In this frank and resonant interview with Yuriy Romanenko, former Armed Forces of Ukraine officer Arty Green speaks without holding back about the situation surrounding the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region, and also analyzes the deep processes occurring in the Ukrainian army, Russian politics, and international relations.
Main storylines of the interview:
- The Kursk Operation and Its Results: A detailed breakdown of the reasons for the Armed Forces of Ukraine's withdrawal from the Kursk region — from initial successes to logistics problems under constant fire control, which made holding the bridgehead impractical.
- Putin at a Crossroads: Analysis of Putin's difficult position, forced to choose between a shameful peace and transitioning Russia to the rails of "war communism" with total mobilization, which threatens internal upheavals.
- Trump, Negotiations, and Geopolitics: Discussion of the new security architecture that Trump is trying to build using Russia as a "convenient monster" to control Europe.
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine Generalship and Corruption: Shocking revelations about "butchers" in the army's high command, corruption, and catastrophic decisions that led to enormous losses.
- Ukraine's Future: A harsh assessment of the country's prospects under possible ceasefire conditions — from neutral status to the inevitable demand for just punishment for corrupt officials and marauders, without which "there will be no one at the military commissariats."
The interview represents a rare example of unvarnished, honest conversation about war, corruption, and politics. Arty Green doesn't mince words, calling things by their proper names and giving unexpected assessments of both Ukrainian military leaders and international players, which makes this interview a unique source of insider information about the current state of affairs.
Yuriy Romanenko: Friends, hello everyone! Surfer-slackers, beloved deviants, everyone who watches our broadcasts. And today we have a very interesting guest, you all know him well. He's been on our broadcasts many times, long before the full-scale war, and continues to appear during it. This is Arty Green. Arty, hello!
Arty Green: Hello, hello!
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, let's discuss our sorrowful or not-so-sorrowful affairs, we're trying to figure it out now. Everyone knows that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have practically withdrawn from the Kursk region. The information is contradictory — either they've completely withdrawn, or, let's say, they're still holding on to some piece. But it's obvious that this major maneuver that occurred in August of last year, which in principle created quite a stir, has come to an end, and it's high time to sum up what role it played. As a military man, how do you assess what happened? Because at first, when they went in there, they thought it would all last a few weeks. Then it dragged on for months, and as a result, they held out for more than half a year, practically six months. There were huge losses among the Russians. It wasn't easy for us either, because I had soldiers who fought in the Kursk direction, they told me repeatedly in broadcasts that it was very, very tough there, we shouldn't fall into illusions either. But nevertheless, what happened happened. So as a military man, how do you assess this?
Arty Green: Well, let me start from the very beginning. Because we need to look at not just the final phase, but comprehensively. When about five — I won't list them all because I don't remember if all the brigades made it into open sources — about five highly mobile brigades, mainly Airborne Forces, rangers, and highly mobile units crossed the border with the Russian Federation in the area of the settlement of Sudzha and deployed raid operations to a depth of up to 40 kilometers over a total area of up to 1,600 square kilometers — that's where our units appeared, not counting reconnaissance groups.
The enemy had nothing there. There were some conscripts, some blocking detachments, apparently "Akhmat." Well, and various police, FSB. And they entered successfully because the Russian Federation didn't bother to keep the border under control with serious forces. So they entered absolutely without problems.
And so they penetrated, I repeat, up to 40 kilometers in different directions. What the plans were, how far to go, I don't know. Nobody knows, and nobody will tell us. Maybe someday papers will emerge, let's say, specifically operational papers for the plan of this operation.
But the force complement was definitely insufficient to hold these one and a half thousand square kilometers with the line of contact that formed around, well, let's say, the Sudzha salient, let's call it that. So. Since the Russians had no troops there, Putin, if you remember, first tried to ignore it altogether, like "provocations on the borders," and something like that, like a sabotage and reconnaissance group of five brigades went in.
But then, when he understood that we weren't planning to leave just like that, he was forced to send a force complement there and gradually build it up. And it was built up to approximately... Here the figure ranges from 50 to 70 thousand troops. Moreover, these aren't simple troops. These are elite troops. This is the 76th Airborne Division. These are two marine brigades.
