Former Ukrainian Ambassador to Japan and Turkey Serhiy Korsunskyy, in a broadcast with Yuriy Romanenko, analyzes the rapidly shifting landscape in the Middle East following the death of Ali Khamenei and the launch of a major military operation against Iran. Korsunskyy explains why the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps began firing chaotically in every direction - from Cyprus to Nakhchivan - and how this paradoxically helps forge the broadest possible anti-Iranian coalition. In his assessment, the ideal scenario is regime change in Iran within two months, driven by internal opposition - primarily Kurdish formations - with the backing of US and Israeli intelligence. A separate segment of the conversation focuses on the window of opportunity for Ukraine: the US has already requested Ukrainian anti-drone systems, and Zelensky has offered to send specialists. Korsunskyy sees this as a tremendous chance to build authority and obtain Patriot systems in exchange for Ukraine's unique drone-fighting experience. But he warns: this must be done under intelligence cover to prevent the technology from leaking to Russia. The bulk of the broadcast is a deep dive into Turkey: from the fundamental pillars of its policy (NATO, the Bosphorus, Crimean Tatars) to personal stories from diplomatic practice. Korsunskyy recounts Dugin's presence on the eve of the 2016 coup attempt, how Erdogan is willing to return the S-400s for F-35s, and why Turks "hate Russians at the DNA level." A separate topic is the complete collapse of Russia's and China's image as allies: Beijing said nothing, the weapons turned out to be useless, and Global South countries are seriously rethinking the reliability of a Chinese umbrella.
The Middle East on Fire
Yuriy Romanenko: Friends, hi everyone! Surfers, slackers, our beloved deviants. We're doing a daytime broadcast today, because this broadcast is with Serhiy Korsunskyy, our diplomat, former Ukrainian Ambassador to Japan, former Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey, former head of the Diplomatic Academy. In short, a man with enormous credentials, experience, and wisdom. And two weeks ago, when we did a good overview of global political processes, we promised to do a broadcast on Turkey, because Mr. Korsunskyy was there for a long time, served as ambassador, and knows the country extremely well. And there's obviously plenty to discuss, given Turkey's influence on the region, on us, and its generally high role in the global system.
I was thinking we'd just have a calm conversation, as I'd planned. But events in Iran simply catalyzed everything. And Turkey is directly relevant here too, because Iran managed to fire rockets in every direction, including toward Turkey, and this morning several drones hit Nakhchivan in the direction of Azerbaijan, injuring four people. And the key thing is that this Azerbaijani case makes every observer ask: why? Because Aliyev was one of the first neighbors to express condolences over the death of Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader. Iran was just this morning upset that Kazakhstan hadn't done the same. Azerbaijan did. Aliyev played it quite skillfully, said there would be no problems from their side. But now it looks like there will be problems from the Arabs, the Turks, the Azerbaijanis. And I suspect from other neighbors too, because Iran is doing everything to quickly forge a motley coalition against itself. So today we'll talk about Turkey, of course. But we'll also talk about all these developments, because they have a direct bearing on all of us. Just look at the currency exchanges, look at the gas stations - prices are going up and the dollar exchange rate jumped again. So the coming weeks will be interesting. Serhiy, good evening. It's evening for you, daytime for us.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Good afternoon, greetings.
Yuriy Romanenko: So how do you see all this "splendor," in quotes, that's energized absolutely everyone? Spain, I see, is already sending a frigate to Cyprus to protect Cyprus, because apparently Trump's scolding was enough, and France is sending ships. Everyone's scrambling. As a character in a classic Ukrainian satire put it: "I marvel, I love it when everything burns, blazes, and people scramble." It seems to me that Trump is now in the role of that guy, swinging a nuclear club and tossing matches in every direction.
Fighting Fire with Fire
Serhiy Korsunskyy: You know, first of all, it really is all very interesting. An association immediately came to mind when I saw the picture unfolding. And it became clear that this isn't just about Iran and that it will have very serious consequences for countries far from Iran. The association that came to me was: fighting fire with fire. You want to stop a war - why not start another one? And that's what we're observing today. After all, there isn't just one war in the Middle East. We're talking about Iran. But today there's Israel's ground operation against Lebanon. They've finally decided to finish off Hezbollah. And I understand them completely. I wasn't just ambassador to Turkey. My first posting was in Israel, and I know what the Golan Heights look like, and I can picture what the border of northern Israel with Lebanon and Syria looks like. So I understand the problem and how many times the Israelis have tried to solve it. I think now they've decided to see it through, and a ground operation is underway. Plus we know that Pakistan and Afghanistan have entered into hostilities. That's another interesting development. It has less impact on global matters, but still, it turns out that the Middle East, which is a zone of strategic interests for the US and China, among others, is truly engulfed in flames. If this fire can be channeled in the right direction and results achieved quickly enough - I mean one to two months, roughly that timeframe - then that's one story. If it drags on and turns into another Iraqi campaign, then of course that would be a completely different story. Many factors are at play here. And the biggest blunder that could have been made was that decentralized IRGC units scattered across Iran began firing at their own discretion in every direction. By doing this, they attacked in every direction and provoked negative reactions from literally every country, including, for example, Britain, which isn't even participating in any of this. Why was it necessary to attack their base on Cyprus? Nobody can explain it. The Iranians themselves certainly can't. Just as it's unclear what frigates and aircraft carriers from France and Spain will be doing there. There's no need for that, as I understand it. But the fact remains - a coalition is forming, and this coalition will apparently be very, very broad.
Yuriy Romanenko: So here's a question from our viewer. How do you see the baseline scenario, or several baseline scenarios, for the potential of the Iranian conflict? That's from Oleksandr Chekmarev. Given that this is acquiring a broader coalition than initially expected - Israel and the United States. Well, thanks to the Iranians firing in every direction, the number of involuntary participants is growing very fast. Azerbaijan just said - one of their parliament members said, "You see, dear Azerbaijanis, we told you not to sympathize too much with the Iranian people, because bombs can start falling on us too." So now they've got a problem with Azerbaijan as well.
The Ideal Scenario: Regime Change from Within
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Oh, you know, yes. Well, Azerbaijan is a special case. If I'm not mistaken, Northern Iran is actually called Southern Azerbaijan.
