Geopolitical analyst Peter Zeihan, known for his sharp demographic forecasts and blunt assessments of world leaders, gave an extensive interview to the Superpowers podcast on the eve of the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zeihan explained why Russia will fight to its last conscript, called Trump's special envoy "a slobbering moron who gets spoon-fed propaganda," and outlined a scenario in which the Kremlin's export revenues could collapse within months. During the recording, breaking news arrived: the US Supreme Court struck down Trump's global tariffs - and Zeihan explained live why it won't change a thing.
James Heappey is a former UK Minister for the Armed Forces and host of the Superpowers podcast on The Trump Report. Peter Zeihan is an American geopolitical analyst and author of several books on global geopolitics, specializing in demographics, energy, and trade.
The War in Ukraine: Another Five or Six Years?
James Heappey: It's a few days before the fourth anniversary of this latest phase of the war in Ukraine. So can we start by thinking ahead one year: on the fifth anniversary, will we be talking about an ongoing war or a war that is over? And if so, what sort of peace will exist?
Peter Zeihan: Let me preface this by saying that all of us, including myself, who saw this war as inevitable, made our predictions before it began - and we were all wrong. And then we adjusted two or three times since then, and we've all been wrong since. We're dealing with a geopolitical environment with a changing Europe and a changing United States. At the same time, we're dealing with a technological revolution in what warfare means. So keep that in mind.
That said, yeah, we're definitely going to be in more or less this situation in one year. The big things in movement right now are the American withdrawal from the system, which means the financial and military weight has to be carried by the Europeans. But that has been the case for pretty much all of calendar year 2025. If the Americans just said "hands off" and stood back - we've already been there for 10 months. So I don't think that's going to move the needle very much.
The other thing is, the degree of military innovation here is just immense. As we've seen in just the last several days, the Russians have lost all communications along their entire front line, which has allowed the Ukrainians to go on the offensive. This is a very dynamic environment where whenever there is a change, the Ukrainians generally have the upper hand. They just don't have the people to take advantage of that. So that argues for a very dynamic, yet static front.
James Heappey: I don't think a peace is particularly imminent either. I just can't see the Russians offering in peace talks the sort of terms the Ukrainians would be remotely interested in, and vice versa. But here's my question: for all the speed at which the Ukrainians pick up the technological opportunity - and I agree with that - does Russia's numerical superiority ultimately mean that whatever the Ukrainians do, the Russians are going to keep on coming?
Peter Zeihan: For the Russians, this is an existential conflict every bit as much as it is for the Ukrainians, just with a slightly longer time horizon. Russia has been invaded dozens of times in its history, and the corridor where invasion has always been most likely is through either the Baltic Sea or the North European Plain - which takes you right through Ukraine. From the Russian point of view, in the post-Soviet world, they need to get back to some version of that western periphery they had under Stalin, Brezhnev, and the rest. It has always been about that. It will continue to always be about that.
So from the Russian point of view, any meaningful peace now means they paid the price of a major war but got none of the benefits. This was always going to happen. This was always going to happen about right now. And it was always going to be the last great war that Russia fought. They will push until they run out of men. Based on the Russian birth rate, that's about another five or six years.
The Economics of War and the Shadow Fleet
James Heappey: That's striking. And you don't worry about their financial capacity reaching an end sooner? We've heard some quite bold predictions about just how fragile the Russian economy is and that Putin's got about a year to win it or end it. I'm always skeptical about that sort of prediction - it just feels a little bit optimistic.
Peter Zeihan: It would take a fairly dramatic shift in both the internal and external environments in Russia for that to happen. I don't want to rule it out, because so much of the hardware now comes direct from China. We're in a conflict where 80% of the casualties are drone-driven, and the Russians have zero ability to manufacture their own drones. If their export income were to go to zero, they'd have to use entirely domestic capacity to raise hard currency to pay the Chinese for drone production. And that may generate enough internal dissent to break the system.
But for the Russians, again, this is existential. The idea that the people must suffer for the survival of the country is not that far a reach for the Putin government.
James Heappey: Is there any scenario - let's set aside Trump's political will for a second, though that's quite a big thing to set aside - where the United States has the leverage to end the war?
