Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top policy official and architect of the 2026 National Defense Strategy, spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations just days after the US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran - and one day after a US submarine torpedoed an Iranian warship in the Indian Ocean, the first such sinking since World War II. In a wide-ranging conversation, Colby laid out his vision of "NATO 3.0," in which wealthy European allies take primary responsibility for their own conventional defense - and for arming Ukraine through the PURL mechanism. He confirmed personally participating in discussions to ensure Ukraine receives the weapons it needs, but made clear this is now fundamentally Europe's job. On Iran, Colby carefully distinguished US military objectives - destroying Iran's power projection capabilities - from the broader goal of regime change, while noting that degrading Iran's military will inevitably cut off its drone supplies to Russia. Perhaps most revealingly, Colby framed the entire strategy around a single problem: preventing America's adversaries from acting simultaneously - the very scenario the previous administration, by his account, allowed to develop.
The National Defense Strategy and the Western Hemisphere
Michael Froman: Well, good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for joining us. In addition to this full house in the room, we have about four hundred people online. So thank you for joining us. We will have thirty minutes of conversation here and thirty minutes of Q&A from all of you and from the folks remotely. We are really pleased and honored to welcome back to the Council Under Secretary Elbridge "Bridge" Colby. He has been here before. He is a longtime member. He spoke here a little over a year ago when we launched the China Strategy Initiative, led by his friend and former colleague Rush Doshi. So thank you for coming back. You all know his background. He is the principal advisor to the Secretary on matters of defense and foreign policy. He oversaw the development of the National Defense Strategy, which we are going to talk about today. And welcome back.
Elbridge Colby: Thank you very much, Michael. Great to be back.
Michael Froman: Let's start with the National Defense Strategy. And by the way, he was up at the Senate yesterday, Senate Armed Services, being grilled by that committee, and I promised him this would be equally hard.
Elbridge Colby: That's not what he said.
Michael Froman: Look, the National Defense Strategy really, in my view, in my reading of it, makes a real effort to try and connect ends and means, to set some priorities, to recognize that we've got limited resources. Two interesting areas of focus: the Western Hemisphere, of course, and also our willingness to engage with all sorts of different countries, whether or not they share our particular form of government. With the Western Hemisphere identified as our highest priority, we've now seen action in Venezuela. More recently, we're working with Ecuador and hitting some boats there. What's next for the Western Hemisphere? Is Cuba next? And how do you see that playing out? What would be the role of any military action with regards to Cuba?
Elbridge Colby: Well, thank you, Michael. It's great to be here. I see a lot of friends in the audience. So, a pleasure to be back at the Council. I think you're right that the Western Hemisphere is being put back in sort of pride of place, and I think this stems from that America First, peace through strength, but also common sense. That's the hack I often give to allies and others to understand what we're trying to do under the President's leadership in this administration, which is to say: we are going to make sure that the defense strategy and policy of the United States serves the interests of regular Americans, which is of course what the President ran on. And the Western Hemisphere is our neighborhood. There are problems of illegal migration, there is narcotics trafficking which has killed hundreds of thousands of Americans, et cetera. And so what we are doing on the defense side is signaling - and I should say that the 2018 National Defense Strategy also put the homeland as the priority. So it's not that radical of a break in terms of the overall prioritization, but I think there is a change in tone and emphasis, mostly to say the military will play a role in making sure that Americans are protected and their interests are advanced in our hemisphere. And narcotics and our efforts against narco-terrorists are a perfect example, where military forces are on the table because these things contribute directly to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans, and we're going to do our part. Obviously, the great bulk of the efforts in our own hemisphere are not necessarily going to be military. But it's a signal that that is part of the critical part of the agenda.
I'd also say that actually, looking at the Venezuela operation - very successful - that has enlisted, and I think you've seen already, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had a conference, Secretary Hegseth is going to have a conference leading up to presidential-level efforts, to bring together and to catalyze efforts by regional partners. It's not like all the region is saying, "Oh, what you're doing is terrible." Actually, to the contrary, we're seeing a lot of support.
In terms of what we might or might not do, or the President might or might not do, I won't tip our hand. That would be very inconsistent with his approach and our approach. So I won't comment on that. But what people should calculate on and should factor is that the President, and we under his direction, will not hesitate to put American interests first and is not going to be bound by the sort of shibboleths of the past, if those are not consistent with American interests.
The Indo-Pacific and China
Michael Froman: So the Indo-Pacific is certainly not ignored in the National Defense Strategy, but you get the feeling it is somewhat less emphasized than it has been in the past. It reiterates the commitment to defend the first island chain. But China, when you look at the NDS and also the National Security Strategy, it plays a much less prominent or significant role in it. You talk about a decent peace, a balance of power. China wasn't even mentioned in the State of the Union. I mean, this is an area where there is a rare bipartisan consensus, or there was, in the city around being tough on China. Has the administration gone soft on China? Is China still the pacing threat for the US military?
Elbridge Colby: Well, there's a number of questions in there. I would certainly reject the notion that the United States under President Trump has gone soft on China - hasn't gone soft on anything. And I would put it a bit differently.
Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, and if you look at Secretary Hegseth's speech at Shangri-La, as well as at the Reagan Forum - I think you were there in December - it's very clear about the central military role and specifically what's at stake. So I would say in the past, for many years, there have been grand gestures about the Asia-Pacific, or the Indo-Pacific as it's evolved. I've seen a lot of them over the years. I'm sure many of you have as well. This is, I would say, going back to the concept of flexible realism, which is underlined as the core idea or heuristic in the National Security Strategy, and the National Defense Strategy follows from that, is to say: we're going to figure out what the military needs to do as part of a broader administration strategy. I think there's a clear sense of what that is.