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: So there's a huge number of Azerbaijanis living in Iran. And by the way, they don't particularly love their northern sovereign, so to speak, their historical homeland. They actually have a rather negative attitude toward the regime in Baku, toward the government that's been in Baku for many years now, as far as I know. But that's not the point. The scenario. From my perspective, the ideal scenario is a change of power, a change of regime that should happen as a result of internal... Well, ideally it wouldn't be a civil war, because that means civilian casualties and a drawn-out process. But the fact that it will be an internal coup based on some form of armed action is most likely inevitable. Because the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, if I remember the figure correctly, numbers around three hundred thousand people. That's like the army in Japan, you know. It's a very large force, they're very well armed, well trained, and they - their affiliated units, street thugs who collaborated with them - they were the ones who participated in suppressing all the uprisings, in shooting demonstrators. Ultimately, they were the pillar of the regime. This was a country - the Islamic Republic of Iran - where two armies existed simultaneously: one official regular army and this Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And when their leadership was decapitated, they dispersed to bases across the country. And there's information, confirmed by many sources - I didn't know about this, for example, but I've genuinely seen and listened to many different opinions from various countries, and everyone unanimously says that it was the will of the now-deceased leader that after the previous attacks during the twelve-day war, they decided to grant individual unit commanders the right to act independently without central command, without a central command mechanism. Whereas the regular army has a succession system - if someone is killed or can't give orders. The IRGC has a different approach. And what we're seeing, I believe, is exactly the result of that.
So today, weapons are being received by the Kurds - Iraqi Kurds, Iranian Kurds, Syrian Kurds, there are many of them. Other groups are also receiving weapons - groups that existed there because Iran was home to ethnic groups that were far from happy under the regime. They also have units - small in number, but they exist - which, if armed, would be ready to at least control the situation in some parts of the country. And the task of these ground-based, so to speak, partisan formations will be the elimination of pockets of resistance on the ground. Otherwise nothing will happen. As we know from our own experience, no matter how many drones fly or how much air superiority you have, it all comes down to people having to walk into the palace, throw out everything that was there, and install some form of government. So the bet will most likely be placed not on a ground operation by the American military itself - I can barely imagine that, although Trump said he doesn't rule it out - but rather on these proxy forces. And right now - I'm absolutely certain of this; I obviously can't know it for sure, but you don't need a crystal ball to understand it - all intelligence resources of both Israel and the US are working to ensure these formations, first, receive weapons, and second, have the ability to act. And the task set for them will of course be to seize power on the ground. And that would be the ideal scenario. The goal of this entire operation is regime change. In Venezuela, they managed to do it simply by extracting one person and seriously intimidating everyone else, and that led to a change of power. But in Iran, the situation is completely different. If this were simply civilian government, then okay, it could probably be achieved in principle. But this is religious fanaticism, and fanaticism of absolutely cosmic proportions. The Shia and those who followed the teachings emanating from Tehran exist in many countries. You can see it in the protests happening in some countries. That's a fact. They live there, Shia live in these countries. And this religious fanaticism creates complications when changing civilian power. So this is still a factor of uncertainty. But these two months I'm talking about - that's exactly what they're needed for.
What's happening now - with forces from not just the US and Israel, but as far as I know Qatar is already using its aviation for this, and other countries will likely join too - is the suppression of launch sites for drones and missiles. That will continue, but it can't go on indefinitely. And then ground forces need to simply carry out regime change, and the state that was built on the ideological platform of orthodox Islam of the kind that crossed directly into terrorism must simply become a normal secular state. And the process of democratic development should proceed along a completely different path. That, I believe, would be the ideal scenario and forecast for the coming months.
Yuriy Romanenko: Iran, by the way, denies involvement in the strike on Azerbaijan. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibabadi denied Iran's involvement in the drone incident near the international airport in Nakhchivan. "Iran does not strike neighboring countries. This incident requires thorough investigation," the diplomat stated in an interview with Azerbaijani channel Anews. Well, I-
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Yes, and Russia also hits hospitals. We know that.
The Kurdish Factor and Turkey's Anxieties
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes. This whole thing feels like deja vu. When you observe it and the arguments being used - just total deja vu. Regarding the Kurds, because I'm also seeing the Kurdish topic come up more and more. Yesterday in the broadcast I said I've been reading Iranian Telegram, and there were already reports as of the day before yesterday - overnight from the day before to yesterday - that the IRGC was already trying to move into Kurdish cities in western Iran and clear out the peshmerga - this Kurdish armed militia - clearing cities. So some kind of process has started. The Kurdish issue will obviously become very serious not just for Iran. Because if the Americans and Israelis are betting on this creeping Kurdish insurgency launched with their help, then the probability that it turns into a civil war along the Syrian scenario - where internal and external players are all intertwined, every formation bets on its own external sponsor, and it all becomes a mad cauldron that simmered from 2011 - increases considerably. In that respect, I think it raises the chances if things go along this "ground operation" scenario, in quotes. And then I think Turkey will have very serious reasons to take this very seriously too, because they only just extinguished Kurdish autonomy in Syria, and now this is essentially flaring up on an even larger scale, directly concerning them. Because the regions border each other - Kurdish populations in Eastern Anatolia on their side and Kurdish regions in western Iran - and they'll need to deal with this somehow. So Turkey will very likely be deeply involved in all of this. What do you think?
Serhiy Korsunskyy: This is the problem of problems for Turkey. For many years, more than forty years, Kurds waged armed struggle and terrorism against Turkey. It's a very old story. Everyone probably knows the name Ocalan - the leader who was arrested and is serving a life sentence on some island in an unimaginable prison. And this all continued. I visited the eastern part of Turkey more than once, on the border with Syria. There are several cities - Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa - these are very famous, very ancient cities. For context, in case anyone doesn't know: in Sanliurfa, for example, there's a place considered to be the abode of the Prophet Abraham himself. Well, the Israelis obviously dispute this, to put it mildly, but this is the level we're talking about - the Tigris and Euphrates, Mesopotamia, the source of all world civilization, not just regional. And the Kurds are there. They're there because once upon a time there was a state of Kurdistan that was divided between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. And ever since, the Kurds have dreamed of its restoration. During the Iraq campaign - that was the first attempt; during the Syrian campaign - that was the second.
