Vladimir Putin held a Security Council meeting and instructed the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, intelligence services, and civilian agencies to prepare proposals for the possible resumption of nuclear testing.
One might think this is a response to Trump's announcement about beginning nuclear weapons testing. However, immediately after Trump's statement, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright explained that it concerns subcritical explosions, which are not nuclear tests. In subcritical explosions, there is no chain fission reaction that occurs during a nuclear explosion. Such tests allow verification of all nuclear weapons components without an actual explosion.
Subcritical tests were conducted, for example, during the Biden administration, most recently in May 2024, and this did not cause any concern from the Kremlin. Yet now there is such a reaction. In other words, the Kremlin, fully understanding that the U.S. did not plan to conduct nuclear tests, is using this as a pretext for further escalation. And this escalation did not begin today.
On October 23, Putin launched the Yars intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk cosmodrome toward the Kamchatka test range—that is, in the direction of the United States. On October 26, Putin announced the successful test of Burevestnik—a cruise missile with a nuclear propulsion system that can fly 14,000 kilometers and is essentially a new class of missile, as it is not tracked by the American SBIRS early warning system.
On October 29, Putin announced tests of the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater combat drone. And now Putin is threatening to begin nuclear tests. This does not yet mean he will conduct them, as Peskov later stated, but it is an unambiguous threat. Thus, the Kremlin is raising the stakes of its aggression and testing the West's readiness to contain it. Russian military officials have already announced the readiness of the test site on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago to conduct tests in "short timeframes," which is a political message to the world: Moscow is keeping nuclear testing infrastructure ready.
In 2023, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), leaving itself the option to conduct tests, and abandoning the moratorium regime would undermine the remnants of this system. The Kremlin is trying to present Russian nuclear tests as a "reaction" to hypothetical actions by Washington, but it is Moscow that is taking steps to prepare for tests and conducting large-scale strategic nuclear forces exercises.
The American test of the strategic Minuteman III missile was a reliability check of its own arsenal without violating the nuclear test ban; even the Russian side acknowledged that this does not contradict the CTBT. It was a routine launch of a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from California toward Micronesia—that is, not toward Russia. A routine launch—meaning that because such tests are conducted regularly, they don't always even make it into the media.
Nevertheless, Moscow still decided to raise the stakes and threaten the world, while the U.S. and allies demonstrate restraint without violating international law norms. Today, Russia has 4,309–5,500 nuclear warheads, of which 1,710 are deployed; the U.S. has 3,700–5,500, of which 1,670 are deployed; China has 500–600, of which 50 are deployed, though its nuclear potential is growing rapidly; France has 290 warheads, of which 280 are deployed; the United Kingdom has 225 (120 deployed); India has 180; and Pakistan has 170.
Russia's return to nuclear testing should lead to increased isolation of Moscow in international institutions and new sanctions initiatives specifically for this. The rhetoric about "threats from the U.S." is needed by Moscow to justify the militarization of Russia's economy and the suppression of dissent within the country. Putin is reproducing Khrushchev's logic, but today Moscow risks getting the opposite effect: Western weapons are already hitting targets deep inside Russian territory, and attempts to play at a "new Cuban Missile Crisis" only increase nuclear risks without the necessary political dividends for the Kremlin.
Russia's military nuclear program is largely motivated by the desire to maintain parity with the U.S. and "national prestige," as well as to compensate for the weakness of conventional military forces. The Barents Observer reports that the Russian defense minister's statement about the "appropriateness" of beginning preparations for full-scale nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya means an actual return to the doctrine of pressure through demonstration of force.
The Arctic archipelago, where Moscow has strategic bases, is becoming not only a testing ground but also an instrument of intimidation. Such a step poses a direct threat to the U.S. and the West, as it disrupts the balance of deterrence, creating the impression that the Kremlin is ready to test the boundaries of what is permissible in nuclear security. The deployment of preparatory work in this region will intensify Russia's intelligence and military activity in the Arctic, where Washington's and NATO allies' interests already intersect.
The strengthening of the nuclear factor in the north undermines the fragile system of predictability on which global stability between great powers rests. The U.S. risks facing not only technical challenges—the need to build up monitoring and defense capabilities in polar latitudes—but also the political effect of demonstratively violating unwritten taboos on nuclear testing.
Moscow's actions provoke a new phase of the arms race, where every gesture will be evaluated as a potential threat. In the long term, this could change the very logic of American military planning, forcing Washington to operate under conditions of growing unpredictability and nuclear blackmail disguised as "political expediency." Russian statements about preparations for nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya fit into a broader trend of Arctic militarization.
Moscow is actively expanding military infrastructure, modernizing bases, and conducting exercises in which the Arctic theater of potential military operations is viewed as a zone of potential confrontation with NATO. This approach allows the Kremlin to combine a show of force with political blackmail—a hint of readiness to go beyond international agreements if required by domestic or geopolitical goals. For the U.S., this creates a dangerous situation where even routine military maneuvers acquire nuclear undertones.
Preparations for resuming tests could be used by Russia as an instrument of pressure on the West in negotiations on security and sanctions issues. At the same time, such a policy undermines trust in the global non-proliferation system, where Washington traditionally acts as a guarantor of stability. The Arctic is gradually turning into an arena of multi-level competition—from resource competition to control over important sea routes. The strengthening of the Russian nuclear factor in this region limits the freedom of action of the U.S. and allies, forcing them to adjust their own strategy to a new reality.
Consequently, the statement by Russia's defense minister effectively signals the Kremlin's readiness to destroy the status quo in nuclear stability. The test site on the archipelago has long been modernized and used for underground experiments, demonstrating Moscow's technical readiness for a rapid transition from symbolic steps to practical ones. Such actions form a signal not so much for the domestic audience as for Washington, indicating a desire to return the "language of force" to American-Russian dialogue.
In the U.S., this is viewed as a direct attempt to destroy predictability in nuclear deterrence. For the U.S., such dynamics create risks of limiting freedom of action in a region where NATO is developing its own presence. Russian statements about nuclear tests coincide with the intensification of Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation, indicating the Kremlin's intention to restore great power status through demonstration of technological potential.
A situation is forming where a symbolic gesture could escalate into a new phase of competition in nuclear technologies. Preparations for testing potentially destroy the remnants of trust that maintained the global non-proliferation system after the collapse of the USSR. The Russian signal undermines expectations of stability, forcing other nuclear powers to reconsider their own limitations. For the U.S., the challenge lies in the need to simultaneously deter Russian aggressive behavior and preserve the international control regime without succumbing to Moscow's game of reviving fear as a political instrument.
Russian blackmail is calculated to obtain Western concessions, but the Kremlin underestimates Washington's and its allies' readiness to defend the nuclear non-proliferation regime and their own security. In its time, the USSR lost the competition for resources and technologies at the end of the Cold War, and modern Russia has less economic resilience than the former Soviet Union. The Kremlin, no matter how much it wants it, will not get a "new Yalta" through threats. A return to negotiations on nuclear arms control is the only way to avoid a catastrophic mistake and stabilize global security.