So whether something is hard or soft or aggressive or defensive, I think there's a clear set of objectives which are very much in line with the American people's interests, which is a decent peace. What is a decent peace? A decent peace, as Secretary Rubio has said, is this concept of strategic stability where we can trade and have respectful relations with the People's Republic of China, which has risen to become a great nation in the community of nations, and we all respect that from the President on down. But at the same time, we are going to operate from a position of strength. Obviously, on the economic side that you're very familiar with - if you talk to Ambassador Greer or Secretary Bessent. But also, there's a critical military component of that. Our objectives are carefully scoped, they're limited, they're reasonable, and they're designed to, in a sense, nest with the interests of the countries of the region. And in fact, we see that not only from our traditional allies, although certainly from them, but also from countries in ASEAN and South Asia and so forth.
And so in that context, I would categorically reject that we've taken our eye off the ball. To the contrary, there's even more of a focus on meeting that standard, which is consistent with this peace through strength, strong and clear but quiet, decent peace kind of balance of power model. And that's, I think, the right approach. This administration, certainly at the Department of War, is focused on delivering real combat-capable, combat-credible forces in the right place at the right time and less on grand rhetorical flourishes.
US-China Relations in 2026
Michael Froman: So this is a big year potentially for US-China relations. There could be up to four summit meetings between President Trump and President Xi. What do you expect to come out of this year? At the end of the year, if you look back, if last year was a year of escalation and de-escalation creating some degree of stability in the relationship, what would be your objective for this year and these four summits? Is there likely to be a grand bargain of some sort? The Chinese are pushing for the US to change its rhetoric on Taiwan from not supporting independence to opposing independence. How do you see this playing out?
Elbridge Colby: Well, a lot of that is obviously kind of outside of the purview of the Department of War. I defer to the White House and the Department of State, the President, Secretary Rubio. I would say we are certainly in support of the overall agenda, which is this strong and clear but quiet and respectful approach towards China. I deal with my PRC counterparts. The Secretary is engaged with his PRC counterparts in a spirit of respect and constructive engagement, but also from a position of clarity and ultimately strength, which is, from a military point of view, the job of the Department of War.
So I think the goal is, again, contributions towards a decent peace. That requires the right calibrated balance. But at the end of the day, what we're focused on is making sure that the President of the United States has the capabilities to meet the objectives that he has set out. In terms of the issues you talk about, it's not our place, and we are certainly not trying to change our traditional policy on any of these sensitive issues. We're making sure that the President has the ability to back up American policy.
Michael Froman: And so that sounds like it's continuity in terms of our China policy, in terms of being tough, supporting Taiwan with military sales.
Elbridge Colby: I would say - look, obviously time evolves, circumstances evolve. I wouldn't really characterize it as continuity. Since you mention it, I think in the last administration you had very vocal statements from the President who would make comments about the leadership of China, about very sensitive topics, in a way that would catalyze a massive reaction, but without delivering the strength. And so I think our approach is really the exact opposite - to be calibrated and careful about what we say, but make sure that the President has absolute, unquestionable capability. And I'll just say, I said this in response to a question from Senator Sullivan yesterday: I think we are absolutely focused on making sure the President has the capabilities to meet the standard set by the National Security Strategy, which is denying aggression along the first island chain.
Iran and Operation Epic Fury
Michael Froman: Let's turn to Iran, given everything going on. We've got Operation Epic Fury. How does Iran fit into this National Defense Strategy? Because as I said at the beginning, you prioritize the Western Hemisphere, talk about limited resources. We've now moved carrier strike groups from one region to another. It feels a little bit like no matter how much successive presidents try and pivot away from the Middle East, they get dragged back into it. So where does Iran fit into the prioritization set by the National Defense Strategy?
Elbridge Colby: A couple of things. First of all, the strategy very clearly lays out that the Islamic Republic is a threat to the United States and our allies and partners in the Gulf, Israel, Europe, et cetera. Of course, especially the nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic, as well as the conventional missile forces. And so that is clearly called out, and it's really stressed in the strategy that it's incumbent upon and necessary for the department to provide the President with credible, rational military options to advance his objectives around the world, and especially the ability to use our aerospace and maritime forces to reach out and conduct decisive operations.
A second thing is the strategy really emphasizes the importance of burden-sharing and looking to model allies like our ally Israel, but also South Korea, Poland, Germany now stepping up. In the case of the Middle East, we see a lot happening as well.
Generally speaking, a strategy is designed to enable the President to conduct such operations, but also to provide an overall framework for making sure that the department over time is providing the options that will be necessary not only to conduct those operations but also to meet the priorities that we've talked about.
And I think, just to anticipate a bit - I talked about this quite a bit yesterday - Operation Epic Fury is consistent with that approach. The President has directed the United States Armed Forces to conduct a military campaign with a focus on degrading and destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran's ability to project military power in the region and potentially beyond. That is specifically focused, in particular, on the missile and one-way attack drone capabilities and production of the Islamic Republic, and the naval forces. Obviously, the Israelis, our close ally, are operating further north, with a somewhat overlapping set of objectives and goals.
But at the end of this, this is a reasonable and attainable scoped set of objectives that will leave the United States better off under a range of outcomes. The President has stated a fact that this is a historic opportunity for the Iranian people to change this oppressive and opprobrious Islamic Republic. But ultimately, a lot of that is going to rest on the shoulders of the Iranian people. I think the military campaign is designed, and we have reason to believe, will leave us better off with respect to this very serious threat.
US and Israeli Objectives
Michael Froman: So are you suggesting that the US and the Israeli objectives are not completely aligned?
Elbridge Colby: I would say they're very close and overlapping. At the political level, there's a lot of discussion. The military campaigns of the two are, I would say, kind of overlapping. I can't speak to the military objectives of the Israeli Defense Forces with any authority. But I can say, and Secretary Hegseth and the Chairman referred to this again this morning, the objectives are, as I detailed, the power projection forces of the Islamic Republic.