But right now I don't think there will be another attempt, because just before all these events, the Kurdistan Workers' Party laid down its arms and is ceasing its struggle against Turkey. It's hard for me to judge because I'm no longer in the country. You need to understand the details. But this was perceived by everyone who understands Turkey well as a major victory for Erdogan. Because I was in Ankara when very terrible things happened there - I saw them with my own eyes - when a bombing was organized at a bus stop in the center of the city, at a spot where there's a small bus terminal right in the center of Ankara. There was a horrific explosion, and many people died. Then there was an attack on Ataturk Airport in Istanbul. These were all visible factors. And the Kurds even speak their own language. It's not Turkish. So this was all a very complex situation.
Now, the fact that Iranian Kurds will receive weapons - I don't think this is likely to spill over into Turkey. Although the Turks will certainly react to this very anxiously. Absolutely. I also want to remind you that I think our audience hasn't forgotten Primakov. And the fact that Mr. Primakov personally participated in encouraging Kurdish militant formations in the mountains on the border with Iraq and supplying them with weapons. They were born with a Kalashnikov and died with a Kalashnikov. Fighting against the accursed NATO in the form of Turkey - the Russians had been doing this since God knows when. So there's nothing surprising in the attitude Turks have toward them. But in this case, I think the CIA also had quite a time there in roughly the same vein, just trying to bend these formations to their own ends. Ultimately, this isn't very important now, because after the end of the Syrian campaign and the fight against ISIS and so on - it's less relevant. What matters now is that these Kurds have considerable fighting spirit and experience. And if the peshmerga - these armed Kurdish formations - get down to business, they can certainly pose serious competition to the Revolutionary Guards.
And the fact that Turkey will react nervously to this - there's no doubt about it. But I think in the current situation, Turkey will not try to participate in this. When Khamenei was killed, Erdogan expressed the sentiment that it was somehow wrong. I think, you know, when you pull on one thread, a whole tangle comes with it. Because if Iran ceases to be an Islamic Republic and transforms normally into ordinary Persia, they'll immediately reconcile with Israel, as was always the case. Jews lived in Persia and felt perfectly fine. And the Crown Prince of Iran has already stated that as soon as he can, if he can lead Iran even for a short period, one of his first steps will be to recognize the State of Israel. Turkey, as we know, has been in a serious feud with Israel for many years now - fifteen, if not sixteen, because this started around 2009-2010 - over the Palestinians. So this is also a development that doesn't quite suit Erdogan. Everything is linked, like gears in a mechanism that has long been set to spin in different directions.
So the question now is whether there's another way to organize ground resistance. You're not just going to walk the streets of Iran handing out weapons to anyone. That's physically impossible under current conditions. You need formations, at least some organization. Who has it? As I said, the Kurds, plus one or two other national, localized groups that can organize more or less meaningful armed units that will take up weapons and resist the IRGC. That's the story.
A Window of Opportunity for Ukraine
Yuriy Romanenko: And it looks like an unexpected window of opportunity has opened for us, because Zelensky already said he'd send specialists. And this morning information came in that the US has requested our anti-drone systems, the ones we use against Shaheds. And by and large, I think if Ukraine plays its cards right, it can substantially - compared to what we had before - build up its influence and authority. Because they're all in shock over there right now. And if we simply come to their aid with anti-drone systems, with electronic warfare and counter-EW specialists, the East receives that very warmly. That's what I think.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: You know, you have no doubt that we've been telling them this for all four years of the war. And not just these countries. We told everyone in Asia too and explained that this would come, that this would happen. But they didn't listen. I myself know that three years ago the Japanese would shrug when I told them that North Korea would soon get drones, and that together with South Korea they'd have a very hard time dealing with them, because they have absolutely no idea what to do with them other than shoot down this pathetic moped with an entire Patriot missile. They treated this very calmly. Now they're no longer calm about it, I assure you. They're also thinking very hard about what to do. So in the Middle East, this inertia is even greater - an unshakeable belief that all the very expensive weapons they'd bought in vast quantities would save them. As it turns out, they won't, because when a drone comes - and there are three hundred of them - you need three hundred Patriots, and you might only have a hundred. You see? So now they'll genuinely be very interested in getting information from us. For us, this is absolutely a colossal opportunity. It would mean a tremendous boost to our authority and the future ability to obtain resources we desperately need to improve our technology and produce more powerful systems. There's just one critical thing - I'm obviously not a military man, let alone an intelligence officer, but just from common sense - it should be said: all of this must be done under appropriate intelligence cover so that our technology and know-how don't leak to Russia.
Because that's the worst thing that could happen - if, while helping third countries, we reveal our most advanced defense systems, and this causes indescribable joy in Moscow. That's a serious problem that, among everything else, needs to be handled appropriately, as I'm saying. We need to be absolutely certain that what we provide will be used for the purposes our partners intend. In exchange for future support, or even right now, as President Zelensky correctly said, in exchange for Patriots. That is: we give you anti-drone systems we can produce, and in exchange we get Patriots we cannot produce. Because we need to defend against Kinzhals and all the other Russian filth. So of course there's an incredible opportunity here, but it needs to be approached wisely and carefully. Because, let's say, people who've been to the Emirates report that there are quite a few Russians there, to put it mildly. Russians who aren't exactly poor guys and who are connected to the military-industrial complex. Everything must be done wisely. And then, absolutely, we can rise very significantly. I see a huge opportunity if everyone finally understands that these mopeds are not some invention of ours or our inability to deal with them, but a genuinely cheap and deadly weapon that demands a universal countermeasure. It will of course be found. The question is doing it with minimal casualties. That's what we need to work on. And Arab resources would obviously be enormously valuable for this.
Yuriy Romanenko: By the way, the Washington Post has reported that the administration has reached out to Kurdish leaders in Iran and Iraq asking them to support efforts to weaken the Iranian government. Trump offered air support and told Kurdish leaders they need to choose a side - the US and Israel, or Iran. And American officials are exploring the possibility of an alliance with Iran's internal opposition as the conflict with Tehran escalates and Washington considers deeper military involvement. So bit by bit...
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Obviously. Of course.
