In this interview, Israeli Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhailo Brodsky analyzes the fundamental changes occurring in the Middle East following the start of Israel's war with Hamas and the fall of Bashar Assad's regime in Syria. Key topics of the conversation include: transformation of the regional security architecture, weakening of Iranian influence, prospects for normalization of relations between Israel and Arab countries, particularly with Saudi Arabia, as well as economic opportunities opening up as a result of these changes. Special attention is paid to the situation in the Gaza Strip, the future of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the role of the Kurdish factor. Brodsky also touches on Ukrainian-Israeli relations and the impact of the weakening of Russia's positions in the region on the geopolitical situation.
Yuriy Romanenko: Friends, hello everyone, dear surfers, slackers, beloved deviants. Today we will have an interesting conversation with an interesting guest who has been with us many times before. This is the Ambassador of Israel to Ukraine, Mikhailo Brodsky. Good evening, Mikhailo.
Mikhailo Brodsky: Good evening, Yuriy. Thank you for inviting me.
Yuriy Romanenko: How could I not invite you when over the past three weeks the Middle East has simply become the talk of the town in Ukraine. We have had many outstanding Oriental studies specialists appear. Actually, not without reason, because a fundamental change in the Middle Eastern order has simply occurred. This is reflected in the world order, reflected in Russia's war with Ukraine. And the best reflection of what happened for Israel and for better understanding by our viewers, I think, can be expressed by a quote from Egyptian journalist Usama Saraya, who said the following: "Bashar Assad was the last Arab leader who opposed Egypt's philosophy on resolving the Middle East conflict through concluding peace agreements with Israel. Assad is the last domino, the whole world welcomes Egypt's approach."
Mikhailo Brodsky: The Syrians opposed.
Yuriy Romanenko: The Syrians opposed, yes. And after Egypt signed this peace agreement, essentially a framework one with Israel, Syria found itself at the head of the anti-Egyptian camp in the Arab world, which Iraq joined, Libya, many others. And this was connected with a mass of problems for Egypt. Such an assessment actually demonstrates the fundamental shift that has occurred. Because a year ago, a little over a year ago, there was this terrible tragedy of October 7, then Israel began a military operation in Gaza. And then the war began to drag on, then there was an operation against Hezbollah. And there was this peculiar swing, which is well familiar to Ukrainians. After the first weeks of euphoria, that "we're about to finish them off, these bastards, they'll be defeated now," then it begins... Then people start thinking about how long this is all dragging on, how it affects the economy. And in the summer, I remember, this summer already there and Western press, there on Foreign Affairs articles, and The Washington Post everywhere went theses: well, Netanyahu made a mistake, and the situation for Israel is essentially hopeless, because clearly the war is dragging on against him. And suddenly we see how in literally a few months everything fell into place in such an absolutely unexpected pattern for everyone.
This situation that arose after Bashar Assad's flight for Israel... Can we say that now many projects, many dreams that Israel had, for example, regarding energy, regarding all these gas pipelines that go from Qatar to Europe, regarding the Silk Road from India - this is also one of the important logistics projects - that this can become reality? Or on the contrary, let's say, in the near term this is a brilliant victory for Tel Aviv? But the strikes on Syria that the IDF is now inflicting virtually every day indicate that Israel is not confident that everything has stabilized there in the long term?
Mikhailo Brodsky: We probably need to start with the fact that the Middle East is probably the most seismic zone in the world in terms of political processes. The Middle East has been seething for more than a year, for many years events have been happening there that affect the whole world. And what happened in Syria recently is partly a continuation of the process of the so-called Arab Spring, which began in North Africa, you remember, in Tunisia, in Egypt, and processes also began in Syria itself, which with a 14-year delay concluded with the fall of Assad's regime. Regarding the situation in Syria today, there are more questions than answers. We don't know what Syria will look like tomorrow or in a week. Much less how it will look in a year or five years.