Michael Froman: That goes to the nuclear, the missile, the drone capability, the navy -
Elbridge Colby: Obviously, the nuclear program had been decisively set back with Operation Midnight Hammer. That remains one of the main underlying reasons - as Secretary Hegseth said the other day, a big part of the strategic rationale for this operation is the fact that there was the potential for the Islamic Republic to be able to build up its conventional missile forces and other capabilities to shield the ability to resume a pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Michael Froman: How much focus is there right now on the four hundred and fifty kilograms of enriched uranium that are somewhere in Iran?
Elbridge Colby: Well, without getting into any specifics, obviously we're always highly focused on that. I think the key thing - and as you probably heard from Admiral Cooper last night, our very capable CENTCOM commander, as well as the Secretary and the Chairman this morning - this is a dynamic situation. As Admiral Cooper says, his assessment is we are on plan. That is our assessment. We are making a lot of progress. We're shifting from a campaign that in its initial phases was primarily focused on bringing down air defenses and other kinds of tactically imminent threats, to one where we can, as they say, get on top of the target and be able to use - as the Chairman said this morning - precision gravity bombs and other kinds of comparable weapons that the President referred to in his Truth Social post the other night.
Grand Strategy Behind the Iran Operation
Michael Froman: So stepping back, one interpretation of what we're doing in Iran is that there's a grand strategy underneath - that by attacking Iran, we're further cutting off oil supplies to China; that together with the Venezuela action, we're making it more difficult for Iran to support Russia's war in Ukraine with the provision of drones and other material support; and that this is really sort of a bank shot to get a better situation in Ukraine and gain leverage over China heading into the summit meeting. Are you the father of this strategy, or...
Elbridge Colby: I'm the father of nothing. I'm the second cousin twice removed.
No, I mean, I would not - I'm not the right person to be able to comment on what the overall plan might or might not be. What I can say is, as to my knowledge and the way we're looking at it from the Department of War - maybe I'm too linear - there is a direct, clear threat from the Islamic Republic in terms of obviously its nuclear ambitions but also its military forces, and that is more than sufficient to have justified the operation. Obviously, substantially and materially degrading the military capabilities of the Islamic Republic will have a range of beneficial secondary and tertiary effects. But from my point of view, this is pretty straightforward in the sense that there's enough of a rationale right there.
Supercharging the Defense Industrial Base
Michael Froman: One of the top priorities you've cited in the National Defense Strategy is supercharging the defense industrial base. You've spoken before about your concern that we were depleting our stocks in our support of Ukraine. Now we have this action against Iran. How depleted are our stocks? How concerned are we about that? And why is it that we can't build enough of our interceptor missiles or artillery to keep up with our demand here and around the world?
Elbridge Colby: Well, I'd just say up front that our armed forces have the necessary equipment to take on anyone and pursue the President's goals and objectives, and nobody should have the impression that we're somehow behind the curve. As I said yesterday at the Senate Armed Services Committee, that is something that everybody should understand, friend and potential foe - we are on top of this problem.
I think, as the President said the other day, that said, there are certain areas where we are not where we need to be. That is something we have anticipated, and many of us have been working very hard on. I'd give special credit to Deputy Secretary of War Steve Feinberg, who is really, under the direction of the President and the Secretary, leading that charge and making a tremendous amount of progress.
I would say a couple things. Overall, the strategy is designed to deal with this kind of situation. I was just talking to some European counterparts right before I came over here and said NATO 3.0 is already actually taking this into account - that we need to all get ahead of the problem, and the strategy is designed to map to it.
I would say there are at least three major prongs that the administration is undertaking to get after this problem under the President's leadership. One, a $1.5 trillion defense budget. That is a huge signal from the President himself of the seriousness with which he takes making sure that the American people have the armed forces that are more than equipped enough. And secondly, that we're able to provide our allies and partners.
Money is critical. It's a critical predicate, but it's insufficient on its own. You need to have an industrial base that can produce at scale. And both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy call for a national mobilization. I just want to stress that. That's not "Hey, we need to do better, we need to be more aligned or integrated." That's a national mobilization. And following up on that, you can see that expresses the attitude of the President and the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, which is really a different approach. And I believe there's been reporting of a meeting later this week, as well as a supplemental. So this is happening, but we need to see it through. Everybody knows that.
And also, with our allies and partners, we need to be able to scale production more broadly. And that's the third part of this, which is a big part of the problem. Everybody loved to talk about how we have the wealthiest, greatest group of allies in our network, yada, yada, yada. Didn't go through the formality of actually having serious militaries in many cases. Not in all cases. And I say that a lot of that is our fault.
One of the things I was talking to Senator Reed about yesterday in the hearing - he used the term "partisan." I objected to that because I don't think there's a partisan tone in the National Defense Strategy. There is a pretty tough tone on what I would really frame as the post-Cold War foreign policy. I think it's really important to distinguish the post-Cold War from the post-war, because people often want to wrap themselves in the flag of the post-1945 world. But I think what we're talking about is much more akin to the level of practical realism, problem-solving, and real brass-tacks conversations with allies that you saw in the Cold War.
And that's that third part, which is getting allies to step up and commit to the new global standard as referenced in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. And here's the thing, and this was a little bit of what I was saying yesterday: this is happening. That debate is, in a sense, over.
The Problem of Simultaneity
Now the conversation with the Europeans - and that was a lot of the theme of my remarks at the Defense Ministerial in Brussels last month, as well as at the Munich Security Conference - is: people have now bought into NATO 3.0, and similarly in the Indo-Pacific, model allies like South Korea. Now the question is, how do we get down to business together? The conversation I was having just before I came here with a major European ally is: how do we think about syncing industrial production so that we can scale together, and so you're buying the right stuff that makes sense?
So I think together we're already moving very much in the right direction. We'll put ourselves in a position where obviously the President of the United States is going to have the ability to conduct military operations around the world. But we'll also be able to deal with the core problem addressed in the strategy, which is the potential for simultaneity, which is - maybe backing up for a second.