Peter Zeihan: Not directly. But what we've seen with the Trump administration in the last few days, as part of the post-Venezuelan shadow fleet cleanup, is the United States has now snagged eight vessels. And it looks like other countries are getting in on the act. The French grabbed one temporarily, though they released it. The Indians have grabbed three - which is a real shock.
If the shadow fleet is dismantled - which would only take two to three months with the Europeans on board, easier said than done - then the Russians would lose three-quarters of their export income in a very short period. Then we're talking about a very different economic reality. To continue the war, Russia would have to redirect funding from other sources, which generates all kinds of internal stress. But unless and until the shadow fleet is removed, there's more than enough capital coming into Moscow to keep going at the current rate for a long time.
James Heappey: So the bottom line is, it's not a military contribution to the Ukrainians, nor a sustained diplomatic effort. It's actually an economic challenge to Russia - through sanctions and through an attack on the channels of illicit finance?
Peter Zeihan: Barring a new breakthrough in military technology, which doesn't appear imminent - yes, probably. The only other thing I'd point out is that throughout the Biden administration, one country would pick one weapons system supposedly over the red line, ship it to the Ukrainians, and see how the Russians react. When the Russians didn't nuke London, Paris, or Washington, everyone else followed suit. We did that 35 times, gradually getting more and more advanced stuff into Ukraine.
Now in the United States, we've reached the point where we've depleted all the weapons systems we had in storage. All that's left are the systems we actually use. Any further escalation of weapons transfers means training the Ukrainians on systems we're actively using today. These aren't ATACMS from 1980s stockpiles anymore. And I don't see how a country that needs every person on the front can train people on those systems on a short turnaround in a way that makes any meaningful difference.
So from an innovation point of view, the ball is in the Ukrainians' court. From a financial point of view, it's up to the Europeans. And for all of us, it's a question of how to get the next incremental shipment of shells, artillery, or drones in on time. That doesn't argue for any breakthroughs.
Europe: New Weapons Instead of Old Ones
James Heappey: The US and European positions are subtly different on sharing from the current warfighting inventory. The US regards China as the pacing threat, so anything it gives up is unavailable against China. But for the Europeans, Russia is the pacing threat. A number of experts, including the former UK Chief of the Defence Staff, have eloquently argued: you can hold on to your warfighting inventory, or you can give it to the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainians will degrade that threat for you. The risk is worth taking. But the unity and urgency the international community once had hasn't been there for two years now. Could the Europeans, should they, get back in the game - not just funding, but actively handing over from their own inventories?
Peter Zeihan: Unlike the United States, which has been spending more than 4% of GDP on defense for quite some time, the Europeans haven't. The volume simply isn't there. We've taken 30 years of discontinued inventory and bit by bit handed it over. We're running out. In Europe, that inventory never existed. After 1992, most European countries simply stopped spending on defense in any meaningful way: they slimmed down personnel, stopped acquisitions. Everything they have is 30 years old. Only now are they starting to spin up defense production lines.
But here's the thing: the defense capabilities that existed 10, 20, 30 years ago, even if they could spin them back up, have already been proven inappropriate for this type of war. And the most fascinating thing I'm seeing is a turning of the page in Germany in particular. They've finally realized that history isn't over, military force isn't irrelevant, and they need to ramp up production. But they know that things like Leopard tanks or the Eurofighter are just not the right tool.
So the Germans are working with the Ukrainians on mass-producing drones. Rheinmetall - the company that has been a headache for American automakers for decades - is now retooling most of its facilities for military tech that didn't exist five years ago. There's a very real scenario here: many European countries are beginning to produce military equipment far more appropriate for their strategic needs than anything they've bought from the United States since the Cold War.
Trump, Witkoff, and Chaos in the White House
James Heappey: Let's talk about Trump's patience. We've seen his quiet meeting with Zelensky at St. Peter's Basilica [at Pope Francis's funeral in April 2025]. We've seen the red carpet for Putin in Alaska [the Anchorage summit, August 2025]. Trump has been on the bus, off the bus almost weekly. He's inescapably the key player. How much longer does Trump stay interested?
Peter Zeihan: I'd argue there is no international community. You've got the Russians, the Chinese, the Europeans, and the Americans - those four blocs determine everything that matters in this conflict. Anything beyond that is window dressing, as we've seen over and over these last four years. The burden is with the Europeans, perhaps with some assistance from the Americans. The US is still providing targeting information and intel - that's important, and it's not something you develop quickly.
