For decades, Iran invested enormous resources into cultivating a network of armed partners across the Middle East - Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Houthi forces in Yemen and Shiite militias in Iraq. Together, they formed what Tehran called the axis of resistance, an outer defense perimeter that promised to turn any attack on Iran into a region-wide conflict. The logic was straightforward: strike Iran and the entire Middle East erupts.
That logic contained a fatal flaw, Carnegie scholars Nicole Grajewski and Ankit Panda have argued in Foreign Affairs, as "Hvylya" reports. The proxies increasingly pursued their own agendas and dragged Iran into confrontations it did not seek.
The cascade began with Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 - an operation Tehran probably had no advance knowledge of, according to the authors. Israel responded by systematically dismantling Iran's proxy infrastructure: pummeling Hamas in Gaza, devastating Hezbollah in Lebanon and striking Houthi positions in Yemen. By 2026, the network that was supposed to shield Iran had been largely neutralized.
Worse still, the proxy strategy backfired diplomatically. By arming Hezbollah, backing Hamas and directing Houthi strikes on Gulf shipping lanes, Iran brought together adversaries that might otherwise have remained divided. Israel, the United States and key Arab states found common cause against Tehran - a coalition that proved overwhelming once military operations began in June 2025.
Grajewski and Panda draw a blunt conclusion: deterrence cannot be outsourced. Iran treated its proxies not as guardians of its nuclear program but as tools of offensive competition - and in doing so, inadvertently assembled the very coalition that destroyed it. When the 12-Day War began in June 2025, the proxy network that was supposed to set the region ablaze could barely respond.
Previously, "Hvylya" examined how Iran's real strategy in the war targeted something far beyond missile strikes.