And special units, I suspect, special forces units of GRU and so on. So quite an elite part of the Russian Federation's army was forced to be distracted by this event of ours. Moreover, our troops are traditionally more effective in raid conditions.
Therefore, the initial phase of the operation was extremely effective from a military point of view. Because our highly mobile unit, instead of sitting in trenches somewhere near Pokrovsk, where the effectiveness of a special forces fighter and a 60-year-old grass-cutter is approximately the same. That is, you sit as an infantryman, hold a sector, and hide from shelling. But in the highly mobile phase, all the advantages of highly mobile and special units are manifested. So ours performed well there.
The first phase of the operation was extremely successful. And as the Russian General Staff drove troops there, the size of our troops' operations gradually decreased to... what was there? At first it was a bit more than 1,500 square kilometers, down to about 500-600. And in this form, this bridgehead existed for how long? About 5 or 4 months? Moreover, it should be noted that our troops withdrew to pre-prepared positions. All units and formations that were involved had good combat experience, so they chose convenient defense lines on site. I'm more than sure that they weren't drawing in the General Staff where who should stand, but whoever stood where, decided that it's convenient here for a number of objective reasons, and they took up defense there. And that's why this bridgehead held for quite a long time. And the Russians were forced to drive there 5-7 times more troops than ours, and elite troops at that. Drive aviation, artillery, and drone operators there, and their best drone operators at that.
As a result, when quantity turned into quality, they took the main logistics supply routes of this entire grouping under fire control, plus on the flanks. That is, our grouping there was about 10 thousand troops. That's quite serious supply and evacuation traffic.
And this traffic practically went along one main road, plus forest roads, but forest roads are such a thing, depending on the weather, forest field roads, probably. Therefore, due to the fact that drones, especially fiber-optic ones, reached quite serious distances, that is, they operate up to 15 kilometers there calmly, quite a significant section of logistics was taken by the enemy under quite rigid control.
In these conditions, maintaining the logistics of such a grouping became ineffective. And actually, it was necessary to leave this bridgehead probably a month earlier, when this effective fire control over logistics had already, let's say, taken on an irreversible character.
Our forces tried about a month and a half ago to conduct a small offensive operation, or more precisely, attacking actions in order to widen the isthmus so that additional logistics routes would appear, to push FPV operators and artillery a bit further from the main road. Something worked, something didn't, but in general, problems with logistics were obvious. Everyone who has any contacts with our military in this area, everyone knew perfectly well that getting to Sudzha is a lottery.
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: Well, I mean driving to Sudzha.
Yuriy Romanenko: That is, the road was constantly under fire, drones there constantly... Well, in short, it just turned into a shooting gallery.
Arty Green: Actually, we have quite a lot of such places, but there's a large force complement of troops there. It wasn't a battalion standing there. Let's say, I won't say specifically, my close friends, where they rotate, they choose fog. And practically any rotation and replenishment, evacuation is only possible in fog conditions, when drones either can't see or don't fly. Or heavy rain.
That is, they sit there, waiting for rain, rain starts, and then like a bullet to fly through, say, 5-10 kilometers, drop off everything needed there, and fly back before the rain ends. In such conditions, holding such positions is ineffective. And if it's not just a position, but a 10-thousand-strong grouping that's constantly under pressure, in addition to fire pressure, also infantry pressure, then that's a big problem.
So now opinions have split. Butusov, at least, Yura stated that there was no order to withdraw. This wasn't an organized decision by tactical commanders. So. But since no one was encircled, everyone warned everyone. It wasn't like a battalion withdrew on the right, on the left. The middle one knew nothing, they forgot him there. There was nothing like that.
That is, in principle, the grouping withdrew relatively organized, despite the fact that there were problems with communications, Starlinks don't work there. Quite a large number of units. As usual, our General Staff engages in fragmentation, so there weren't exactly 4 or 5 brigades, there were probably also a bunch of GUR [Military Intelligence], SSO [Special Operations Forces], and other fragmented splinters.
I know who was in command there, and when they told me, I was pleased. At least in the final section. At first, there was apparently Krasylnikov, he's the commander of the "Pivnich" [North] operational command. And then they replaced him with an airborne blockhead. And for the last few months, a weak commander was in command there, and one of such, how to say it, a type. In short, one who doesn't spare troops at all. His own.