Asia's Reaction: Japan, Oil, and Patriots
Yuriy Romanenko: I have a question about Asia's reaction to all this. Because Japan, in particular - well, China, we discussed yesterday that they were buying up virtually all of Iran's oil, and now they've been cut off from Iranian oil, cut off from Venezuelan oil. Although they still get some, but shipments have significantly decreased. Now, against the backdrop of all this turmoil in the Gulf, this morning there was news that the Americans landed a contingent in Nigeria, where oil is produced. And Nigeria is one of the largest oil producers in West Africa, and globally it's not in last place either. So maneuvers are beginning there too, probably to secure supply chains. But in any case, Asia is critically dependent on oil and gas shipments from the Gulf, because Japan, if I remember correctly, received liquefied gas from Qatar. And Qatar has now stopped all LNG processing after the drone strikes, so everything has halted. How has Japan reacted to this situation overall, and how do they see this conflict and their role in it?
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Well, look, the question is broader than just Japan. The Japanese, by their fundamental worldview, are people of order. They would absolutely prefer to see decisions from organizations like the UN Security Council. They'd want to see some negotiation process, some legal mechanism for resolving any problems. But in the current situation, you don't get to choose, because it's already happening. Japan, this was officially stated in the press, has oil reserves for two hundred and fifty-four days. That's more than China; if I'm not mistaken, it's just about the largest reserve among all countries in the region. This makes sense, because Japan's economy is massive and requires resources. And of course, these are islands. They have no domestic production, so supplies can be cut off.
But at the same time, liquefied gas is a very serious problem, because you can't stockpile it. Storing one billion cubic meters of gas costs one billion dollars. So this is a very serious matter. And the fact that Qatar is experiencing difficulties - I'm not sure they've stopped deliveries for long, because they don't supply just Japan; they're the world's largest supplier. But there's also American LNG. The distance is of course great, but I think the Americans will help the Japanese. I think this issue will now gain momentum - how to survive.
For now, I can tell you that the population is somewhat energized, because a rise in electricity prices is fairly expected - they're already high in Japan, but this could happen. Literally around the nineteenth or twentieth, Prime Minister Takaichi will visit the US. It's not being canceled. And we'll see how that goes. This is important because Japan is one of the few countries that produces Patriot missiles under US license. They could ramp up production, though not very quickly, because previously Japan couldn't export, and even now it hasn't fully made that decision. But the gates are slowly opening, with creaking and great effort, but they're opening - the gates to weapons exports. I know for an absolute fact that the quantity Japan produced was exclusively for the needs of the Self-Defense Forces - only enough to replace those fired during exercises or replace expired systems. They can scale up, and this presents no problems whatsoever for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries or Kawasaki Heavy Industries. But for that you need a market and a mechanism - you need the licensor's permission. So I think this topic will also be discussed. Possibly it's already being discussed; I just don't know.
But today I saw a report that the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates is in Japan. I thought to myself: now why would he come so urgently? It's unlikely this was planned far in advance. I suspect they're interested in certain products that the Japanese can manufacture. So there's no panic here - as I've rarely seen panic here - but concern, absolutely. Because now you need to clearly understand where you're getting your gas, where you're getting your oil. Incidentally, I want to mention this because it's an important factor. For as many years as I served in this country as ambassador, I heard complaints about LNG from Sakhalin. I always explained that the Japanese don't actually pay for it. It's a return on investment. Yes, there are tax payments, but the Japanese received special permission after sanctions were imposed and the war began - they received special permission from the US. You know why? Because the Middle Eastern LNG contracts that could have replaced Russian gas were given to Europe. That is, they get nine percent of their LNG from Sakhalin. And now you can see how important that is for them. And you can see how important it is to have a diversified portfolio of critical resource supplies. Japan has such a diversified portfolio. It's a very wise energy policy that we could only dream of in our time, when we were dependent on the Russian needle. And I, along with many other Ukrainian experts, spoke, wrote, and urged the government to diversify supplies. And only when the war started did we finally begin getting gas from Europe. All of this could have been done much earlier if not for Firtash and the whole crew. But that's ancient history.
So Japan has diversification, but clearly there will now be a fight for resources. Everyone who's seriously worried about the possibility of the Strait being blocked, about prices rising because British insurance companies have started jacking up rates - these problems will arise, and it will be competition among very strong and wealthy players. Everyone who's counting on their energy balance with reserves needs to look at what's being done and how. The Japanese seem to understand what needs to be done. What the Chinese will do is hard to say, because Xi Jinping is dead silent. He has the National People's Congress, another round of military purges, and waiting for Trump's visit against the backdrop of this Middle Eastern spectacular. So everyone's busy.
The Collapse of Russia's and China's Image
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, they're essentially - both Russia and China - they're sort of allies of Iran, but sort of not. Yesterday I watched how they interpreted this on Solovyov's show. Solovyov says: "No no, they're not an ally, we have a partnership but they're not an ally." But now this situation should compel them to sign an alliance. One of their so-called experts said: "Let them send the IRGC, tens of thousands of them, to the so-called "special military operation," and then we'll start providing the assistance they want." But it all looks pathetic, frankly. And here's what I actually wanted to ask you, through the prism of your experience working in Turkey, since it's also part of the Middle East. How are these kinds of image failures generally perceived? Because in the East, the concept of honor is treated very seriously. And here it turns out that, on one hand, Russia was puffing up its feathers - friends with Assad, friends with Maduro, friends with Khamenei, supplying weapons, everything. But so far it all follows the same pattern - allies getting picked off like chickens in a henhouse.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Well, when Solovyov and company discuss all this, it wouldn't hurt to remind them of a few facts. Iran is a member of BRICS and a member of the SCO, at minimum. And it was dragged in there - China pulling one ear, Russia pulling the other. It received full membership just before these current events. Back in 2021, China signed a twenty-five-year agreement with Iran worth four hundred billion dollars in investment, let me remind you. And Russia signed an agreement with Iran - I just don't remember whether it was 2024 or 2025, I think 2024 - they signed something very close to what they signed with North Korea. But with North Korea it's a full military alliance. With Iran they didn't create a military alliance; there are no such obligations. But there were very strict obligations for mutual assistance and support. Considering that Russia is at war and Iran was under immense pressure from the wicked West. So all their excuses and dodges about not being able to or not wanting to help - that's complete nonsense for domestic consumption. Certainly, their image... Well, Russia's image - there's nothing left to say. It's been lost long ago. But as for China, the other countries of the Global South that were considering sitting under a Chinese umbrella, switching from the American one to the Chinese one - they're seriously reconsidering now. First, the weapons, as it turns out, are useless - first time in Venezuela, now in Iran. Second, they saw that, excuse me, Xi Jinping didn't even say anything. It was at the level of the foreign minister. He called on the phone, expressed concern, and told Iran not to block the Strait of Hormuz. I understand China, but it's hard to gauge the feelings of Iran's now-deceased leaders. The IRGC, of course, very much promised to block the strait. I think neither the Chinese nor the Americans will let them do it. Their interests align on this point. But the image damage is truly done.
