Hungary dedicates an astonishing 5.5 percent of GDP to child subsidies and tax credits - one of the most generous family support programs anywhere. Yet its total fertility rate has dropped back to where it was before Viktor Orban took power, according to a new policy analysis from the Cato Institute.
The data comes from Johan Norberg's broader study on Orban's Hungary, which challenges the narrative of the country as a conservative success story, "Hvylya" reports.
The fertility numbers tell a clear story of temporary gain followed by reversal. Hungary's total fertility rate rose from 1.25 per woman in 2010 to 1.61 in 2021 - a bump the government touted as proof its policies were working. But the rate has since declined every year: 1.39 in 2024, and an estimated 1.31 in 2025 based on preliminary data showing 7 percent fewer births than the year before. The current rate is essentially back to the 2009 level, before Orban's long tenure and massive subsidies. Norberg argues the initial increase likely reflected delayed births from the financial crisis being brought forward, rather than any genuine shift in attitudes toward family size.
Combined with emigration and resistance to immigration, the low birth rate has shrunk Hungary's population from 10 million in 2009 to fewer than 9.6 million in 2026, while the median age rose from 38.6 to 44.2 years. The country that some US conservatives cited as a demographic model is aging and depopulating at roughly the same pace as before the subsidies were introduced.
The pattern extends to religion. Despite Orban's vocal commitment to Christian heritage and heavy subsidization of churches, the share of Hungarians identifying as Christians dropped from 54.2 to 42.5 percent between the 2011 and 2022 censuses. Catholics specifically declined from 3.7 million to 2.6 million. A Pew Research Center study found only 14 percent of Hungarians say religion is very important in their lives. Hungarian theologian Rita Perintfalvi attributed the decline to a conscious protest against the politicization of faith, adding that the church cannot change course because "the church's entire financing is in the hands of the government."
In Budapest, less than a quarter of residents now describe themselves as Catholic. Among Hungarians aged 20 to 29, identifying with no religion is almost as common as identifying as Christian - a generational shift that accelerated precisely during the years of heaviest state investment in Christian identity.
Earlier, "Hvylya" analyzed why China faces the prospect of becoming the first major country in history to grow old before it grows rich.