Therefore, there really were problems, they had to be solved by leaving these territories and withdrawing to where logistics would be much more covered. As a result of this maneuver, that is, the question is open whether it was an order from the General Staff or not. There's a strong suspicion that there was no order from the General Staff, chaotic withdrawal under pressure, that somewhere one unit failed, neighbors began to wrap flanks, warn other neighbors.
Yuriy Romanenko: Reminds me of Debaltseve.
Arty Green: Yes, very much reminds me of Debaltseve, where from above the command was to hold, and there was no other, and tactical units agreed among themselves. The senior commander of tactical units then was Sergey Shaptala, brigade commander of the 128th. Well, roughly speaking, we all pressured him and sort of demanded he lead the breakthrough.
Yuriy Romanenko: Near Debaltseve.
Arty Green: Yes, and then he took that responsibility, and when he came out there and reported via military communications to the ATO commander that he had withdrawn his brigade and organized the rest of Debaltseve, he yelled at him and demanded he urgently return back. That was the reality of Debaltseve, but nevertheless, you can't call this withdrawal unorganized. That is, from the Debaltseve operation we lost...
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: Taking only killed, about 200 people. That's the entire Debaltseve battle, from January 24 to February 18. Including the night of the breakthrough, we had losses. We counted then, a bunch of scattered units too, we got 11 people. But specifically in my battalion, one died, the acting commander of the 1st company.
In other units, we counted on our knees by individual units. It turned out to be one percent of those killed during the breakthrough. That's for about 3 thousand people participating in the breakthrough. They mentioned the figure 2,700, but it was unrealistic to count. Each unit had its own accounting, and it was unrealistic to verify it.
That is, from two to three thousand, let's say. And here five times more came out, approximately. But people have good combat experience. That is, this is already the fourth year of war. All the units that were there are well battle-tested. The staffs aren't from yesterday. Therefore, despite the lack of communications and natural chaos, not a single unit was encircled, wasn't cut off and destroyed, and didn't fall into captivity. Butusov gives a figure that about 40 prisoners today, but there are still many missing in the sense that maybe they haven't been found yet, or died in battles during the withdrawal, because the withdrawal was accompanied by pressure from troops.
This 70-thousand-strong grouping received, apparently, a command to take prisoners, well, sort of to hurt us more. But it was tough on both sides. I think more enemy were killed during the withdrawal than we lost, and by multiples. But that's logical because the enemy is advancing not knowing exactly where they are, but he's advancing through territory he doesn't know.
You're retreating through your territory, which you know well, because you always know the near rear well. And this advantage of your own field, it affects very strongly. Therefore, skilled units retreat extremely effectively in terms of the loss ratio of retreating and advancing forces.
Yuriy Romanenko: And there was no trap to the accompaniment of these negotiations that are now going on in the triangle of Ukraine, Russia, USA. And one of our viewers, Serge Ubb, writes absolutely correctly: "As someone said, 'There's no Minsk without a cauldron.' Perhaps Trump leaked data to arrange a new cauldron. Well, that's already such..."
No, I just think the political logic is more or less that you need to score some points. And therefore Putin sort of went on such an offensive.
Arty Green: Well yes, yes, he's throwing everything in now, he understands perfectly that very soon that's it, Zelensky has agreed, and the fire will stop when Putin says "I agree, tomorrow I'll stop firing." And that's it, and tomorrow it will stop. That is, now it's in his hands, he decides - tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, or in four days. But if he drags it out for more than a week, he might get another package of sanctions, which will then also have to be negotiated for removal and something will have to be given for that.
That is, Trump chose such a cool tactic, he doesn't particularly warn apparently, he just says "it will be bad" and that's it. And if you're dragging your feet, you just get an announcement of some new sanctions package. Oops! And then when you've already agreed, the package has also been introduced. And sort of because of it, you'll then have to somehow resolve something. So I think that Putin, since the ball is on his side and moreover not just the ball, in principle, the date of the ceasefire is in his hands now. He was apparently waiting for the end of the Kursk operation, that is, judging by the information I possess today, there was no deal about withdrawal from the Kursk region so that Putin would stop firing there. Everything was quite spontaneous. At least the units that participated in this, they didn't receive such orders.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, plus the leadership, as far as I know, the leadership of the Russian grouping changed right before the offensive. And there, sort of more aggressive actions began. I don't know...