And to recall what happened in Egypt? You remember when there was the revolution at Tahrir Square? In Egypt people came out, everyone talked about democratic transformations, everyone said that Egypt would become a free, liberal, democratic country. In the end, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, and for a certain period established their laws, their orders there, and it ended with a military coup, as a result of which the military came to power and are still in power.
The same events can happen in Syria. Therefore, we don't know who will ultimately come to power in Syria. Syria is a patchwork quilt, very many groupings, many nationalities, there is not... it's not a monolithic society, there are not only Muslims, it's clear that there are Shiites and Sunnis, but besides Shiites and Sunnis there are Christians, there are Alawites, there are Yazidis, there are Kurds, many, many, many more, and they all have their own interests.
And this is only as far as the Syrian population is concerned, and if we take the interests of other countries that are involved in the processes in Syria, these are colossal interests of practically all the major players in the international arena. This is the United States, and France in some sense, this is Russia, this is Israel, this is Saudi Arabia. This is Turkey, undoubtedly, which plays a colossal role and so on. And how all these interests, often contradicting each other, what they will ultimately lead to, no one can say now, it's impossible to say. We'll see.
From Israel's point of view, this process worries us greatly, our neighbors, this is a country with which we have a common border, from which a threat emanated throughout the entire history of Israel's existence, because since 1948 Syria was among those countries that attacked Israel, and we won victory in the framework of the War of Independence. After that we fought with Syria in the Six-Day War of 1967, we fought with Syria, there were very heavy battles on the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Therefore, our history of relations with Syria is a history of unceasing wars and a cold period of cold wars, when there were no military clashes between us, but there were never friendly relations between us and there were no diplomatic relations.
If the new authorities want to, first of all, recognize Israel and want to establish normal relations, we will welcome this. For now, I think that the new authorities have enough problems and enough concerns inside Syria, how to stabilize the situation, because Syrian history is just beginning. It is far from completion today.
Yuriy Romanenko: We see how the new authorities in Syria are not making any sharp statements against Israel. They are not making any statements against Israel at all. Except that when Israel began to strike with air strikes on all these warehouses, on air defense systems, they said that we have no strength now to fight with Israel. In this situation, maybe Israel is rushing. It's clear why it's doing this, in the logic you mentioned. Not understanding what kind of authorities will be established there, possibly it will be some new Islamist regime, possibly it will be a regime loyal to Iran, it's necessary to maximally remove the military potential of Assad's army so that it won't then be used against Israel. But in principle, from the point of view of forming relations with the new government of Syria, this probably also doesn't put them in the best position, because essentially Israel is entering Syrian territory, creating some kind of security corridor there. This raises a mass of questions among many Syrians who, to put it mildly, many are not fans of Israel. This develops conspiratorial stories that Israel stood behind this, including behind Assad's fall. How did this situation catch Israel, how much was Israel inside this scenario?
Mikhailo Brodsky: Israel was definitely not inside, in Israel no one supposed that such a thing could happen. I don't think that even in Turkey, which to a greater extent stands behind what happened, they supposed that this resistance movement would achieve such success and within a few days would take Damascus, that the Syrian army would simply scatter, that Assad would be forced to flee and that there would be such colossal success. I don't think anyone could have predicted that there would be such success.
But indirectly, of course, Israel contributed to the events that occurred, because by weakening Hezbollah, this is the force on which the Syrian regime relied among others, by weakening Iran indirectly, we contributed to the fact that the opposition found the right moment and was able to seize power in Damascus practically without any resistance from the Syrian regime.
But this doesn't mean that we were interested in such a result. We don't yet know how to perceive this new Syrian regime. We knew well what to expect from Assad. Assad the elder - Hafez Assad and Bashar Assad, they were enemies of Israel, but predictable enemies. We knew what to expect. A certain status quo was established on the Golan Heights. And in general, this situation of neither peace nor war, when there was no immediate threat from Syria, no military threat to Israel, but at the same time there were no relations with Syria. It continued for quite a long time, everyone got used to it.
What the situation will be now we don't know, and we cannot risk. We cannot, not knowing the nature of the new regime that has arisen in Syria, we cannot provide it with all the armament that the Assad regime had. And we had to act quickly in order to destroy the military potential of the Syrian army.
