Two Brookings Institution scholars have argued that the next generation of nuclear arms control must go far beyond the familiar U.S.-Russia dynamic. Amy J. Nelson and Michael E. O'Hanlon have called for an architecture that includes not only the United States, Russia, and China, but also the United Kingdom and France - with pathways for the eventual participation of India, Pakistan, and Israel.

The proposal was published in a new analysis by the Brookings Institution, as reported by "Hvylya".

The scholars argued that the emerging nuclear order "is no longer confined to two roughly symmetrical arsenals." China's rapid buildup has already turned the strategic landscape into a three-player game. But even a tripolar structure would be incomplete. Britain and France each maintain independent nuclear deterrents, which make Moscow and Beijing resistant to any balanced numerical cap.

India, Pakistan, and Israel present an even thornier challenge. None of the three has ever joined a nuclear arms limitation regime. Israel has never confirmed having nuclear weapons. Yet the Brookings scholars said any serious effort at managing the global nuclear order must create pathways for their inclusion, even if full participation takes time.

The expanded system would also need to cover far more than traditional strategic weapons. Nelson and O'Hanlon called for incorporating nonstrategic and shorter-range systems, as well as missile defenses, air defenses, and counter-drone systems. They argued that modern deterrence depends on interactions across offense, defense, and multiple domains - "not nuclear numbers alone."

The scholars also pushed for a renewed political commitment to a ban on nuclear explosive testing. Building on the norm established by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, such a pledge would "help preserve limits on qualitative competition and signal restraint even amid broader rivalry." They noted that public opinion on nuclear testing has historically been a meaningful source of political pressure, and could be again.

With eight or more nuclear states and an expanding range of weapons systems, the old arithmetic of bilateral parity is no longer useful. What replaces it, Nelson and O'Hanlon argued, must be broader, more flexible, and grounded in transparency rather than treaties.

"Hvylya" previously explored what Ukraine's fight foreshadows for dozens of other states around the world.