Arty Green: They were aggressive all the time. The crisis came precisely because they could resolve the coverage of logistics. And that logistics route, which was under such intense fire control, wasn't enough to supply and evacuate such a force complement that was on the Sudzha bridgehead, or salient. The withdrawal, naturally, was conducted by unit commanders. I strongly suspect to pre-prepared positions, some chosen, more precisely, maybe not even prepared, not that everything was completely prepared there, because there wasn't sort of planned, possibly there wasn't a planned withdrawal, but at least in terms of terrain, number of buildings and green areas.
Accordingly, commanders chose where they would effectively hold defense. So the approach to them was through some green areas, evacuation well covered. And it turns out that instead of the force complement that was in this construction resembling a nuclear mushroom or tree crown, this same line has now shrunk five times. That is, it can be held not by five brigades, but by two brigades.
And the number of drone operators and artillerymen will remain the same. If infantrymen can withdraw exhausted, then artillerymen, believe me, when there's an intensive phase of fighting, they get their second and third wind. And they can work there all night without sleep. The same applies to drone operators. Because it's hunting excitement. You see the result, the enemy is running around in full height, and not one by one, but in threes, in units.
And when such game is walking around, well, there's no time to sleep. And you don't want to. Therefore, let's say, the fire capabilities and strike capabilities of these five units have been preserved. They managed to develop a sense of camaraderie there during this time, so in principle there's quite solid defense there.
But, I repeat, they didn't take up defense along the state border, but where it's convenient. And this "where it's convenient" is mainly on the Russian side, that is, from where they were withdrawing. But a bit to the north, the Russians pushed in somewhere and want something there, well, I mean, they entered the Sumy region. That is, somewhere the Russians entered some piece of Sumy region, and somewhere some part of Kursk region remained under our units. And now the defense line is stabilizing. I think it will be stabilized because the density, fire density per kilometer of front has increased five times. Well, accordingly, by how many times the line of contact in this area decreased, by that many times, you can say, the density of strike assets increased.
Therefore, with such density, no one will go anywhere there. Neither the enemy in our direction, nor us in theirs. That is, this situation is doomed to freeze on convenient positions.
Yuriy Romanenko: But look, from what you're saying, a direct consequence follows that since the number of troops around the perimeter of this mushroom has decreased, logically, it should decrease because the front line has shortened, then accordingly, the Russians can also transfer these freed-up troops, well, let's say, to the same Donbas, because we see that near Pokrovsk they had a significant, let's say, slowdown in advancement, which was there in autumn and early winter. And possibly this was connected with the fact that, for example, the best drone operators were transferred there, to the Kursk region, and accordingly, some reserves were thrown there. And now all this can appear there, in Donbas. Well, logically, probably, I think so.
Arty Green: But you understand, the thing is, if we take the same Pokrovsk, Pokrovsk is holding not because we have many troops there, but because we have a total destruction zone there, that is, a kill zone along the entire defense line of this Pokrovsk-Myrnograd defense area, it's simply impossible to pass through there. That is, actually it doesn't matter how much of our infantry is standing there, and how much infantry they drive in. That is, if this zone can't be passed, then neither a platoon, nor a division, nor an army will pass. So, therefore, if they're transferred there, they won't make much difference, there will just be large instantaneous losses.
Therefore, throwing these troops at Pokrovsk, for example, is ineffective. But at the same time, Putin wants to throw them because it's an argument he has in his hands. And if tomorrow there's a ceasefire, this trump card won't play. Therefore, he quite possibly will try to manage before he agrees and says "that's it, ceasefire tomorrow," to bite off something else somewhere. In order for the final chords to be, sort of, on his side of the scales, which when trading.
So, therefore, of course, he'll want to do something else there. But from where our front is still quite unstabilized, it's the Kurakhove and South Donetsk directions, generally Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka. But they've already been lost, so it's more likely the Kostiantynivka direction.