I mean, the core military problem is the potential for possible foes to operate on simultaneous or roughly concurrent timelines. That's the most stressing scenario. But because it's the sort of "best" approach from potential opponents, that's the one you need to be prepared for.
In fact, I would say the administration's diplomacy is designed precisely to avoid that, and I would distinguish that from the last administration. I think this is a substantive, not a partisan point. Jake Sullivan, the former National Security Advisor, at the end of the last administration said in Time magazine interviews that our adversaries were aligned to an unprecedented degree. Now, if you'd asked Henry Kissinger, that would have been the standard of unsuccessful American diplomacy.
So under our President, you have a president who is prepared to talk to potential opponents, whether for various reasons. But you also have a military that is prepared for that in a way that is realistic and has our allies do their part. And people get it - it's common sense.
And so I think together, I actually think we really have a very positive future before us - where you've got a more well-equipped defense perimeter around our alliances, with a much healthier industrial base, not only here but in our allies' countries as well. Obviously, we're going to want our weapons to be sellable in their markets, but we also understand they're going to indigenize a substantial portion of their defense purchases in terms of their own DIB.
And then you're going to have a diplomacy that is saying, "Hey, we're going to talk. We're going to be prepared to talk to China, to Russia." The President had been prepared to talk to the leadership of the Islamic Republic. The White House just indicated its receptivity to talking to North Korea without preconditions. So there's an openness. If you go back to the Cold War, under presidents of both Republican and Democratic parties, that was considered sort of common-sense, normal. And that's, I think, where we're headed, and we'll be in a good position for sustained and decent peace.
Europe Stepping Up
Michael Froman: And as you talk about Europe stepping up and bearing more of the burden, taking responsibility - how confident are you that they're going to be able to make the tough political decisions they need to face, so that not every country has its own air defense system or its own tank, but they're actually spending the money on the right stuff?
Elbridge Colby: I think it's happening. And I was there. I mean, I've been watching it, obviously, and I see Europeans all the time coming through here, but it was striking to be there. The Federal Republic of Germany, which was traditionally considered kind of a laggard on these issues - they are spending, I think, four percent or close to it by well before the end of the decade. They're on track to exceed 3.5%. They changed their constitution. And that's under - talk about bipartisanship - you have the Christian Democratic Chancellor, and the Minister of Defense there is a Social Democrat. That is happening, right? Finland, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands. Secretary General Rutte, I was talking to him - he pointed out that the Netherlands is going to raise its retirement age to seventy. That's a serious step.
Michael Froman: But it's one thing to spend more, and it's another thing how you spend it.
Elbridge Colby: Totally. And that's the NATO 3.0 conversation. That's, "Hey, we're not talking about NATO as a set of symbols, and did you say the right words to me." No, NATO is a real military alliance that's designed to put combat-credible forces in the field. West Germany had twelve active divisions along the line in 1988. They can do this.
That's where the conversation is going now. We're working really closely with them, as well as other Europeans. And I think what you're seeing is a lifting effect. Even here, I think some of the momentum behind the $1.5 trillion proposal is that we've seen our allies do it. And you even see internal pressure. We're not always the ones putting pressure on other countries, because people will say, "If I'm in Germany, well, wait, why aren't some of these other Western European countries matching?"
The European Nuclear Umbrella
Michael Froman: So you made a very important distinction in your speeches in Europe between Europe stepping up on conventional defense and the US continuing to provide the nuclear umbrella. The Europeans, feeling somewhat distrustful of the United States right now, or not certain about the commitment of the United States to their security, are now talking about having their own or a further nuclear umbrella - either the British and the French cooperating or other Europeans cooperating and acquiring nuclear weapons. How do you assess that? Is that dangerous for us? Is it useful for us for them to also invest in that capability?
Elbridge Colby: Well, I think it's important to be empirical here, because I have not heard credible reporting of European governments really thinking about independent acquisition in violation of their nuclear non-proliferation treaty obligations. I see churn in the commentariat, having been in the commentariat, no disrespect. But I haven't seen government-level moves in that direction.
Michael Froman: But didn't Germany say they wanted to join Britain and France?
Elbridge Colby: So what I understand the Federal Republic to be doing - and I've had conversations, and this is something I spend a fair amount of time in - bottom line up front, what I would say is I think it's perfectly appropriate, and from our point of view at the Department of War reasonable, for there to be a greater European complexion to NATO nuclear deterrence. And it goes back to the Ottawa statement, which has been a summit statement repeated for, I think, fifty years now, which is that the independent nuclear deterrence of the United Kingdom and France contribute to the deterrence and defense of the alliance. So there's already a built-in validation of a European contribution to nuclear deterrence.
My understanding - and I was talking to the French actually recently, I haven't read the French President's very important speech, I think it was in Brest, yet - my understanding is what's being discussed now is more of how exactly it folds into NATO planning, et cetera. These are important, but they can be worked out. It's Europeans taking on more of a role. I know the United Kingdom has decided to contribute more to NATO nuclear deterrence. I think there's other potential. In that spirit, that's all to the good.
And by the way, the Europeans are usually saying to us, "Hey, we're talking to the French, but don't take it the wrong way. We understand that this is not a substitute." I mean, the reality is, candidly, we put ourselves in contortions for seventy-five years trying to figure out how to do extended deterrence. The French nuclear deterrent is designed for the defense of France. So it's one thing to change declaratory policy. It's another thing to have a credible nuclear deterrent that you can extend to countries that may be hundreds of miles away.
I'm not pouring cold water on it, but I'm just saying I'm not that worried about this whole dynamic, because I think in the spirit of NATO 3.0 we can adapt the alliance. Obviously, we're asking the Europeans to step up. We just need to be practical about it.
Ukraine
Michael Froman: Let me ask one more question before we open it up, on Ukraine. There are reports that there's been some progress in the negotiations on Ukraine, at least between the United States and Ukraine, on what security guarantees might look like and what various territorial concessions might look like. How confident are you that Putin wants an agreement? And wouldn't peace through strength mean building up Ukraine's capability to achieve peace?