Turkey: NATO, the Bosphorus, and Crimea
As for Turkey and its position - you see, you have to understand that there are fundamental things in Turkey you cannot change. And the fundamental things are as follows: first, this is a country that controls the Bosphorus. Second, it's a NATO country, and that's a key factor for Turkey's security. And it's deeply invested in not letting the Black Sea become a Russian sea. That's why it has always supported Ukraine's NATO membership and will continue to support it to the last drop of blood. They'd be thrilled if Georgia joined NATO too, because unfortunately neither of our countries has a full-fledged navy. Although I understand we're working on it. But the fact that this is a positive factor for Turkey in terms of the security of its northern borders is a fact. Turks remember seventeen lost wars, but they also understand that there's Crimea, and you can't do anything about that. Crimea must be part of Ukraine, it must be the land of the Crimean Tatars, who in Turkey are called Crimean Turks. And this cannot be changed. So Erdogan has always built his position like this: we quarrel but don't break off relations with the EU. We have a customs union with them, it's an enormous market and investment source. We develop relations with everyone we can reach. Incidentally, including with Japan - they have a special relationship with Japan, with Toyota's investments, car production, and so on. And by the way, the biggest Japanese companies from the top five all have investments in the largest Turkish construction companies, and through them they participate in construction projects, including in Ukraine, including in Russia, and other countries. That's a fact.
But they've always pursued this flexible policy. You remember the incident when a plane crossed into their airspace, they shot it down, we all cheered. But afterwards Turkey apologized, because Russia imposed very harsh sanctions against Turkey, and they eventually made peace. But I'll tell you this: deep down, deep at the DNA level, they hate Russia, they hate Russians, and they deeply despise them, because they see them in Antalya. There isn't a single hotel in Turkey whose manager hasn't told me that they pray for Ukrainian tourists - who are reasonable, calm, family-oriented, they rest, they don't steal toilet paper. And what they told me about the Russians - you can imagine. Theft, alcohol, falling from the fifth floor of these hotels, ordering room service at midnight after a sauna with binge drinking. It's the same story in every hotel. So they understand everything perfectly. But geopolitics is such that they can't afford to push things with Russia to the point of escalation and going to war. They believe in acting through indirect means. Incidentally, the situation around the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict was one such test, just as Syria was a test before that - where on one hand they were sort of involved alongside Iran and Russia in Syrian affairs, but without merging into any alliances, without forming any joint units, and so on.
And Turkey has always tried to navigate. That's its strength. You can feel however you want about Erdogan, but the fact that he's a born politician and that he can conduct this kind of navigation, whether anyone likes it or not, is a fact. And right now for them - if not for this harsh turn of events, the resolution of the Karabakh issue, getting everything sorted with Azerbaijan, it looked like they were ready to begin normalizing relations with Armenia. That's very important for Turkey. And as you understand, that's very bad for Russia, because for as long as this empire has existed, it has looked at the Caucasus as a critical region. You know they did everything to prevent the Karabakh problem from being resolved, invaded Georgia, leveled Chechnya. This is all connected. And the fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan have now sort of broken away and are allowing themselves to pursue a tougher policy - that's a fact. And of course Russia doesn't like it. If Georgia would finally change its pro-Russian government too, that would also be great. But we'll wait. Let's recall the Transcaucasian Republic - 1922. The RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasian Republic created the Soviet Union. So this delusional dream lives in Putin's head, you see? He can't put two thoughts together. He has one thought - to restore the empire whose disappearance was a terrible tragedy. That's why Turkey is by far the strongest player in the Caucasus and in the world in general.
The Caucasus and the Turkic World
There's also the Organization of Turkic States, its headquarters is in Ankara. Just look at the list. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan. And all of this, as you understand, means the Silk Road, energy resources, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Blue Stream, TurkStream. Turkey has been moving very actively in this direction and continues to do so. But at the same time, it built a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu with the Russians. Well, that's the kind of policy - very multilateral, I'd say.
Turkey Between the US and Europe
Yuriy Romanenko: Look, how do Turks view other great powers - the US and Europe? Because, for instance, regarding the United States, they have this strange, dual position. On one hand, I've traveled extensively in Turkey and talked to ordinary people and elites. Among ordinary people, you can often encounter antipathy toward the United States. On the other hand, at the elite level, there's a clear understanding that America can be both a serious threat to Turkey and a very important strategic ally. And we see how, over the past twenty years, maybe more, Erdogan has had these swings with the Americans. Tensions with the Democrats, then when Khashoggi was killed - the journalist in Istanbul - there were tensions over Saudi Arabia. Certain tensions over the Gulenists, whose leader lived in Pennsylvania for a long time. And Erdogan was constantly-
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Fethullah Gulen.
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes, Fethullah Gulen. Also a very interesting figure, by the way, because he's a vivid example of how you can build a serious organization from scratch - with its own universities, its own schools, its own influence in the army - and over several decades raise essentially its own elite that had enormous influence on the country's processes and tried to seize power in 2016. I'm curious how you saw this from the inside?
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Well, you know, you're absolutely right, because I arrived in Turkey to work in 2008, and at that moment Turkey was euphoric about doors opening to the European Union. In 2005, they became a candidate country, they began preparing to open chapters, actually opened several, and negotiations began on actual EU membership. At the same time, of course, the EU was making all sorts of demands on Turkey regarding certain political confrontations with the opposition and various other aspects.
But then the quarrel happened when they were denied a visa-free regime. We got it then, but the Turks were denied. And they were deeply offended. Then the Turks wanted to revise the customs union, because the customs union in its current form benefits the EU but not Turkey. But the Turks wanted to revise it, the EU refused. Long story short, they had a very serious falling out over this. And then political processes began that led to Erdogan, who was initially prime minister, becoming president and changing the constitution. He brought back a lot from the Ottoman Empire and various other traditions that, to put it mildly, deviated from the European path. In short, they had a falling out.
