Britain's nuclear deterrent, Trident, depends on American software and American missiles. That dependency, Ben Judah argued in The Spectator, is the starkest example of what he called a "specialist relationship" that "confers real capacities at the cost of independence." His proposed solution, as "Hvylya" reports, is as radical as it is specific: Britain should build a new, complementary aircraft-delivered nuclear system with France.
"If the leader of the Free French could reconcile with Germany after the war, we can reconcile with France after Brexit," Judah wrote. He argued that there is "only one basis for a renewed entente this geopolitically profound: working together on that ultimate expression of sovereignty - nuclear weapons." The former Labour adviser framed this Franco-British nuclear partnership as nothing less than Britain's path to becoming "a guardian of Europe."
Judah grounded his argument in de Gaulle's own logic. The French president courted West Germany because he believed that without sharing a degree of sovereignty through the Treaty of Rome, "the logic of superpower geopolitics was such that they would end up with none at all." De Gaulle once admitted to Pompidou that "no state is independent, for it is in reality more or less always linked to others." The pursuit of a "political Europe" - a geopolitical team built around a loose customs and subsidy club - mattered to de Gaulle as much as France's independent nuclear deterrent.
Applied to post-Brexit Britain, Judah argued, this means building a customs alliance with the European Union - "a pact against Trump's coercion where the UK and EU agree to support each other in the trade wars and to begin exploratory talks for a new customs and regulatory union for goods for growth." He described this as close to what de Gaulle himself sought from the European Economic Community.
The more erratic Washington becomes, Judah wrote, the less British national interest will align with American priorities. But he insisted Anglo-Gaullism "need not be puerile anti-Americanism." There is "much more room to disagree and diverge as an ally than we realise." The strategic imperative, in his framing, is not to reject Washington but to ensure Britain has enough independent capability that the alliance becomes a choice rather than a dependency.
Also read: why Brookings scholars warn that "disciplined ambiguity" is replacing binding treaties in the new nuclear arms control framework.