Elbridge Colby: Well, on the first question about what's in President Putin's mind - inquiring minds would like to know, obviously. I think that's a tough topic to get insight into. I think we are all committed to advancing the President's, I think, moral goal of bringing this tragic conflict to an end.
I think we all have to be prepared. One of the points from the Department of War point of view - not being the negotiator, obviously we're supporting - I think a lot of the brush has been cleared, so if there is a political alignment or agreement, I think it could be done pretty expeditiously.
But whether the war goes on or whether it ends, the implications are the same, which is a European buildup. And to get to your point, Michael, about supporting Ukraine and having it well-defended - yes, it's in our interest for Ukraine to be well-defended. In fact, the President ordered, and we played a critical role in building, the PURL system to be able to facilitate the sale of American weaponry to Europe and then from there to Ukraine. I myself was involved when I was over in Brussels in some of these discussions about ensuring Ukraine has what it needs, and I heard from the new minister, Fedorov, about their plan and so forth.
But it's really got to be Europe stepping up, right? And this is again where I think the strategy was already anticipating this world that we're in. Some of the logic of the argument is, "Oh, hey, if we just went back to normal or something like that, went back to the old ways, we could keep doing things the way we've been doing." And it's like, no, no, no, we've got to lean forward into a world in which not only are we spending more and producing more, but Europeans and Japanese and Australians and Koreans and New Zealanders are all spending more. Canadians for sure.
In terms of peace through strength, I think there's a tendency to look - the United States has the preeminent military on the planet, but we obviously have limits. We do not have - I'll put it this way - we have unbounded potential, but we do not have unbounded resources at this particular precise point in time. The defense industrial base, et cetera. The President talks about and Secretary Hegseth talked about restoring the "arsenal of democracy." I believe we can get back to that. But right now, to secure the actual physical safety of the regular American, there are constraints. And so if we try to just be super tough everywhere all the time, we're going to end up leaving ourselves vulnerable, as the previous administration found itself frankly over the last couple of years before leaving office. We've reversed that dynamic.
So I think peace through strength means building up our own power but dealing with practical realities while building a grand coalition of strong and capable allies. That's frankly what brought the original Cold War to a successful conclusion. I think that's the path ahead. And I think you kind of see that working. I mean, you look around the world - not to get Pollyannaish or anything - but people know that a new set of rules has arrived from Washington, D.C., where strength rules. We're going to protect our interests and we're going to look out for our friends. But we're also going to expect reciprocity and seriousness from those friends, to get back to what they actually always pledged to do over successive generations.
Michael Froman: So looking around at our allies and partners all over the world, to step up - I assume including building up the industrial base over time, so that not everybody produces everything but they produce more than what they're producing right now - who is the laggard?
Elbridge Colby: That's not a wise decision for a diplomat to be making here. I would not name an individual country. I would say, as those of us who follow this know, Europe needs to move. A lot of that is the European Union and breaking down frankly protectionist barriers in Europe. I think there's a tremendous amount of potential in Europe.
Our interest is clear. Obviously it's ultimately determined by a higher pay grade than mine. But our basic posture is: we obviously want fair and open treatment of American defense firms. These are some of the most innovative and scale-effective, scalable defense companies in the world. But we absolutely recognize that we need and want the European defense industrial base to be producing at the scale that is required.
And I would not point out laggards, but I would point out people who represent tremendous promise. South Korea, clearly. You look at what South Korea is doing, not only indigenously but providing advanced and very capable defense articles to countries like Poland, and frankly a variety of other countries. I just was engaged with the Romanians recently and they're looking at buying South Korean materials. And Japan has obviously changed its longstanding rules on export of defense articles. So that's where we need to head.
Q&A
Michael Froman: Great. Let's open it up.
Japan and the New Global Standard
Question (Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times): Question about Japan. Prime Minister Takaichi is coming here in a couple of weeks. One of the reasons she won a landslide is she's promised to cut the consumption tax. That's complicating things in terms of whether you can spend more on defense within the government in Tokyo. What do you think is a reasonable amount that Japan should be spending on defense, and what would you like to see her announce when she comes here?
Elbridge Colby: It's not my place, I think, to talk about specific figures or put the government on the spot there. I think what we all recognize, and I know Japan is going through this very important process of strategy development over the course of 2026, and hopefully rapidly - I think if you listen to what the government of Japan has said, not only in the last few months but over a number of years, they are the ones who are saying there is an unprecedented security situation around the world, but even in their own neighborhood. And they know this better than anybody.
I think what we're seeing around the world is obviously there's this new global standard idea. That's a standard. But I think we're seeing everybody, all around the world, of our allies really step up. And to be honest, Japan has for many years been a big advocate of the idea that all these theaters are interconnected. So this is not about what the United States is insisting. This is about what very advanced, large, sophisticated countries see as being in their interests.
And I think that's where I'd really go back to what Europe is doing - countries like Germany, the Netherlands, the Norwegians, Swedes, Finns, South Koreans - they are stepping up. We all know what we need to do. It's not my place to lay out any demands.
But I think one of the key themes, and what we are looking at in 2026, is that 2025, in a sense, was about reframing and really credibly demonstrating that things needed to change. I mean, candidly, I know people talked about the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, "everything's changed." If I could be maybe a little bit ungenerous, there was a discussion of a Zeitenwende. The Zeitenwende did not go through the formality of actually happening until Chancellor Merz and Minister Pistorius, to their great credit.
I think people have now internalized that things have changed. And it's not just about Americans like me badgering people. This is for your own reasons. And that's the common sense. Minister of Defence Collins from New Zealand has a great point. She said, "After the end of the Cold War, a lot of us basically took a huge reduction in defense, and we put it in - the Americans were paying more."
Question: The peace dividend.