As for our actions on the Golan Heights, this is a forced preventive measure that we had to take, because we cannot allow unclear people to come close to our borders, people professing the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism. This is a temporary and forced measure. Israel is not interested in annexing Syrian territory, Israel is interested in protecting its borders, and naturally Israel acts based on the lessons that we learned on October 7.
When we were attacked by Hamas, we understand that we cannot allow anything like this. This time from Syria's side. And if we had not taken such a step, then theoretically elements could have arisen there that would have wanted to do something similar to what Hamas did on October 7.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, here's the news. Our viewers write, Katya Gudyshyn, "Julani called on all branches of Palestinian resistance Hamas to leave Syria."
Mikhailo Brodsky: And if they adhere to this peace-loving moderate course, it's not excluded that we will ultimately have quite normal relations with Syria, the Syrian regime. Because Syria is not our enemy, we have no claims against Syria, and we can quite resolve all the problems that exist between us. But I think that at this stage the Syrian regime will for some time, maybe even quite a long time, still concentrate on stabilizing the situation inside the country, because one thing is to seize power, another thing is to hold power, given the fragmentation and those differences that exist between opposition groups, and there are masses of them there. As I said, each such group has its own interest, and often these interests collide. And how to find a compromise between all these interests, I think this will be the main task for the coming months, if not years.
Yuriy Romanenko: How do you assess Turkey's influence on post-Assad Syria? Because you're right that Turkey played a big role, supporting the new authorities, essentially. But on the other hand, many overestimate Turkey's influence on processes, thinking that Erdogan is pulling strings. This is absolutely not so, because I know that the Turks were absolutely unprepared, like everyone else, they were not prepared in Ankara for such a development of events. And now they are very afraid that there will be some kind of explosive mixture there.
Mikhailo Brodsky: This doesn't mean that Turkey won't try to use the situation in its favor. Naturally, it will try, it's already doing this. But if we look at the short-term perspective, then in the winners, undoubtedly, is Turkey, in the winners is Israel and in the winners are all those who opposed the Shiite "Axis of Evil" - this is Iran and Hezbollah, and everything between them, they used Syrian territory to supply weapons to Hezbollah, all this, I think, will now stop. This is good news for everyone who saw Iran and Hezbollah as enemies, including Israel, definitely for us this is good news. But this is in the short term. What will happen in the long term, I think no one will say today. We'll see how the situation in Syria will develop, because any scenarios are possible there, the situation is unstable, this is a seismic zone, processes continue that we still don't know where they can lead us.
Yuriy Romanenko: Regarding Turkey, it's obvious that Israel has two positions. On one hand, Turkey and Israel compete for a regime to appear in Syria that will be loyal to them. This causes friction, contradictions. We saw that Turkey played in Syria, it has its own position regarding what was and is happening in Gaza, regarding Hamas, and so on. Although this is a public position, not a public one, we know that between Ankara and Israel everything is very good.
Mikhailo Brodsky: You're right, one needs to separate the rhetoric of the Turkish regime and Erdogan, in particular, and the actions of the Turkish regime and their interests. As for actions and interests, our basic interest lies in good relations with Turkey, because we have very many views on many things that coincide. Between Israel and Turkey there are very many common interests both political interests that concern the Middle East, and economic interests.
Mikhailo Brodsky: By the way, an interesting fact, I don't think you know about this. For all those years when Erdogan criticized Israel, very harshly opposed Israel and almost broke diplomatic relations, trade turnover between Israel and Turkey constantly grew. Economy... economy, business works excellently. There are very many coincidences on very many issues. In Turkey itself, far from everyone is happy with this course of Erdogan, Erdogan's anti-Israeli rhetoric. And at the level of businessmen, at the level of elites, at the level of the army and intelligence services we have excellent relations with Turkey to this day, despite everything.
