When Vladimir Putin eventually leaves power, his successor will likely reach out to the West - and the greatest risk at that moment will be Western leaders getting "carried away with wishful thinking and premature conclusions about the scale and scope of change in Russia." That warning anchors the conclusion of a sweeping Carnegie Endowment assessment of post-war European security, "Hvylya" reports, citing the analysis by Eugene Rumer.
Rumer considers it "possible, even likely" that a Putin successor will seek an opening to the United States and Europe. Putin himself cannot credibly resume dialogue with the West - he has been indicted for war crimes, "the evidence of which is in plain view." But the structural pressures pushing a successor toward engagement will be immense: a stagnant economy, depleted conventional forces, and an exhausted population in need of a breather.
The trap, Rumer argues, lies in mistaking tactical flexibility for strategic transformation. Western and Russian views on international relations are "fundamentally at odds." The Western vision is enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris, built on democracy, human rights, and cooperative relations. Russia's worldview is "reminiscent of the 1815 Congress of Vienna," where empires carved up the continent into spheres of influence.
That gap cannot be bridged by goodwill alone. For Russia, accepting the vision of a "Europe whole and free" would mean rejecting its "historical worldview, legacy as a European power, and one of the core tenets of its strategic culture," Rumer writes. "No country has done that voluntarily." History backs his caution: Russia's two periods of retrenchment in the twentieth century - after 1917 and after 1991 - were both forced by domestic collapse, not deliberate choice, and both times the imperial instinct quickly reasserted itself.
The Carnegie assessment recommends a Cold War-tested formula: combine military deterrence with an open door to diplomacy and crisis management, without requiring fundamental domestic change in Russia as a precondition. The 1980s Euromissile crisis offers the model - NATO deployed Pershing II missiles while keeping the door open to negotiations, ultimately producing the INF Treaty. "This path offers no guarantee of success," Rumer writes, "but so far no one has come up with an alternative to it."
Previously: Russia Eavesdrops on Africa and Middle East From the Heart of Europe, Western Officials Say.