Elbridge Colby: The peace dividend. And frankly, a lot of that is kind of our fault, even here, if you forgive me, at the Council on Foreign Relations, because it was the elite of the United States, and I think we're all probably guilty of that if we're here. But that system just doesn't work anymore. And we don't need to sort of pin who's at fault and who's not, because it doesn't matter anymore. Now it's about everybody's got to get on the new dispensation, and let's get down to business.
US and Israeli Objectives: Regime Change?
Question (Elise Labott, journalist, Cosmopolitics Substack): You said yesterday in the Senate testimony and also a little bit today that your objectives with Israel are overlapping but different, and Israel seems more focused on leadership change, while you have a limited military objective. You've encouraged the Iranian people to rise up, or the President has. But does that kind of leave the US on the hook for helping shape what happens after, to make sure that it's not more dangerous - not just for the Iranian people, but for the region and US interests? And given your own history in terms of restraint in military action, how do you personally feel about the fact that Israel's objectives in terms of a broader change in the region may be a little bit different than the US?
Elbridge Colby: Well, there's a lot in there. And I'm a government official, obviously, not on think tank or commentator anymore. But just to be clear, I'm sometimes described as a restrainer. I don't see it in the mirror. I've never described myself that way. Flexible realist, actually - that's about right.
My view is, we should never be totally a hawk or a dove, because it's contextual, depends on the situation. So for instance, to go back to China, I don't think of myself as a hawk or a dove. I want, totally in line as I understand it with the President's goals, a respectful, peaceful situation in which our interests are respected. Part of that is having the power to ensure that you're respected. Part of it is being willing to engage. And I've been, for instance, personally engaged with the Chinese over many years from a position of respect.
And I think we're all clear that we regard the Israelis as a model ally who are willing to go forward and not only spend a lot, but actually do a lot and take a lot of risk and deal with a lot of the threats that they face, and we also face, in a very forward-leaning way.
Just to be clear, I'm speaking about the objectives of the military campaign that have been directed by the President of the United States. Obviously, the President has and will continue to set the overall objectives and the military objectives. But the military objectives that have been given, if you look at what the Chairman has said, if you look at Admiral Cooper's updates - those are what we're doing.
That's not at all inconsistent with, for instance, saying the Iranian people have an opportunity to take the situation into their own hands. And whether others may be helping and et cetera, that are outside of the purview of the military campaign, I'm not speaking on behalf of the entire United States government. I'm talking about the military campaign and how it nests.
And in terms of, you know - as the President gestured at with the Venezuela operation - he's not going to be bound by the sort of conventional-wisdom parameters. The President is clearly going to lead us in a direction where this is going to be net beneficial to the American people. The military campaign is part of that. Obviously, we would all welcome a change in government, I think. I mean, it's been pretty striking to see - the Chancellor of Germany yesterday, the French actions over the last day or two, the Prime Minister of Australia, et cetera, et cetera. Lots of support for what we're doing and very little credible opposition.
So I think those all nest very well, but it's going to be on the terms that he sets, and to make sure that we're in a position where we're left better off. Having reduced, from a military standpoint - what's the job of the Department of War and the Armed Forces of the United States is to leave us in a better position than when we started.
Michael Froman: So just to be clear, the objective of the military campaign is not regime change.
Elbridge Colby: That's making it seem like I'm saying that that would not be a desirable outcome.
Michael Froman: That would be a desirable outcome, it's not the objective.
Elbridge Colby: The designated tasks to the United States Armed Forces are to destroy and degrade the power projection forces. Of course, if that contributes to regime change - and there may be other countries and so on that are moving towards that goal - but the instructions given to the United States Armed Forces are to degrade the military threat posed by these elements.
Indo-Pacific Readiness and the Defense Perimeter
Question (Bob Grady, Summit Partners; Vice Chairman, Hoover Institution): On this issue of stocks and readiness and defense industrial base readiness, you talked about part of the answer being the contribution of our allies and partners. That's clearly happening in Europe with the NATO five percent mandate. As you say, the debate's over, and even 1.5% of that could be used for infrastructure. How do you think about that exact set of problems - readiness, supply chain, even fuel, airfields, equipment - in the Indo-Pacific context, where in the event of a conflict you'd be facing an unprecedentedly long supply chain of seven thousand miles, never been done?
Elbridge Colby: Excellent question. A couple of thoughts. The Indo-Pacific problem, the first island chain problem that's been directed by the National Security Strategy and is in the National Defense Strategy, presents real challenges like the one you refer to. It also presents opportunities.
Fundamentally, and this gets back to the flexible realism balance of power, the military strategy of the United States at this point is very tightly nested to a balance of power approach because it's fundamentally defensive. That's why it nests very well with our political strategy, which is designed, as the Secretary has said, we're not trying to strangle or humiliate China. To the contrary, we respect China and its extraordinary accomplishments over many decades and beyond. But it's basically saying: we are not going to allow military aggression along the first island chain.
The thing about that is it's a maritime theater where you have to project and sustain power. And as we demonstrated - the USS Charlotte last night - it's the first sinking of an enemy vessel by torpedo by a submarine since World War II. We have a military of unparalleled prowess, and everybody really does know that. We can see that in the evidence.
And that's another area where our allies and partners matter. Allies and partners are not just a kind of symbolic shibboleth with a little flag. I mean, countries like Japan, a very close relationship with the Philippines right now, of course South Korea, as well as countries like Australia and New Zealand. Basically, what we're asking them to do, as well as countries in ASEAN - and we're totally flexible in how we work with them. I always say to them: this is the opposite of John Foster Dulles at the Bandung Conference refusing to shake Zhou Enlai's hand. This is saying, "Hey, we're going to work together." I actually like to quote Deng Xiaoping: "Whether the cat is white or black, doesn't matter as long as it catches mice."