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: Because in Chasiv Yar there's nothing to catch, the 24th will eat us for breakfast there. They were jerking around there recently, they burned 40 units of equipment at once. The 98th Airborne Division Ivanovo is there, it's been declassed to a terrible state, which is conducting an offensive there. And about Khmelnytskyi, it's not even worth talking about him.
In Toretsk, the mighty AZOV of the National Guard is now standing up. Plus several combat units. They came to active attacking actions in Toretsk.
Yuriy Romanenko: They recaptured a piece this morning, there was just information that they recaptured some piece of Toretsk in the south.
Arty Green: Well, the mobile phase of war is going on there. They're smart, they don't sit in one place, they constantly pull the enemy apart. They don't let them relax. And by the way, this Kursk operation was also beneficial precisely in that Putin was sitting there, and Gerasimov was relaxed, so where active combat operations weren't going on, no one would fight there.
And therefore they didn't need to keep a force complement there. And we're forced to keep a force complement along the entire Belarusian border, well, and accordingly along the entire inactive Russian-Ukrainian border. Because they can strike anywhere. So. And they were sitting relaxed. They were fighting only where they wanted to fight. And our action in the Kursk region sort of made them understand that no way. It doesn't work like that. And we can choose where to fight.
So in principle, the operation is a big plus. Besides the fact that Putin was forced to drive specifically to Kursk, to this area, to fight with our five brigades, I'm conditionally saying five. That is, there weren't only brigades there, there were also separate units.
Putin was forced, of course, to strengthen the defense of the Belgorod region, Bryansk region, and even started worrying about Belarus, sent some units there for exercises. That is, the diversion of troops from the main directions, besides those that were involved in Kursk, I think another fifty thousand approximately, due to the fact that he was forced to cover other areas too. Especially since rumors were circulating here, and we didn't strongly refute them, that we might strike somewhere else in the Bryansk region, at the junction with the Belarusians in general and so on. Good rumors in terms of "keep troops there too, because the same thing might happen." All this pulls heavily from, let's say, the main directions of effort. So this is also a benefit, operational-strategic sort of benefit from this operation.
Well, so, well, I repeat, it will freeze there precisely where ours decide that it's convenient to defend and they'll stand, because the density of strike assets is such that no one will survive in the kill zone. And the kill zone is 10-15 kilometers there. Generally, where no one survives. Especially now there's no greenery yet, you can't hide at all. Greenery will appear, there will be more or less some chances to get lost, and until April, you can say, not a single chance, even until May approximately. In May, lush vegetation already begins, you can already hide somewhat more effectively there.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, that is, in fact, even based on such weather conditions, it seems that combat operations will continue for several more weeks there, because we see that everything is going on to the accompaniment of these negotiations, because Trump made another statement today that on March 18 he'll conduct a phone conversation, and the Americans said today that there are 10 yards left to the ceasefire...
And actually, a mass of such news is coming that shows that the sides are intensively bargaining. Because, for example, today Bloomberg reported that Putin is allowing some Western funds to sell Russian securities. The day before the planned negotiations with Trump on a possible ceasefire, according to the published decree, Putin allowed the US-registered fund 683 Capital Partners to acquire securities of Russian companies that previously belonged to about a dozen Western investment and hedge funds. Among the funds that received the right to sell their assets were Franklin Advisors, Templeton Asset Management, Baillie Gifford Overseas. The decree also authorizes two Russian entities to conduct transactions. In short, there's obvious some kind of unfreezing of business activity, and it's targeted. In the spirit of "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours."
They froze this one, Trump will freeze this International Court judge who imposed sanctions on Putin. These, on their side, are conducting negotiations with Iran, trying to sort of get involved in negotiations with Iran. In parallel, we now see a mess starting with the Houthis. This is also such a psychological and not only element of pressure on Iran. Trump has almost declared war on the Houthis there and says that "we know that Iran is behind them."
Well, that is, they're trying to play out their games with their interests on several chessboards at once in a complex way. And in this context, how do you think, actually, Ukraine enters this game, sort of there, has already entered, with what cards? Because when the Americans, the new administration, threatened us with stopping arms supplies, many here, including the top leadership, said that we can calmly fight until the end of the year on those supplies and those reserves that were made earlier. In this context, how do you assess our sustainability? How does it seem to you? From a military point of view.
