The Trump administration's military escalation against Iran has forced a reallocation of military assets to the Middle East, a shift that may give both the Venezuelan and Cuban regimes breathing room to adapt to their new realities. The longer the Iranian conflict continues without producing tangible success, the more likely Trump becomes to either escalate further or seek an easier public relations victory elsewhere.
Charles Larratt-Smith, an assistant professor at the University of Texas at El Paso, argued in "Hvylya" that the administration risks premature imperial overreach. The president initiated conflict with Iran on Feb. 28, encouraged by the apparent ease with which the Jan. 3 capture of Nicolas Maduro converted a regional adversary into what Trump presents as a vassal state. But the Iran war and the regional instability it has unleashed have raised considerable doubts about the replicability of this strategy.
The conflict in the Persian Gulf affects the Caribbean basin in several important ways. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz has driven oil prices above 100 dollars per barrel, making Venezuelan oil investments theoretically more attractive. Yet foreign capital has not followed - the same structural deterrents that plague Venezuela's oil sector remain unresolved. The constant barrage of threats from Trump himself has not compensated for the military attention diverted thousands of miles away.
The geopolitical competition with China adds another layer of complexity. A central goal of the Trump administration in the Americas, as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy, is to contain and expel Chinese influence from the region. Maduro's ouster seemingly advances this objective. Yet Larratt-Smith argued that regime co-optation may prove beneficial to China in the long term, as it allows Beijing to divest from Venezuela and write off debts unlikely to be repaid. China has sought to protect its investments without risking a direct confrontation with Washington, and the fate of Venezuela and Cuba remains ancillary to Beijing's longer-term strategy of securing hegemony in Asia.
Time constraints complicate the picture further. Trump's use of economic coercion through tariffs has been curtailed by the U.S. Supreme Court, and November's midterm elections are expected to deliver losses for the Republican Party. If the current regimes in Venezuela or Cuba are still standing after the midterms, Larratt-Smith wrote, they will have weathered the worst and be better positioned to survive long-term. The administration's aggressive revival of gunboat diplomacy in Latin America has produced performative compliance from regional leaders, but this obedience is unlikely to survive the waning of Trump's power - especially as distrustful Latin American countries deepen ties with other powers. Also read: "Hvylya" analyzed how America's Asian allies discovered a critical vulnerability the Iran war laid bare.