But to your specific question: when analyzing what comes out of the White House, you have to consider three factors. First: Trump is mercurial. He's easily convinced and easily unconvinced. He has a conversation with one person, and it changes his entire position. Sometimes he doesn't talk to anyone - he just changes his mind. Incredibly mercurial.
Second: Steve Witkoff - the man Donald Trump has entrusted with foreign affairs, especially thorny negotiations. Steve Witkoff is a slobbering moron who knows nothing about the world and is proud of that fact. When Witkoff conducts negotiations, his counterparts basically pour propaganda in his mouth. He goes back to the White House, vomits it out on the table, and that becomes policy. Because Trump doesn't bother to verify. He doesn't trust US foreign policy institutions - the ones he hasn't already gutted.
Third factor: who's with Witkoff. When he's accompanied by Jared Kushner [Trump's son-in-law, informal advisor] or Marco Rubio [Secretary of State and National Security Advisor] - that's different. There's someone with a brain in the room, and the President gets a more balanced picture. Almost every knee-jerk response from Trump can be traced back to Witkoff being alone with foreign counterparts. Right now - I don't want to jinx it - it seems Witkoff isn't being allowed to travel alone, and we've seen much more sanity in American policy at the top in recent months. I'm not promising that will last.
Munich: Rubio Instead of Vance
James Heappey: I was in Munich last weekend for the Security Conference. Everyone went with some trepidation. But Marco Rubio came instead of the Vice President, who traditionally speaks for the US there. The content was no different - US foreign policy remained the same. But Rubio clearly made an effort to be friendlier than Vance had been a year earlier. I thought the administration consciously chose to send Rubio to, if not rebuild bridges, at least smooth things over. Rubio is smart, more worldly. He holds dual roles as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. What's his relationship with Witkoff?
Peter Zeihan: Let's be clear: Steve Witkoff is liked and respected by no one except the President himself. He's a friend of the President, brought in from the outside. Trump distrusts the State Department and the National Security Council because in his first term, they kept trying to explain why his crazy ideas wouldn't work. Coming in the second time, he fired everyone who might have an opinion about anything they'd trained their whole lives to study.
The top of both institutions has been purged. Rubio was brought in for the optics. For the first eight to ten months of the second term, Rubio was on the outs. Trump made him Secretary of State, gave him the NSC - and then kicked him out of the White House. Rubio couldn't get a meeting with the President.
So we had people like Witkoff, who is simply dumb, and Vance - let's call it what it is - a white nationalist. Vance has ideology, the only lens through which he views the world. And Witkoff, who was just dumb. That was the only input Donald Trump was getting, aside from Tulsi Gabbard, who is basically a Russian plant. No wonder the White House was producing crazy policies.
Trump kept looking stupid, being played by everyone. Finally, it took the First Lady - Melania Trump - to point out to the President: "You're just being played, again and again." Then he brought Rubio back in when Rubio pitched the Venezuela idea - that appealed to Trump. And suddenly Rubio was back in the room after months of being shut out.
We're seeing a strange culture clash and internal infighting at the very top, with no middle layer doing the actual work underneath. Lots of drama in the press and inside the White House, not much real work at the mid-levels, but the entire military machine keeps functioning. Hence the wild swings. And if you're in Europe, used to consensus-based decision-making, it must be incredibly discombobulating.
Senators in Munich: Hope or a Last Gasp?
James Heappey: Another observation from Munich: the record-sized congressional delegation, especially the Senate. Twenty-five senators planned to come - not all made it, but still, a quarter or a fifth of the US Senate crossed the Atlantic for a European security conference. With one or two MAGA exceptions, it was a real bipartisan initiative to reassure the world that America hasn't completely abandoned its superpower responsibilities. Many reminded us of the Senate's role in foreign policy and its war-making powers. Am I being too optimistic?
Peter Zeihan: You're trying to have it both ways, and I totally understand where you're coming from. It's not that I disagree, it's just... Okay. Foreign policy in America is a presidential prerogative. Full stop. Military use for the first 90 days is a presidential prerogative. Full stop. No exceptions.