The mentality is pragmatic. We understand what we need to be able to do, and the military strategy is tightly connected. And that tells us the kinds of capabilities we need, the kinds of capabilities we're recommending our allies build. It's all coherent and logical within that structure. And one of the reasons I believe we have a right to be optimistic is because our defense perimeter has existed for a long time there. It's well grooved politically. It's something we understand militarily. And countries like the United States, Japan, Germany, South Korea - when we put our minds to it, we can get after industrial production problems pretty well.
Greenland, Canada, and Presidential Leadership
Question (online, Gideon Rose): Mr. Secretary, very impressive presentation. You would never know that you're in Trump two rather than Trump one. I find everything you're saying, if this was all the administration was saying, quite plausible and sensible. I'm just curious how it squares with what the President actually says and does. And in particular, how does threatening to invade Greenland and fomenting separatism in Canada fulfill the kind of policies you're talking about?
Elbridge Colby: Good to hear from you, Gideon. I think Trump one and Trump two are both very, very successful. Proud to have served in both under the President's leadership. We definitely work for the President. I'm very proud to work for the President. I think he's the one who's driven the change and the needed focus and the needed ability to adapt.
I think the President's been clear, and we agree, that we need to have our key interests respected in places like Greenland. And I think there's a process that's underway that appears to be addressing that, from what I can tell. That's in other channels. But I think we have reason to be optimistic that that will be a successful outcome.
And I guess that would be sort of part of the answer to your question, Gideon - the proof is in the pudding. How many times have we all heard Secretary Gates or Secretary Panetta going to whatever NATO confab and saying all these words about needing to rebalance, and nothing really happening? And then, because of President Trump's leadership, and in fairness the leadership of people like Secretary General Rutte, Chancellor Merz, and a number of other leaders and populations of course around Europe, that is changing. And so I think the results are what we go by, and the President's leadership is critical. The way he engages in negotiation is critical. I obviously rebut the spirit of your question, and the results are what matter.
AUKUS Review
Question (Cayman Gok, Australian Broadcasting Corporation): I was just curious what the findings from the Pentagon's review into the AUKUS submarine agreement were, and what the "opportunities" were that it found to strengthen the deal.
Elbridge Colby: I can't get into the specifics, but what I will say is I think we took very much the President's instructions that AUKUS is full speed ahead, and the review is fully consistent with that and put it on an even firmer foundation. I think when we came in, we found some things that - sort of a shakedown cruise - were not going to put the AUKUS program on a lasting, lastingly successful footing. And we went through the AUKUS review in close consultation with our allies from Australia and the United Kingdom, and I think we came out with a framework that basically is a pathway to do exactly what the President said, which is to put it on full steam ahead.
And candidly, I heard from a very senior official the other day who, almost unprompted, said, "You know, actually, that AUKUS review, it's really great that we all did that" - this is from one of the allies - "because now it's on much firmer footing." So everybody knows what we all need to do, with greater clarity.
I mean, at the end of the day, AUKUS started out as a lot of fanfare, if you will. But it has to do with real military deliverables, and we've got to make sure those are on time. And that's the spirit of this administration, certainly the Pentagon approach in general. You look at things like FMS - everybody's been wringing their hands about foreign military sales for years and complaining about the bureaucracy. We are actually doing something about it under the President's direction, led by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary.
Stranded Americans and North Korea
Question (from the audience): We have one to two million Americans in the Middle East who are stranded there, and our ambassador to Israel has basically said, "I can't help you." How could we begin a war and not consider how to take care of these Americans? If our interest is protecting America, how could we leave such a group stranded? And secondly, about North Korea, which you have said nothing about, and they have sixty nuclear weapons.
Elbridge Colby: Well, we did say something about North Korea. It is part of what our close, very close alliance with South Korea addresses. And I'd mention that that's actually a center-left progressive government there, but they've agreed to the new global standard of 3.5%, and they've agreed to take primary responsibility for their conventional defense on the peninsula. So they're really extending the model from Europe, to their great credit.
But again, I think the overall approach is similar to the approach we're taking elsewhere, which is: be strong, but be open to dialogue and engagement.
And I can say from personal experience that we're absolutely not neglecting Americans in the region. I would defer to the State Department and others for more detail on that. But I know we're paying a lot of attention to make sure we do what we have to do.
Nuclear Proliferation in Europe
Question (online, Rodolph Costanzo): Regarding nuclear proliferation - if the German government, the Polish government, and/or Scandinavian countries were to come to you and say, "We want to develop our own nuclear capabilities," would you try to talk them out of it, or would you try to encourage them?
Elbridge Colby: We'd more than try to talk them out of it. We'd obviously, at a minimum, strenuously oppose it. So I don't know exactly what that would entail - it's a hypothetical. But we're against such an eventuality.
Iran Campaign and Deterring China
Question (James Siebens, Stimson Center): One of the commonsense concerns that has been raised consistently, especially by Republicans, about the amount of aid that's been provided to Ukraine is the depletion of our own long-range fires and whether that would count against our ability to deter major actors in other theaters like Russia and China. After this conflict with Iran, do you feel that the United States will be better equipped or less equipped to deter China?
Elbridge Colby: As the President said, we have very plentiful munitions for a lot of the things, especially the phases we're moving into. As he gestured at, there are areas where we're going to focus on getting healthier. And that is why we are calling for and implementing a national mobilization of the defense industrial base, the proposal for a $1.5 trillion budget, and the overhaul and really kind of radical approach towards increasing productivity from that defense industrial base, and the allies doing more.
So I'd honestly kind of volley back. The administration is doing everything that we really can. This is where we need Congress, we need industry to really step up. And I mean the level of seriousness about making sure that our forces always have the weapons that they need and that we'll be able to provide our allies and partners with weaponry, whether through sales or otherwise, is very much top of mind.
But I think this is something where the sky's the limit in terms of what we can do to get after this problem.