Arty Green: Well, look, if everything on the Russian side was stable, that is, they have the same replenishments coming in monthly and so on, that is, they're not building up their force complement, we're not building up our force complement, then everything is quite stable. But the problem is that, apparently, by mid-year the Russian army will have a big problem with personnel.
A big personnel problem. I mean the number of infantry first of all. Staffs don't particularly die there, but infantry dies with enviable regularity. And the recruitment mechanisms, essentially hiring mercenaries, will no longer be enough to ensure the previous force complement.
And this PSO [probably referring to recruitment], because they fulfilled 107 percent there, and so on, well, this is PSO. Well, that is, obviously, by the nature of enemy personnel taken prisoner lately, its quality decline is so huge, so, for example, my 24th brigade is now in Yar, it's been fighting there for more than a year at least, in Chasiv Yar. The main enemy is the 98th division, Ivanovo, Kostroma. At first there were professionals there, good quality airborne troops, let's say. Lately, everything that comes across are continuous misunderstandings. And, first of all, literally in the second week after signing the contract, they're all already warm here with us sitting. That is, there's no training. The average age jumped by about 15 years for these so-called paratroopers. There, 50-plus are all paratroopers now. Yes, from Ivanovo. That is, if they're fulfilling replenishment there, soon 70-year-olds will go into service there. That is, this is already qualitatively different material.
And you only go for such when there's no normal one. So, therefore, Putin is definitely running out of troops to conduct precisely that type of combat operations that he's been conducting since the beginning of October 2023, when he started the offensive on Avdiivka.
That is, constantly intensive fighting. If you remember, precisely from that moment daily average daily losses amount to about one and a half thousand people per day according to our General Staff data, and I'll tell you that this figure is very close to reality. I just know how it's formed, it's really very close to reality. That is, this is the type of combat operations, the only one that had external success, because this is precisely external success, there's the acquisition of settlements, a couple of square kilometers, let's say 70 square kilometers per week. At such rates, they need another 3 years to take Donetsk region, understand? And at such rates, they need to lay down 800 thousand soldiers for this very Donetsk region.
Therefore, tell me, to lay down 800 thousand soldiers, while sort of taking an agglomeration consisting of, one, two, three, four cities. Well, what's too much is unhealthy. That is, calling it a victory will be very difficult. That is, he's in a positional dead end in this case. So, but this doesn't mean he has no way out. He has a way out. If they don't give him the opportunity to exit the war, then he has the opportunity to make North Korea out of Russia and transition to the rails of war communism. Whoever says he won't succeed is deceiving either himself or everyone. Because Putin definitely has the tools to turn on the mechanisms of war communism, like "For the Motherland! For Stalin!". Everyone into service, all factories stamping shells, cartridges, until there's "Great Victory" and so on. And this very war will give him the opportunity to sort of apply this power. But in this case, he'll have several million people under arms.
In this case, when the war stalls actually and the bayonet is stuck in the ground, February 1917 will immediately arrive. That is, let's say, if this rat is driven into a corner, he'll be forced to come to general mobilization already. In order to mobilize forcibly already, everything needs to be restored to North Korea, in the full sense of this word, both economically and politically. Does he have such an opportunity? Yes. But this can lead to the fact that he'll prolong his life for exactly two, maximum three years. Because when this forcibly driven people stick their bayonets in the ground, while they're young there, mobilized yesterday, their balls are the size of 7 kopecks, they're driven there, "Akhmat" scares them, after 3 years they'll become fighters with 3 years of combat experience. You can't scare them with "Akhmat" anymore. And then they can create soldiers' committees there, and the whole picture of 1917. That is, in this case, it will be a disaster-catastrophe for Putin.
And therefore, at minimum, therefore it makes no sense for him to go there. It makes sense to find some format for ceasefire, exit from war. But he has very mandatory conditions. He needs to exit the war so that he can quite declare to his subjects about the Great Victory achieved under his great leadership. And not just declare it, but so that at least more than half are convinced of this even. Therefore, he can't exit the war with a beaten face. He needs to exit with a proudly raised tail and with banners. And it's precisely this that Trump provides him. Speaking publicly about how he's a good guy, he has a good conversation with him, that he's been waiting for him in the G7.