For example, we're currently building up military force against Iran. If Trump decides to pull the trigger, he's got three months to do whatever he wants. There's the War Powers Act, passed after Vietnam, by which Congress can intervene and stop the President from using military force beyond 90 days. It was passed by overriding a veto 40 years ago, and every administration since has rejected its constitutionality but chosen to abide by it - except this one, which just rejects it outright.
The only way to resolve this is a two-thirds congressional vote to force the President's hand, or a referral to the Supreme Court. But the Republican Party is now a cult of personality. It controls both chambers, and that confrontation hasn't happened. So when senators come to Munich, keep in mind: Congress has chosen to sit this out. And by "this," I mean everything.
There's enough MAGA support to easily block any two-thirds opposition vote. With every election, MAGA gets stronger in Congress and traditional Republicans get weaker. They're already a minority in their own party. And the Democrats are so chaotic they can't do anything beyond reflexive opposition.
What you saw in Munich was the last gasp of old-school Republicans who had run the party since the Cold War started. They really turned up for the Greenland situation, for example - thank God, because that would have been the end of America's entire global position overnight. Someone managed to convince Trump it was a truly wretched idea. But who knows what comes next.
James Heappey: Depressing to hear. I came home much more hopeful than I flew out. But if what I actually saw was a bit of window dressing from the White House - Rubio instead of Vance - and otherwise just a vanquished rump of the Republican Party hankering for a bygone era... that's deeply depressing. And I couldn't find consensus among the Democrats either - just the conviction that everything Trump does is insane and embarrassing. But when you ask, "What would a Democratic foreign policy look like? Would it bring transatlantic re-engagement?" - there's no answer. Their priority is domestic politics and winning back Rust Belt voters, and their trade policy isn't all that different from Trump's.
Peter Zeihan: Not even a little bit. The bipartisan consensus that shaped American foreign policy during the Cold War and the containment era - it's not gone, it was just never adapted for the post-Cold War world. We've had seven elections in a row where the more populist candidate won - including the transition from Trump 1 to Biden to Trump 2. The two Trump administrations are very different.
Until the parties reconsolidate into a new form - and they will in time - there won't be meaningful foreign policy debate in my country. Which means whoever happens to be at the top can make decisions with very few restrictions. Love Donald Trump or hate him, you can't deny that he is the most consequential president in modern history, because for the first time in a century, foreign policy is made by one person. There's barely even input, much less checks.
Iran: Strategic Surrender or Bombardment
James Heappey: And he's about to start a war with Iran?
Peter Zeihan: Trump is mercurial, who knows. But it does look like we're going to be bombing Iran within a couple of weeks. The amount of force being moved into the region is for a prolonged campaign. The Trump administration is demanding things from the Iranian government that amount to strategic surrender: no missiles that can reach Israel, no uranium enrichment of any type, and no funding for paramilitary groups across the region.
This is Iran's strategic policy. If they agree, they knowingly condemn themselves to being a backwater satrapy. In defense of Trump - I don't say this often - this has been the US position going back to the Ayatollah. The idea that those three things must go. From Iran's point of view, they can't go. So we're finally reaching the point where someone is willing to call the other to the carpet and have a throwdown.
James Heappey: The US public supported Trump's "no more wars, bring the boys home" message. And now Trump is arguably about to start the most dangerous of America's Middle Eastern wars in 20-30 years. It can't play well domestically.
Peter Zeihan: Depends on how long it lasts. Remember, last year the US military was deployed to the Red Sea against the Houthis. We discovered that going after people living like rats in tunnels with a Navy isn't the right tool. Trump gave the military 30 days. When time was up, he just declared victory and went home. Something similar could happen.
But the Iranians are not rats in tunnels. They have developed infrastructure. There's a lot you can hit to throw them back 50 years. Will it solve the problem? No. Will it end Iranian meddling in its neighbors' affairs? No. Will it destroy the nuclear program? No. But the devastation would be immense.
Before September 11, 2001, it was always safe for the American President to bomb something in the Middle East - there'd be no blowback. The mistake was that the more chaos you create, the more fringe groups like al-Qaeda can form. They throw Hail Marys, and it only takes one to hit. That's what happened on 9/11. America has a habit of forgetting. It appears we're back in the 1950s, starting this cycle all over again. It doesn't matter to us until that Hail Mary hits. And it probably won't during this administration.