In parallel, when the coup happened - and even before that - they had a serious falling out with the Americans for roughly the same reason, because the United States treated Turkey, on one hand, as an important and very serious partner. And I can say with absolute certainty that they tried, really tried to maintain a working relationship with Turkey. But it all kept coming back to Incirlik, to the military base, to the operation against Iraq. And then, this constant presence, constant disputes about it. The Syrian border, Kurdish formations. They knew the CIA, just like the FSB, was working with the Kurds. In short, all these stories seriously irritated the Turkish leadership.
And when the so-called coup attempt happened - that's a separate story, it needs to be discussed at length separately. And Fethullah Gulen, who, according to the official version, was seriously ill. He'd had a green card since 1999 and lived in Pennsylvania. The Turks demanded his extradition. The Americans said they wouldn't extradite him, but he's now deceased. But alongside all this, when the coup attempt actually happened in 2016, the official version is that the first person to call Erdogan was Putin. Which isn't true, because we were first. But that's beside the point. They believe, however, that - and the European Union, this is true, the European Union waited an entire day before issuing some kind of statement. And approximately the same happened with the Americans. Erdogan was deeply offended and said it was wrong.
But at the same time, unfortunately, the Turkish leadership didn't take into account the fact that the day before the coup - literally, since the coup took place on a Friday evening - the day before, Dugin was in Istanbul and Ankara. And Dugin was giving speeches, and he came to Turkey as a special envoy of Putin. And what Dugin was doing there and the fact that he left Ankara literally hours before all these tragic events began - these are absolutely established facts. And yet, for some reason, this wasn't perceived as a reason to look at Russia's position instead. But it deeply influenced Erdogan's worldview.
The S-400, F-35, and the Turn Back to NATO
And after this coup attempt, he purchased the S-400. This is a very important fact. To us it seems - so what, an S-400. But the point is that the S-400 is designed to combat American aircraft, not Russian ones. Ideally, Turkey should be getting weapons aimed against Russian aircraft, because they're NATO's enemy, not American ones. But Erdogan feared his own pilots more, because this all started when F-15s began flying over Ankara - which yours truly observed with my own eyes. I saw it firsthand, sitting on a balcony. It was late evening, ten o'clock. And I simply saw them... And after that, considering all factors, Turkey announced it was purchasing the S-400 to be deployed around Ankara for protection from whom? That's the question.
Meanwhile, Turkey had been negotiating with the US for many years to become the largest F-35 maintenance hub. First, they'd get the aircraft, and second, they'd become the world's largest maintenance facility for all F-35s. Can you imagine how much the country's role would grow, what a technological leap it would make in aviation - something Erdogan had dreamed about for a long time. He dreamed that Turkey would produce its own aircraft, and this was all in line with that. And then the S-400 appeared. The Americans said that if you have the S-400, we can't give you F-35s, because if the S-400 radar captures - this is called a signature - if it captures how the F-35 flies, what it looks like on radar, then after that all S-400 radars in Russia would know what an F-35 looks like on radar. And they were against that. I remember this discussion very well; it was even debated openly. And ultimately the US denied Turkey participation in the F-35 program.
After that, as you can imagine, a very complicated period began, with Erdogan speaking very badly about the US. The United States tried to regulate things somehow; nothing worked. It's a very long story. But just about a month ago, I suddenly saw a report that pleasantly surprised me. Erdogan told Russia he's ready to sell the S-400 back. Take them back, because we want F-35s. This means things are finally starting to move. Everything is clear now. There's no need to shoot down F-15s over Ankara, and the S-400s purchased for two or four billion, some insane contract amount, can be returned to Russia, and Turkey can return to a normal NATO trajectory. Although Turkey never suspended its membership and was always a very consistent supporter of alliance relations.
The EU Ambassador Scandal
I'm going into this detail for a reason. You have to understand that there are actually many such nuances. I remember, for example, a story - maybe someone will find this interesting too, since you mentioned the European Union. At one point, an EU representative was appointed - like an ambassador, except they're called the EU representative - who was German. Before him there was a Frenchman, after him an Italian, but this one was German. And this German came from very powerful German circles. That's not without reason, because three million Turks live in Germany, and it's a very important part of Germany. So his role was larger than just - well, there was a German ambassador, obviously. But this EU representative was also a very important figure. And this EU ambassador, in some interview, about a year after he arrived - so he hadn't been there very long - he said a phrase something like: "We have a saying: 'You start a job like a German and finish it like a Turk.'" I still can't understand what this saying means, but when it appeared in the press, it was like an earthquake measuring eleven on the scale. Erdogan demanded he be recalled, and he was recalled. He said: you've insulted the Turkish nation. I don't know with what. I don't understand the meaning. Seriously. But the fact that in the diplomatic world - the fact of recalling the EU ambassador from a candidate country, a German no less, with connections - it looked terrible. But it happened, because Turkey's role is important, nobody wants to pick a fight with them. It's a huge productive force, a strong army. And at the same time, everyone assessed it as an unfortunate, simply unfortunate slip. Because it's unlikely - I was acquainted with this diplomat, he's an intelligent person. We spoke after it became known about the terrible scandal. He said: "I didn't even have the thought of insulting the Turks. I said it in a completely different sense." But in Turkey, such things are not forgiven, and they're very sensitive to things like this when they come from places they don't expect.
Well, these are several stories that give you the picture: Turkey occupies a position where it knows its strength, knows its importance, and has very actively used it for many years. Attracting investments, producing important products. And when the need arose, it actively participated in Syria. Because this is the kind of country that has many faces, and you can't say which one will come into play in any given situation. Under Erdogan, Turkey changed dramatically. And Turkey's economy right now, as far as I know - I'm no longer following it in detail - but regarding the lira, there are difficulties, I understand. But Turkey remains a critically important country, a partner that nobody can ignore. That's a fact. I don't know a country that can simply say: "You know, I'm not interested in relations with Turkey." They have great influence, and they're listened to. So they remain a very interesting, unique, I'd say, case of a state that used one hundred and fifty percent of its geopolitical position and capabilities to maintain a certain security - economic and actual.
