The missile race now taking shape across Europe will make the bilateral U.S.-Soviet competition of the 1970s and 1980s "look like a simple affair," according to a sweeping Carnegie Endowment assessment of post-war European security. Multiple countries are acquiring deep-strike capabilities that can hit targets inside the Russian heartland, with no arms control framework to constrain them, "Hvylya" reports, citing the analysis by Eugene Rumer.

Several European countries now have plans to acquire precision strike systems with ranges exceeding 2,000 km. The United States plans to deploy the Typhon missile system in Europe in 2026, and Germany intends to purchase it as well. During the Cold War, the theater missile competition was a strictly U.S.-Soviet affair governed by the INF Treaty. Russia's violation of that treaty and America's subsequent withdrawal have cleared the way for what Rumer calls an unregulated proliferation of participants.

The historical parallels are instructive but ultimately inadequate. The Cold War Euromissile crisis centered on a single Soviet weapon system - the SS-20 - and NATO's response with Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. The current landscape involves dozens of weapons systems, multiple acquiring nations, and no negotiating framework. Rumer traces Russian anxiety about such weapons back nearly half a century to Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who warned that advanced conventional weapons could become comparable in effectiveness to nuclear arms.

The new geography amplifies the threat. Finland's NATO membership has nearly doubled Russia's land border with the alliance. GRU chief Igor Kostyukov warned publicly that ATACMS missiles deployed on Finnish territory could strike St. Petersburg, Murmansk, the Northern Fleet, and nuclear power stations. Russia's forward-deployed weapons in Belarus and the Kaliningrad exclave create a mirror-image vulnerability for NATO.

This mutual proximity, combined with deep mistrust, creates what Rumer describes as conditions for a "perfect storm" in which both sides during a crisis would be "tempted to seek first mover advantage fearing that waiting or going second would risk unacceptable losses." The last time NATO deployed a credible response to Soviet theater missiles - the Pershing II and cruise missile deployments of the 1980s - Moscow eventually agreed to negotiate the INF Treaty. Whether today's far more complex landscape can produce a similar diplomatic outcome remains an open question.

Previously: FCAS Fighter Jet Collapse: The Fundamental Flaw Destroying European Defense Dreams.