Like the G8 is needed, well, and so on. That is, he's hanging such a carrot for this rat driven into a corner, and with this carrot he's showing how to get out of this corner. And if he's not released from this corner, what do we get next? A five or ten million Russian army. And, excuse me, who will contain it? Ukraine will collapse immediately, because what we're barely containing now. And if you add this biomass, multiply it many times, Ukraine won't handle it anymore. Because the internal worminess of the power has led to the fact that we no longer have the ability to mobilize to the next level. What's happening with the territorial defense, everyone sees. There's not a single chance to increase, say, by 500 thousand the number of troops, we have not a single chance.
That is, to hold out, if nothing was happening with them, and nothing was happening with us, then yes, we could fight like this for many more years. But things are happening with them. Putin will be forced, if the war rolls over June, to transition to mobilization. In order to transition to it, he'll be forced to make North Korea out of Russia. And when it becomes North Korea, he can mobilize not 100 thousand or 500 there, but maybe 5 million.
And having already, once it happened, then he needs to fight and fight further. And preferably successfully. Further, I think, strength will appear for the Baltics too. And for Poland. I think he'll only not go for Scandinavia. The theater of military operations is complex there, and more resilient fighters will stand in defense.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well... But here we just don't forget that if Putin goes into such trash, then we need to understand what economic resources he's relying on. Yes, Russia has huge ones, but there too a mass of destructive tendencies is gradually accumulating.
Arty Green: War communism, Yura, war communism. Internal resources are definitely enough to feed 140 million people. Russia, unlike the period of starvation, is the largest food exporter in the world. So it will feed itself. You can force people to work not only for money, but also for...
Yuriy Romanenko: For rations.
Arty Green: Yes, for rations, for cards. You can invent bijouterie there, "medal for battle, for labor from one metal cast," and so on. So actually he has enough internal tools to transfer the Russian Federation to North Korea mode. Another question, I repeat, if you look at this strategically, when these mobilized five million stick their bayonets in the ground and say that we won't fight further, we're tired.
And when will they do this? When they become experienced fighters. That is, not freshly recruited, mobilized with eyes the size of 7 kopecks, "where they drove me, there I ran." In three years, anyone's eyes will no longer be 7 kopecks, these will already be experienced soldiers. Whom you can't scare with a blocking detachment, an organized unit can still go at night and liquidate this blocking detachment. Well, just so it doesn't interfere with running off for moonshine. That is, this will already be a different quality. That is, in three years he'll get five million armed people hating the power. And this is the 17th year of the last century. Therefore, I think he won't go for this. Well, not that he won't, he really doesn't want to go for this. Because he's planning to live not in the next two years, but maybe another 20 years. And leave heirs prosperous. And here he has a direct path to collapse.
The only interested party in this could be China. Maybe. In the sense that if Russia collapses, precisely the path to centrifugal collapse, yes, then China can get back its Northern Manchuria and at the same time control over all Trans-Urals.
And in general, Putin, when he has to run somewhere, he doesn't really have anywhere to run, and he can, like Yanukovych ran from Crimea to Russia, so Putin can run to China with the Amur region.
Yuriy Romanenko: But on the other hand, we see that Trump is actively maneuvering and trying to make a deal with Putin precisely about China. And this deal is in the spirit in which Roosevelt-Nixon with Kissinger played, and you can remember Truman with Acheson, when they also solved the triangle issue with China, with the USSR, when they maneuvered with Chiang Kai-shek and eventually threw him.
And generally, here actually the stakes are very serious, because Trump, actually, offers Putin quite fat things that are hard not to bite on, because it's recognition that he loves in the eyes of the USA.
And oil, and the ability to export oil and gas to premium markets, though through US intermediation, because schemes are forming there in which the states will play the role of an intermediary who gets his margin from the fact that these transport, these gas flows are launched again, if we take Nord Stream. And the Ukrainian GTS, because it's obvious that the Ukrainian GTS will also be in the same scheme...