Yuriy Romanenko: You even have cooperation in the defense industry, very much so. So when you talked about this situation breaking this "Shiite axis" that Iran was building, then essentially, another axis can form on the basis of economic interests. First of all, which will connect, essentially, the Southern Mediterranean, starting from Egypt and possibly further, Libya and all other countries that go in a chain, and down there to the south (Gulf countries, Sudan, Ethiopia) through Israel, to Turkey, through Syria and to Europe. That is, all opportunities appear for logistics to appear that never existed...
Mikhailo Brodsky: You're right, absolutely right. And if we also consider that in Trump's first term, the process of these Abraham Accords was begun, the establishment of diplomatic agreements, diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab countries, one can assume that now Trump after he comes to power in the White House on January 20, will resume this process. And on the agenda, of course, the main question for the Middle East is relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Mikhailo Brodsky: This is what we talked about for many years, this is what we practically came close to before October 7, but the events of October 7 postponed this issue aside. Now is the time to return to discussing this issue, because this will really change the Middle East. This connection between Israel and Saudi Arabia, considering that we already have diplomatic relations with the Emirates, with Bahrain, with Egypt, with Jordan and with some North African countries.
Yuriy Romanenko: Morocco.
Mikhailo Brodsky: Morocco, Sudan. All this can radically change the Middle East. And we won't recognize the Middle East in a few years. With a favorable confluence of circumstances in the Middle East, unfortunately, one cannot predict for long and cannot know what will happen, because things often happen unexpectedly, like what happened in Syria, for example.
Yuriy Romanenko: But it's obvious that the key element for launching this process will be the cessation of the war in Gaza. Because the Saudis and not only the Saudis directly make it dependent on the end of the war in Gaza.
Mikhailo Brodsky: I would say, not only the cessation of the war, but a political solution must be found in the situation with Gaza. The war is practically finished in Gaza, all military objectives or almost all military objectives have been achieved. And today, when we are talking... According to press reports, literally within a few days there is a chance that an agreement will be signed on the return of Israeli hostages. For us this is topic number one, for Israeli society topic number one. The return of our hostages. More than 100 hostages remain there. We, unfortunately, don't know how many of them remain alive, but we hope that all of them will return home and some compromise will be reached on the Gaza Strip.
This doesn't mean that the situation there will be completely normalized, after all, the Gaza Strip today after the Israeli operation is in a deplorable state. Israel does not plan to stay there for long, but we understand that for some time we will have to control the situation, and we will together with Arab countries, we will search, and not only with Arab countries, but with the United States, we will search for a political solution to the Gaza Strip issue, because a new government must form there, forces must come that recognize Israel, that will change the course toward destroying Israel and supporting terror and will rebuild the Gaza Strip with the help of the international community and with the help of Israel. In such a case, Israel will be ready to help with all its might so that the Gaza Strip becomes a prosperous place and the potential for this exists. It's just that Hamas used this for completely different purposes.
Yuriy Romanenko: Today a Hamas representative in an interview with The Washington Post said that we have abandoned demands for a complete cessation of war and withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip. We insist that Palestinians be allowed to return to the north of the Gaza Strip. But it's obvious that if this happens, they will again use civilians as cover in order to...
Mikhailo Brodsky: That's the thing, that we know Hamas well, we know well what it's capable of, and we will do everything so that the events of October 7 are not repeated. For this we will have to control at least for some time the north of the Gaza Strip, we must receive guarantees from those who will ultimately control the Gaza Strip that nothing like this will happen. But for this, fundamental changes must occur in the Gaza Strip. This doesn't mean that they will give us promises that we will rely on. No, we will certainly not rely on any promises anymore. We must see that the Gaza Strip is changing substantially. The very nature of the Gaza Strip is changing in terms of ideology, in terms of supporting terror, in terms of education, in terms of new generations of Palestinians who are growing up in the Gaza Strip. Unfortunately, today they grow up in an atmosphere of hatred toward Israel. All this must change.
Yuriy Romanenko: This monstrous blow that Iran received because in fact over the course of a year a number of key elements of its policy in the Middle East crumbled. This factor should stimulate the Saudis and other players in the region, I mean from the Sunni camp, to force Hamas to surrender positions in order to reach a big deal.