James Heappey: Iran has the capacity to really hit US strategic interests in the region. Through its network of proxies. I can't see this just being a bombing campaign after which Trump goes home and declares victory. The Iranians will push back. That said, I agree: it's been a long time coming, and it's about time someone did something about an Iranian regime that has deliberately sought to destabilize the region for decades. But it would be naive to think this can be done from aircraft carriers while the Iranians just swallow it.
Peter Zeihan: They absolutely won't. Let's look at what they can do. If they go after US military bases - yes, there are some, but far fewer than before. The bases aren't about projecting ground forces anymore, like during the Iraq occupation. They're smaller, more consolidated, far easier to defend. You're talking about a few missiles cooking off. And for every missile that cooks off, the US will retaliate by hitting 60 targets. That's about the ratio.
Second - energy. The US is now the world's largest exporter of refined products. We export more gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel than Iran has ever produced in crude. If this turns into a real fight, one of the first targets will be Kharg Island - Iran's only oil export point. An island in the Persian Gulf, not even connected to the mainland by a bridge. The US could take it out in five minutes today. And then Iran's foreign export earnings drop by 90% in a day and never recover.
Without that cash, Iran can't maintain its militias across the Middle East. It's not that they'd lose the ability to meddle - they'd lose the ability to bribe politicians, get weapons into the right hands, keep ammunition and Shahed drones flowing. Everything that undergirds the Iranian position requires money. And the countries most likely to help Iran are Russia, which needs every bullet in Ukraine, and China, which isn't going to get into a contest with the US in the Persian Gulf when it can't even get a ship there.
That leaves the nuclear program. It's been hardened, dispersed. An air campaign can't end it. But if you hit every technical university - and remember, this is a very different administration with a very different view of human life - you can set Iran's technological base back to the 1940s in a couple of months.
Japanese Debt and the Chinese Bomb
James Heappey: You've been writing about Japan and Canada. Tell me about the Japanese debt crisis and your hypothesis that it could go global.
Peter Zeihan: Let's start with the reasons not to panic. Japan's debt, including pension arrears and local debt, is now over 500% of GDP. Usually, like during the Euro crisis, we freak out at 90%. Japan has been past that for decades. But almost all their debt is domestically held. When they decide to address it, they just wave a wand and it all goes away in a day. That's a political question, not a financial one.
What's strange is that Japan has been running deficits of 7-10% of GDP every year for 35 years. And somehow people are starting to think Japanese government bonds are a good investment - which is absurd. Now this is spreading to the wider world, just as the global baby boomer generation in the developed world has retired. The biggest tax-paying class in history has become a tax-consuming class in every major country. Everyone's on a Japanese-style debt binge that won't stop until something breaks.
Everyone else is allowing the Japanese system to become a fuse for their own debt bombs. This links us all together in ways none of us signed up for 70 years ago. I'm more concerned than I used to be, because it's no longer an isolated case. It's in everyone's system. The United States is doing its part, of course: budget deficits mean we're adding over a trillion dollars a year to the debt - and that figure is rising fast under this administration.
James Heappey: And China? Does the Chinese economy look similarly fragile? China does own a lot of other countries' sovereign debt.
Peter Zeihan: It does. But getting data on China is increasingly difficult. They've essentially executed their way through their statistical system - very little comes out anymore. And the people who need data are saying, "Well, there's no bad data, so everything must be fine." Good lord.
The debt buildup in China between 2019 and 2023 exceeded what Britain accumulated at the height of World War II. As of 2023 - the last time the data made any sense - corporate debt was around 300% of GDP. In China, the line between local, federal, and corporate debt is blurry - these are state-led fascist systems. There's formally no national debt, but state-owned companies owe 300% of GDP, and local governments probably another 50 to 80%.
In total debt, they've already surpassed the entire developed world, with only Japan ahead. But Japan, for all its problems, is a first-world economy with a high-value-added industrial base, and it's no longer heavily dependent on trade - it's slimmed down since the 1980s to US-level exposure. China is different.
In China, we're looking at one of history's fastest-building debt bombs - the largest accumulation of debt in absolute and relative terms in human history. And some people think since there's no more data, the problem has gone away. Unrealistic. And that's before the demographic crunch, which gives this system single-digit years.