Dugin and the 2016 Coup
Yuriy Romanenko: By the way, about Dugin - since you mentioned him. About Dugin, I was told an interesting piece of information in Ankara by one of the diplomats. He said that Dugin came then, on the eve of the coup, and brought a dossier from Russian intelligence on the coup preparations. And essentially this folder was leaked to Erdogan and used to preempt the consequences of the planned coup. And a situation emerged like Hegel described: I know that you know that I know. The Gulenists understood that Erdogan already knew something and was preparing countermeasures. They began to rush. Erdogan knew about the preparations, they knew he already knew. And so there was this rush, where essentially the mid-level army officers were involved, but the top generals barely participated in the coup. And accordingly, the uprising was contained. Take it for what it's worth.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: The version is very close to reality. Except that it wasn't Dugin who brought the folder a day before or on the same day - it happened much earlier. There are indeed grounds to believe that the Russians poured fuel on the fire regarding certain processes happening in Turkey's domestic politics. The question is... There's a theory, also close to reality, which says that the Gulenist coup plot was a fabrication. In fact, nobody who knows even a little about the situation in Turkey at that time can understand why Gulen would have needed to stage a coup. The fact is, he himself couldn't have used it in any way. And his organization didn't have such political goals. It was a structure, as you correctly said, based on education. And the resources they had were directed toward creating a different Turkish elite - more modern, more European, let's say. And that had its consequences. So the truth is that they were provoked. It's entirely possible that the Russians did this. But not when Dugin arrived. My impression is that Dugin came to observe the results. Because he was first in Istanbul, where politicians welcomed him enthusiastically, then he came to Ankara, where politicians also received him. Which seemed very strange - because who is he? But newspapers wrote: this is Putin's closest advisor, although formally he was no advisor to Putin at that time. And then what happened, happened. You're right - half the army revolted, half didn't. As a result, it was all turned into something of a circus.
The Multi-Layered Nature of Turkish Politics
Yuriy Romanenko: You know, there's another point I think we need to explain to our viewers, because our society is, let's say, often hysterical in its reactions, very emotional, responding to external appearances. Like, say, Erdogan kissed Putin - and that's it. He's an enemy, Turkey is leaving us, practically a geopolitical alliance. Then the opposite happens, Erdogan kisses someone else. And this applies to any other politician or figure. It seems to me that you've articulated it well: a country situated at the crossroads of two continents leverages its position to the fullest extent, a hundred percent. They've always done this absolutely brilliantly.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Exactly.
Yuriy Romanenko: Turks are, in reality - I call them the Germany of the Middle East. Turkey is a foundational element in the Middle East, one of the foundational elements. Because they're better than others at organizing their economy, organizing the state. And that's why throughout their long history they were absolutely not an accident. So this multi-layered nature of their foreign policy - it seems to me that in Ukraine, people really don't understand it. Turkey is never about selling out to someone, but first and foremost about its own interests and selling its own assets.
The Erdogan Phenomenon: Promised and Delivered
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Absolutely, they're very interested in being involved in all strategic projects in the region, including those related to energy infrastructure, transport infrastructure. And let me tell you, I witnessed it - it was truly a spectacular sight. I remember elections, I just don't remember if it was 2013 or something like that, when there were the next elections and Erdogan was traveling all over the country. And I remember his speech before a million-strong, enormous crowd in Istanbul, where he said: "I'm a very humble person, I'm from a poor family" - which is true. "I'm ready to serve wherever the people of Turkey want. I absolutely don't seek power, but if you entrust me to be your leader again, you will get five hundred billion in investment. You will get the world's biggest new airport. You will get a bridge over the Bosphorus, you will get a bridge over Izmit Bay" - which, by the way, the Japanese built for them. "You will get a hundred thousand kilometers of railways. You will get Turkish aircraft and rockets that will fly by the centennial of the Republic. You will see a completely new Turkey." And when he says this - he's brilliantly skilled at articulating it - and when he speaks, Turks literally cry, because they genuinely want all of this.
And what do you think? Practically all of it became reality. He built a gigantic airport. He built a third bridge. He built a bridge over Izmit Bay. He didn't build a hundred thousand kilometers of railways, but he built thousands. But the highways are excellent, and the infrastructure, and a nuclear power plant - okay, with the Russians, but he built it. You see, he demonstrates that when a politician makes promises, he delivers. And you can't take that away from him, no matter what. Well, the rockets haven't flown yet - no big deal, there were objective circumstances. The aircraft aren't quite there yet, but they will be.
His ability to capitalize on things... Someone else would think: do we need another hub? Germany has world-class hub airports, they're all right here nearby. But he had no doubts whatsoever. When he built himself a palace - there was the old palace in Cankaya, from Ataturk's time, a palace is a palace, it was old. But Erdogan built a seven hundred and fifty million dollar enormous presidential complex. The palace has a very Turkish architectural style, with Ottoman motifs, but without gold, no excessive chandeliers. But it's a huge structure, very modernly equipped. And when the opposition started criticizing him for it, he simply went before the people again and said: "Wait, why are you criticizing me? You say this is Erdogan's palace? Absolutely not. This is the palace of the President of Turkey. Do you not want Turkey to be respected? Don't you understand how great our country is? Why should the palace where Turkey's president resides look like a three-story building from World War I? Why can't we afford to build a beautiful complex?" And it really is beautiful, you can't argue with that. "Which will serve all presidents of Turkey." What can you say? That's it, all discussion is over.
And this skill of his - when people complained, and I witnessed this too - there were very serious public discussions because he decided to raise excise taxes on fuel - gasoline and diesel - and on cigarettes. And the people started grumbling, of course, because Turks smoke, and on cars. Erdogan was criticized again, articles were written, he gathered another rally, came out and said: "Wait, so who do you want me to support? Those who drive Range Rovers with three-liter engines, or the ordinary Turk who drives a manual with a 1.6-liter engine? Please, sell all your enormous cars that consume insane amounts of gasoline. Buy modest, Turkish-made Renaults or Toyotas, and everything will be fine. They're very economical, modern. And quit smoking, because it's bad for your health." He came out and said that. How can you argue with it? That's all. He didn't discuss anything else. He simply came out, gave a speech. And as you understand, I'm condensing and concentrating his words, but that was the gist. And that's it. That's Erdogan, that's Turkey - you can't rule out protests. He imprisoned many people, many well-known people left the country - businessmen and journalists. All of that exists. But Turkey didn't change its character.
I remember once he noticed that a minister - one of his ministers, actually a decent minister, the trade minister - was wearing a watch that, as journalists wrote, cost thirty thousand dollars. By our standards, I gather that's quite an average price. He was out of the government the next day.
Yuriy Romanenko: Of course. Why irritate people? Why irritate people? Just once.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Right? Wait, you have nothing better to do than show off a watch? Well, show it, but only in retirement.