Mikhailo Brodsky: This is what is happening today. Hamas has substantially lost its positions in the Gaza Strip. We hope that Hamas will not return to the Gaza Strip. We will not allow a situation where Hamas remains in power in the Gaza Strip, because this is a path to renewing capabilities in terms of terror. This is a path to another October 7. We cannot go for this, this will not happen.
Yuriy Romanenko: Syria, which was left without air defense because the IDF over the past two weeks cleaned all this up, has actually ceased to perform the function of Iran's anti-missile shield. Because just as Israel uses Jordan as cover together with the US, and air defense systems work there, and fighters. Similarly, Syria was used by Iran, and its air defense, and Russian air defense, which was also located there. And is still located. Now a hole has appeared, which in principle weakens Iran's position to protect its facilities already on its own territory, because Iraqi territory is also poorly covered there. And accordingly, does this mean that Israel will try, or it has, I don't know, for a diplomat this is the wrong question, I'll rephrase, that Israel has opportunities to influence the internal situation in Iran. Since Netanyahu in one of his recent messages said that in the near future the people of Iran will be free.
Mikhailo Brodsky: Israel had quite extensive capabilities in Iran anyway, we showed this quite recently when we conducted several counterattacks against Iranian facilities, and no Iranian air defense could prevent us from hitting the facilities that we chose to hit. What will happen further with Iran depends on Iran first of all. We said quite clearly and unambiguously that we will not allow Iran to become a nuclear power. What will Iran do with this message? And today... Especially after Trump's election. I think this is our common message to Iran. A common American-Israeli message to Iran. Iran will not be a nuclear power, whatever happens. Now it depends on Iran. Will they further develop their nuclear program? Will they come close to creating a nuclear bomb? Then any scenarios of events are possible. Or they will understand that this is not profitable for them. They will make concessions on this issue. They will reach an agreement with the West that will ensure that Iran in the foreseeable future will not become a nuclear power. Today the ball is on the Iranian side of the field, so everything depends on them, but all the messages that should have been directed to Iran, they received them, I hope they understood them and perceived them as they really sound, and they sound very serious.
Yuriy Romanenko: What about Hezbollah, what about Lebanon? Essentially, Hezbollah found itself weakened, and its perspective in the context of these events... It also looks hazy, because they need to somehow replenish their armaments and everything else, receive financial resources. And if they are blocked from Syria's side, then accordingly they will be blocked from the sea side. They won't be given the opportunity to receive weapons and everything else. In this regard, a situation arises to also reformat relations with Lebanon, new opportunities for Lebanon.
Mikhailo Brodsky: You're right that these things are interconnected. After what happened with Syria, an opportunity was created for normalization of our relations with Lebanon. Hezbollah is perhaps the only thing that today prevents the establishment of normal relations with Lebanon, because with Lebanon we have no territorial problems. At one time we left southern Lebanon and fulfilled the UN resolution on this issue, we have no territorial disputes with Lebanon. We have no problems with the people of Lebanon. Also, by the way, a complex country ethnically. There are very many religions, peoples and so on that inhabit Lebanon. But we were ready before to conclude an agreement on establishing relations with Lebanon.
Hezbollah held Lebanon as hostages, used Lebanese territory, essentially an Iranian proxy, an Iranian... Pro-Iranian organization that seized the country, put it under its control. Now Lebanon has an opportunity to get rid of Hezbollah or at least get rid of Hezbollah's military potential. Hezbollah today in Lebanon is not only a military organization, it's also a political party that tries to participate in the country's political life. If Hezbollah remains only a political party, I think processes will enter some normal course. If Hezbollah continues to threaten Israel, then accordingly there will be an Israeli response, but recently Hezbollah received a very serious blow, first of all, from Israel. We managed to conduct a whole series of very successful operations, eliminate Hezbollah's leadership. Today there are few willing to stand at the head of Hezbollah, because it's clear that the lifespan of the next leader of Hezbollah is measured in hours or days at best. And the second blow, no less serious, that it received is what happened in Syria. This opportunity to receive weapons, money from Iran without hindrance, this opportunity no longer exists and ultimately this should lead to the disappearance of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization that threatens Israel.