The only bright spot: the debt is mostly domestic. And anyone who's been buying Chinese debt these last five years deserves to lose everything.
The Bridge in Canada and Corruption in Washington
James Heappey: It's getting grim. But you've been writing about a bridge in Canada.
Peter Zeihan: You never know where we'll end up, do you?
The Ambassador Bridge, built decades ago between Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario, handles the largest economic interchange in history. That's where most American-Canadian trade flows through. Contrary to what most Americans and even many Canadians think, Ontario and to a lesser extent the rest of Canada are more tightly integrated into the US economy than any two countries on the planet. Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Alberta - all are more integrated with the United States than with each other. Trade flows north-south, not east-west.
The bridge was outdated, a second was needed. It's been built and is supposed to open this year [the Gordie Howe Bridge]. The old bridge was going to be put on standby.
But the US Commerce Secretary is thoroughly corrupt. One of his buddies owns the old bridge and has been campaigning against the new one for 15 years. He convinced the Commerce Secretary, the Commerce Secretary convinced Trump, and Trump declared: if the new bridge happens, the United States has to own it. A brazen move. But Canada has no choice.
Don't let the sparks, drama, and corruption distract you from the map and the history. Is Trump doing this corruptly? Yes, because it is corrupt. Does it make him look like a jerk? Yes. Does that mean he won't get his way? No.
The World Is Hurtling Toward Chaos
James Heappey: Final question: is what we're going through a consequence of Trump's idiosyncrasies imposed on a fragile global situation? Or has the world simply changed and is hurtling toward something even more dangerous?
Peter Zeihan: Absolutely both. Remember, I mentioned seven elections in a row where America, from a global point of view, picked the wrong guy. We had a chance 30, 20, 10 years ago to create a more sustainable system for the post-Cold War world - and we never did.
We always knew the strategic environment would break, because it doesn't work without the US maintaining freedom of the seas. No trade without that. No trade without consumers either. The world has been demographically aging for 80 years. We haven't just run out of children - many countries did that in the 80s and 90s. Now the advanced world is running out of working-age adults. And the developing world is aging much faster than the developed world ever did, with China at the lead, to the point of potential national dissolution. Both trends were always going to converge in 2025-2035 - the window we're in right now.
What Trump is doing is compressing the timeframe toward the front of that window. We were always going to get here. We were always going to get here about now. But we didn't have to get here this fast. Give someone 10-20 years to adapt, and they can. Give them three - not so much.
Breaking News: Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump's Tariffs
James Heappey: Peter, while we've been talking, breaking news has come in. The Supreme Court has just struck down Trump's global tariffs. The Justices found that the President overstepped his authority by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose the tariffs. The vote was 6 to 3.
Peter Zeihan: 6 to 3. I know which six, and I know which three [voting to strike down: Roberts, Gorsuch, Barrett, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson; dissenting: Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh].
The Trump administration has repeatedly ignored the courts. But the Supreme Court - this is a first. If old-school Republicans are going to get their act together, this is the issue they'll do it for. But I find that unlikely. More likely, Trump will simply find new justifications for even more tariffs. He's the type to double down unless he's been completely boxed in. This isn't boxed in. The challenge will have to be repeated all over again, with a different law and different justification, unless Congress steps in with a two-thirds vote.
James Heappey: Apparently, the government may be forced to refund billions collected in tariff revenue. But the problem is, Congress won't support handing billions back to other countries.
Peter Zeihan: You're crossing your wires there. You've bought into some Trump propaganda. This money doesn't go to foreign countries. It goes back to the companies in the United States that paid for the imports.
James Heappey: Got it. So the refunds would go to businesses that paid the tariffs on imports. That's not as politically toxic, though you can imagine how the White House would spin it.
Peter Zeihan: Of course. And we're only seven months from the midterms. Any Republican in Congress who crosses the administration on this will absolutely face a primary challenger backed by the President. So the timing, in terms of making American politics even more volatile, is perfect.
James Heappey: Given what you said about the President's absolute powers in foreign policy and war, it's interesting to see the Supreme Court trying to curb his authority. Though I note with some concern that you think the White House may simply ignore the Court and create a whole new paradigm.
Peter Zeihan: Let's be honest. This administration is not interested in - and is in fact opposed to - the very concept of institutions. Every other institution has already been challenged. The Supreme Court is all that's left.