Yuriy Romanenko: You know, there's another aspect too, which I also - talking to Turks there - even the corruption, they made it, this Justice and Development Party, they made it beneficial in the sense that millions of people participated in it. Millions. In the sense that this pyramid they built - the distribution of contracts, all of that. Maybe even tens of millions participated, because it determined the stability of his support base. It was genuinely profitable for many, because a region is developing, contracts are flowing at the local level, their own firms, and someone's brother... He knew how to share. He shared so much that it created extensive patron-client relationships. And as a result, the entire country ended up encompassed by this construction boom.
Because I was also in Turkey. When I first came in 2008, like you, I came during the war, I went straight to the east, to the Kurdish part. And what you were talking about - well, I didn't quite reach Diyarbakir, but I was in Erzurum, Van, Kars, around Tatvan, Mus, Varto - that area, the northeast.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: The north, yes, that's the north.
Yuriy Romanenko: The northeast, yes. Northeast and also Trabzon, the Black Sea province. And when I came back later - the changes were so dramatic, in infrastructure, in everything, in air routes. I remember flying from Antalya to Istanbul, and what simply amazed me - there were something like twenty flights just to Istanbul from Antalya. And secondly, what simply amazed me was that it was like an ordinary bus or commuter train. People sit down, open their newspapers, an hour later close their newspapers. And it felt like riding from Troeshchyna to downtown Kyiv. That's how routine and well-organized it all was.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Turkish Airlines - this was state policy: they should fly to every country, every country that has at least one airport. And they told me at Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the policy was this: if some Turkish businessman went to some African country, even a small one, doesn't matter, and started some business there, then practically the next ones to fly there were Turkish Airlines. And they really had an insane fleet. They made such massive aircraft purchases that everyone was chasing them. And these were the newest, most modern planes. And by the way, I want to mention, few people know this, that civil aviation institutes that train civilian pilots - it's us and Turkey. They have Anadolu University, which has an enormous school for professional civilian pilots. So their pilots are good pilots, and they really do continue to fly all over the world. They truly built this machine.
You're absolutely right. Same with Istanbul-Ankara. When people asked why there's no railway, they say: why? You sit down, you don't need anything. Sit down - one hour of flight, you're in Ankara; one hour of flight, you're in Istanbul. Comfortable, calm. The airports are in a good network, no problems getting to the city center. Well, the new airport is farther out, but I don't know about domestic flights because domestic flights used to fly right from inside Istanbul, with airports within city limits. You're absolutely right. That's how it was - year after year they moved forward. And you can see it; you literally see it with your own eyes. They built housing at such speed. Ankara is a five-million-person city in the mountains that had water problems. But they laid three thousand kilometers of pipeline - three thousand kilometers, you understand - from the mountains, to get water to Ankara because there was a problem.
Then, something I really liked around Ankara - few people know this either, because tourists usually don't go there. The ring road - every Kyivan's dream since Princess Olga, to have a ring road. So there, the ring road is four lanes in each direction. When I arrived in 2008, they told me that the master plan for the city had been approved about twenty years ago. And this ring road is the city limit, beyond which it won't expand. But you know what was done when this road was being built? Simultaneously, all the necessary conduits were laid for future cables, future pipes, future sewage. The city plan was approved right away and the infrastructure was built right away. So you don't need to tear up this road again to bury pipes. Everything's already there.
Yuriy Romanenko: Brilliant!
Serhiy Korsunskyy: All these conduits are there, and then - bam - a residential complex gets built at incredible speed. Because you understand that the most important thing is what? You need water, sewage, electricity, and then people can live. They did all of this very fast because the plan was approved twenty years earlier. Well, it's scary to say these words in the city of Kyiv, you understand.
Turkish Airlines and the Turkish Miracle
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes. And this is all of modern Turkey in a nutshell. When you come to Ankara's industrial park, which I think started developing in 1979, and you drive through this industrial park and realize that in this one park alone there's probably all of Ukraine's remaining industry.
Small Business, Turkish Style
Serhiy Korsunskyy: A lot of stuff, a lot, yes. In this regard, you're right: in Islamic tradition, you can't lend money at interest. It's haram. A bank is supposedly supposed to issue credit, but receiving interest is supposedly not allowed - so other mechanisms have been invented for people to earn from their resources. But let me tell you, small enterprise, for example - nobody lays a finger on it. On one Ankara street near the embassy - well, the old building, because the guys have moved now - on one street, every residential building has some small business on the ground floor: a tea house, a barbershop, a pharmacy, then another barbershop. There can be twenty barbershops on one street, because it's a small enterprise. And since we were acquainted with these Turks - they speak English - we asked. I said: "When were you last inspected by the tax authorities?" He didn't even understand my question. I said: "When were the fire inspectors last here?" "What fire inspectors?" he says. I said: "Well, you've got the wrong transformer, the wiring's wrong, the wrong phase in the outlet." He just laughs. He says: "Are you crazy? What are you talking about? We hired a company, they did everything. We don't know anything about it now. My job is to cut hair and earn my twenty liras per client. As for all that - there are specialists, and they handle it." I'm sitting there thinking: how strange, it turns out small businesses can exist without anyone bothering them, you know? And why? Because in the Islamic understanding of life, a man must work. Whether as a janitor, a barber, an engineer, or the head of a corporation - he must work and feed his family, so interfering with his work is wrong.
Aliyev Responds to Iran
Yuriy Romanenko: Okay. While we've been talking, the latest news: Iran has committed a terrorist act against the Azerbaijani state. "Our armed forces have been given appropriate instructions in connection with the Iranian drone strikes," President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev stated. So the Iranians have poured more fuel on the fire.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: The Turkish-trained Azerbaijani army is about to show them what it's made of. It's actually very well trained. Tens of thousands of Azerbaijani officers underwent training. I saw all of this. And let me tell you - don't underestimate the Azerbaijani army.
Yuriy Romanenko: Absolutely. All right, we'll keep our finger on the pulse, as they say. Thank you for another magnificent broadcast. Serhiy Korsunskyy was with us.
Serhiy Korsunskyy: Thank you.
Yuriy Romanenko: I always enjoy reading your posts. I'll share a link to Serhiy's Facebook. He periodically posts interesting information there. And until next time, as they say. Have a good evening.
That's it, friends, thank you so much for watching.