Yuriy Romanenko: We touched on Turkey above. Turkey in the context of Syria is important from the point of view of the Kurdish question, similarly the Kurdish question is important for Israel. Because as soon as Bashar Assad's regime collapsed, information appeared in the press that the Kurds entered into negotiations with Israel. In case the States leave northeastern Syria, there are 900 people located there, then the key problem for the Kurds is that they will remain one on one with Erdogan. And they are very afraid of this, as the press writes, and not only the press, I also know that... Turkey is preparing to go in there, because they also want their buffer zone, they want to solve Kurdish issues for themselves, which have been tormenting them for decades. And in this regard, for Israel it's a window of opportunity, if it can be called that, that in principle the Kurds, who are although not the most numerous ethnicity, approximately 12% in Syria, but very combative and very well armed thanks to US training and the fight against ISIS, they can act as a balancer regardless of what political regime will be established in Syria in the future. Are you right?
Mikhailo Brodsky: Absolutely so. We have had contacts with the Kurds for decades, and these contacts benefit both Israel and the Kurds. Will Israel want to actively participate in what is happening between Turkey and the Kurds? I think not, because this doesn't directly concern our security, we're talking about northern regions of Syria that don't border our borders. We're still more interested in what is happening near our borders, and now that's precisely why we're establishing connections with the Druze, for example, who live on the Golan Heights, both on the Israeli side and the Syrian side. Now the Druze, as far as I saw, turned to Israel with a request to protect them from Islamists who may try to somehow limit them or even begin some aggression toward the Druze. And conversation about this is also being conducted.
Mikhailo Brodsky: As for the Kurds, there really are very many interests there, Americans, Turks. Israel in this case, despite our quite prolonged relations with the Kurds, this is still not problem number one for Israel, because this doesn't concern the security of our border and the security of our citizens.
Yuriy Romanenko: The Kurds are located beyond the Euphrates and at a minimum the Syrian-Iraqi border is now closed, thanks to them. It remains to close the southeastern section through which weapons came, because it was used to transfer weapons from Iran. And then, actually, Israel has a reliable guarantee that weapons will not cross the Syrian border.
Mikhailo Brodsky: You're right, our goal is for weapons to stop coming to Hezbollah, for Iran to stop influencing Syria and stop helping Hezbollah, stop destabilizing the situation. I hope that as a result of all those events that occurred over the past months, we will manage to achieve this.
Yuriy Romanenko: Now let's touch on Russia, because it was one of the beneficiaries in this situation with Assad and actively influenced the situation in the region. I remember how in our first conversation, which was still when Feldman and I were together, you then said that Ukrainians should understand that Israel is a small state, around it the situation is very fragile, and therefore all of Israel's actions are directly connected with this fragility and with the impossibility of disrupting the balance of forces with a sharp movement, which can bring threats to Israel. Two years have passed since this conversation, the fragility has shattered to smithereens and an absolutely different strategic situation has appeared. Can we say that in this situation now Israel can act with less regard for Russia's interests in the region, because they are evaporating now before our eyes, like the naval base in Tartus?
Mikhailo Brodsky: It's clear that Russia is on the losing side from the situation that has developed in Syria. It's clear that Russia's influence on the region will decrease. This concerns both Russia's military presence near Israeli borders on the Golan Heights. This concerns Russia's military presence in the region in general. We don't know what the fate of the base in Khmeimim will be. We don't know what the fate of the base in Tartus of the naval fleet will be, but it's clear that Russia is gradually losing its positions in our region. And naturally these new realities can affect our relations with Russia, our position on the most diverse issues. I don't know, it's difficult to say now, for now, how this will affect, but Israel, naturally, will act in accordance with the new situation and will build its priorities in accordance with the realities that are being created in the Middle East, but it's important to note that the process is not finished, the process is ongoing. And in this situation everyone needs to be careful and not draw too quick conclusions, because the process is still far from completion. What happened in recent weeks is the beginning of the process, not its end. Therefore, one needs to wait until some status quo is established, including in Syria. We still don't know what Syria will look like. What policy it will conduct, what relations it will have with Turkey, with Russia, with the United States, one can only assume, but the process is only at the very beginning.
