The U.S. military can take Kharg Island. What it cannot guarantee is that doing so will accomplish any of Washington's actual strategic objectives — reopening the Strait of Hormuz, lowering oil prices, or forcing Tehran to negotiate on American terms.
That is the central argument made by Bilal Y. Saab, a former Pentagon official who oversaw security cooperation in the Central Command region, in an analysis. Saab contends that even if Marines seize the island, Iran would still retain asymmetric military capabilities sufficient to disrupt oil traffic through the strait.
The logic behind the operation sounds appealing on paper: capture Iran's primary oil export terminal, cut off the regime's revenue, and simultaneously stabilize global energy markets. But Saab argues this thinking is built on flawed assumptions about Tehran's behavior. Iran has already absorbed weeks of heavy U.S. and Israeli bombardment, and rather than weakening its resolve, the strikes have reinforced a siege mentality. The regime views this conflict as existential — and increasingly believes it is winning.
Even with Kharg in American hands, Iran could survive for months before running out of money. During that time, Tehran has multiple escalation options, from striking Gulf states' energy infrastructure to activating Houthi disruption of Red Sea shipping — any of which would push prices higher, not lower.
Saab's verdict is blunt: sending Marines into a dangerous operating environment without a clear strategy and based on flawed assumptions about the Iranian regime is "as reckless as it is counterproductive." The operational brilliance of the troops, he argues, cannot compensate for the absence of a coherent strategic endgame.
Earlier, "Hvylya" examined how the Venezuela raid gave Trump a template he now appears intent on replicating in Iran.