landscape rife with competing national priorities, resurfacing old rivalries, and no single power to act as Europe's security manager."

Previously: Foreign Affairs: Britain, Not Brussels, Holds the Key to Europe's Security Future.