Yuriy Romanenko: In this context, now a question about Ukraine. We have hot-tempered people and everyone expected that Israel would provide support with weapons, technologies and so on. We understand perfectly well that even if Israel does something, it always does it quietly, and it's better not to say it out loud. This concerns military-technical cooperation with any country. Unfortunately, many in Ukraine don't understand this and are always waiting for public statements that someone is supporting us again or starting to support us. Therefore, I won't ask this question, it would be stupid and I wouldn't get an answer. I'll ask a question about the characterization of our relations, because again, two years ago when we talked, there were some statements from our ambassador, some difficulties arose connected with the fact that Ukraine there supported a resolution that in Israel was interpreted as anti-Israeli, then later Israel there made some decision, in Ukraine they interpreted it accordingly. But... Nevertheless, two years have passed, but some catastrophe in our relations didn't happen. Maybe including thanks to you. How do you characterize these relations in diplomatic language?
Mikhailo Brodsky: We have today quite calm, one can even say, even relations. This is connected with the fact that both countries are occupied with their wars. We are occupied with war in the Middle East, Ukraine is occupied with war with Russia. And much in our relations will depend on how the war ends. Both the war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East. I think everything in our relations will depend on this. For today I want to... By the way, you mentioned military-technical cooperation, but the Ukrainian ambassador in Israel recently said that he is satisfied with the level of military-technical cooperation, and I have nothing to add to this. Therefore, in this issue too, I think the situation, if Ukraine is satisfied, then Israel is all the more satisfied. And in other issues, I think that we will return to more active cooperation when there is clarity both in the Middle East and here.
Yuriy Romanenko: Regarding the prospect of these gas pipelines, oil pipelines from Qatar, from Saudi Arabia, that is, it's obvious that without the situation in Syria stabilizing... the gas field off the coast of Israel and Cyprus, which is already being used, developed and in principle this gas could also go to Europe. Including by land route. Therefore, not only the interests of the Saudis or Qatar are here, but Israeli interests, colossal opportunities can be packaged.
Mikhailo Brodsky: I think for the first time we have approached what our late President Shimon Peres called the new Middle East, when relations will be built exclusively on the basis of benefit and interests, economic interests of countries, and not on the basis of ideology or religious wars. This was his such great dream, which shattered against reality at that time. Today we, possibly, one needs to say this with a caveat, because we don't know how these processes will end, but possibly, if everything goes in a positive vein and all our hopes for changes are justified, we will be able to extract economic potential, because the Middle East is an extremely important region that connects many other regions, continents. If peace is established there and there is stability, then of course economic benefits can be extracted for centuries after this. This is both in terms of energy, and in terms of trade, in financial terms. And look how trade and economic relations in general between Israel and the United Arab Emirates have increased since we concluded an agreement on establishing diplomatic relations. Several times mutually beneficial trade, Israelis massively come to Dubai, various projects, investments, investments in technologies and so on. All this can affect the entire Middle East, first of all Saudi Arabia, with colossal resources in financial terms, with colossal land resources, with colossal needs in terms of infrastructure, technology and so on. This is practically unlimited potential that we will be able to start using if the situation stabilizes and those changes occur that we're talking about.
Yuriy Romanenko: Good. I think we'll finish with this. We had a quick, dynamic and excellent dialogue. Mikhailo Brodsky was with us. I suggest everyone subscribe to his Telegram channel. In my Telegram in the description of the broadcast I gave a link, subscribe. In the description of the broadcast on my YouTube channel there will also be a link. Therefore, everyone who is interested in the Middle East and our relations with Israel, here... you're welcome and not only I think not only these topics, because Mikhailo is a versatile and interesting person. Thank you for coming.