Iran Strikes on Turkey and NATO
Michael Froman: I gather that the last twenty-four hours or so, Iran fired at Turkey, and it was intercepted by NATO air defense. Is this an Article Five issue? Can we see NATO being mobilized against Iran?
Elbridge Colby: I'm not sure of the exact specifics, so I don't want to get ahead of the commentary. I think we clearly see that the Islamic Republic is willing to strike against a wide range of countries, not only in the Middle East but also potentially in NATO. And we've seen a strong move by a number of NATO countries to take action.
Michael Froman: Individual NATO countries.
Elbridge Colby: And I think there's a real potential for an evolution towards some kind of grouping or formation that reflects the wide consensus that the Islamic Republic is a noxious threat. This is not like, "Oh, this is the Americans making something up." It's not a high bar to get countries to say this is something that is a threat and that they are prepared to take action against. Look at the Gulf. The Israelis are involved, but the Gulf countries are also involved.
Greenland and the NATO Alliance
Question (Alberto Mora, former General Counsel of the Navy): You use the words "common sense," "ally," "NATO," and I hear Greenland and the threat of military force against Greenland to annex the territory. What deterred the United States from exercising that kind of threat, and how do you assess today the effects of that threat of force against our NATO allies? Is it something that's still on the table? Should NATO allies understand that the United States operates with them in derogation of the treaty? In fact, we violated four articles of the NATO treaty when we issued the threat of force. What is the net effect of Greenland today?
Elbridge Colby: There's a lot of questions in there. What I would say is I think there's a process that's being worked. As the President's made clear, and we support, it's essential that our key interests be reflected with respect to Greenland. And I'm confident that the process being worked through will result in a good outcome.
So I think that's the measure of the wisdom of the President's course, which is to bring attention to issues that may not have been surfaced before and people didn't think about. That'll leave us, I'm sure, in a better position. And I think the NATO alliance is stronger than it's been in a generation. So I reject the premise of your question, to be honest.
Cost of the War and Congressional Oversight
Question (Jane Harman, former chair of the Commission on National Defense Strategy): I recently chaired the Commission on National Defense Strategy, as you know, and served in Congress a long time. We recommended increased spending on defense. But my question is around what are we spending in this war? What have we spent to date? And is Congress properly in the loop here? In hindsight, Iraq and Afghanistan cost us trillions and trillions of dollars. Are we headed there again in this war?
Elbridge Colby: On the last point, absolutely not. We've learned the lessons, as Secretary Hegseth eloquently put it this morning. We're not going to make the same mistakes under President Trump's leadership, and he's been clear about that.
On the cost, I couldn't give you an answer. I do know Congress has been consulted a lot. Secretary Hegseth, the Chairman, I think Secretary Rubio, maybe Director Ratcliffe were all on the Hill yesterday, I'm pretty sure, and then I think on Monday as well. So there's been extensive consultations. Exactly how it's unfolding, I'm not in a position to say.
In terms of the cost, my understanding is that there may be additional requests or something like that. But I think a lot of this is going to be an opportunity - and, ma'am, you served on that commission calling for greater defense spending. This is where the $1.5 trillion, but also an industrial base that can produce more quickly at scale at a reasonable cost, can be vital.
NATO Buildup Timelines and Long-Range Strike
Question (Dov Zakheim): The NATO buildup you spoke about - it's going to take them a few years before they've spent to the level you want. And once they spend it, it's going to take a few years before they get anything in the field. We're going to be building up, as you say, but will we be building up enough to backfill them in order to deter people like Putin?
Elbridge Colby: I think timelines are an issue. But I think you're probably more pessimistic than you need to be, because in a lot of areas, if we look at the Russian military - without commenting on their political intent, but just analytically - obviously they have built up over the course of the war, but they are heavily engaged in Ukraine, and they've suffered very substantial losses of both personnel and equipment.
And Europe actually in a lot of ways already has a lot of the capabilities that it needs - for instance, like tactical aviation. There's a lot of European countries buying and already fielding F-35s. There's a lot of ground troops. Often it has to do with more joint operations training, what the Europeans call strategic enablers. So that's what we're trying to get down to.
I think it's less of a binary issue than a matter of degree, where we're going to have to work together. And that's a lot of what conversations I have with General Grynkewich, who I understand is going to speak, and is very highly regarded by all of us, both as EUCOM and as Supreme Allied Commander. We're trying to understand where we focus efforts, where we may lean forward, how we get across whatever humps there may be.
But in general, I think it's a manageable issue. Because the Europeans are actually doing it. They're ramping up. Certainly the Germans and the Poles, the Scandinavians. A country like Finland has sustained a large military for a long time. They've got F-35s. They've got a huge artillery force. They've got well-trained infantry, a conscription system. That's a frontline state. Poland, likewise.
So when you unpack it a bit, it's actually more manageable than it might initially appear. Similarly in Korea, you have eighteen-month baseline conscription, a very large defense industry. We've been operating with them for generations. So these problems are less pointed than - I don't want to underestimate them, but there's more to work on in a more progressive way than it might seem.
Dov Zakheim: Should Europe build its own long-range precision strike capability?
Elbridge Colby: That's a great question. I think in general, we want a Europe that is able to take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense, and of course long-range conventional strike is a really important part of the battlefield. You see it in Ukraine. There are obviously strategic stability issues that naturally arise, so I think those can generally be managed.
And I don't want to presume one way or the other. But the Europeans already have long-range strike. There's every reason to think there's a lot of interest in their developing more long-range strike. How you think about concepts of operations, deployment, et cetera, especially because we still are extending our nuclear deterrent - it's not like we're trying to slow their roll. To the contrary. But I think it's just a matter of working through it, and those conversations are already happening. I'm confident those can be managed together.
Michael Froman: All right. Please join me. We're so grateful to have Under Secretary Colby here again at the Council. We really appreciate the engagement, Bridge, and look forward to continuing our dialogue. Thanks very much.
Elbridge Colby: Thanks, Michael. Thank you.