Arty Green: Yes, by the way, yes, no one has said anything about the Ukrainian GTS yet. Those rare earth metals are nonsense compared to the Ukrainian gas transportation system. If you hand over the concession, at least the transport capacity, to American business, there will definitely be a security guarantee. But our oligarchs, naturally, don't want to let this go, because they fed themselves with hands from this stinking gas... Well, okay, in short...
Yuriy Romanenko: It's changed, excuse me for interrupting, actually the situation has changed, because the pipe is already empty and therefore, actually speaking, there's nothing to feed on, so...
Arty Green: Now yes, now yes. Give the concession to Trump, say, here's the empty pipe. If you figure out what to do with it, we split it in half.
Yuriy Romanenko: They've already not in half, but they've already figured everything out. That is, in this regard, these ideas, maneuvers with the fund and the Nord Stream scheme, all this already exists. It's just not yet going widely enough in the media, although information is already leaking into Western media too. Therefore, in this context, it's clearly... Well, as a military man, how do you feel? In my understanding, from the point of view of political analysis, international analysis, I just see that everything is clearly already going, sort of, to the fact that a construction is forming, and there not two-three weeks, but I think that by mid-April, maybe by the beginning of April there will be some freezing with subsequent, sort of, unfolding of the scenario. That's how I see it.
Arty Green: Well, the ceasefire will be sudden. That is, today we'll find out that from zero hours tomorrow there's a ceasefire. Therefore, it's difficult to predict this in advance. It's very subjectively embedded on Putin's side. That is, Putin's call to Trump, immediately Trump calls back Zelensky and says "so, prepare the decree from zero." He'll say "yes" and that's it, from zero there will be a ceasefire. Well, approximately like that.
Actually, there's no point in dragging it out further, because Putin, I repeat, has a deficit, a serious deficit of troops already. And he had, sort of, due to give birth, so to speak, this Kursk operation. And he has nothing else due. That is, there are in principle some local battles for a village with the loud name Constantinople in the South Donetsk direction. Well, in general, that's all.
That is, he has no more operations in the foreseeable future that can bring some, I don't know, geographical names, feelings of victory or something else. That's it, he needs to finish on this loud note. That is, I wouldn't be surprised if on Monday there's a ceasefire. Because if there isn't, I won't understand why. Because not a single direction creates any threat. So now Putin is there on a loud note, that he liberated Kurshchyna, even put on their anti-green pixel for this occasion, well, that is, on this loud note he needs to end the symphony, and not otherwise, because otherwise all the impression will be spoiled, because I don't see where else something significant could happen along the entire line of contact.
Therefore, it's quite possible that already, if not this week, then next week there will be a ceasefire. And then, yes, and then... Well, by the way, also, you know, I appreciated Trump's strategy actually. He sort of gives, extends a hand to Putin. Help in the sense that he could preserve his positions inside Russia.
And there's very deep meaning in this actually. The mood inside, I don't know about you, but I monitor what's happening in Russia. That is, I have insiders there. There, sort of, this victory-madness has reached such a level that if Putin suddenly suddenly dematerializes somehow, it's very likely that a fanatic will come to his place.
Some Strelkov there or something like that. Well, I mean, there, it's not that this Putin's circle will put forward a fanatic from its circle. No, it won't be like that. Just the throne will waver, and the most organized and determined will seize this throne. That is, they'll snatch it from Putin's circle and put their own there. And this "their own" might be a fanatic. Some Girkin there or some other character we don't know now, but he's known, so to speak, in narrow circles. And in this case, it's already difficult to negotiate with a fanatic. With a person whose main goal is to live well, you can always negotiate. And with a fanatic, it's very problematic. And moreover, his physical liquidation, this fanatic's, won't give anything. Well, look at Hamas. There, practically the nearest 15 representatives of throne pretenders were liquidated within a year. And nothing, what Hamas was, it remained. Same with Hezbollah. Therefore, liquidating a figure, if it's a fanatic, makes no sense, because in his circle there are also fanatics. But Putin's circle, these sybarites who pull on themselves patriotic skins, imitating their foresight. And actually they're ordinary sybarites, just in this mask. And they shouldn't be removed from power at all, definitely. If Putin wavers, just bends, falls down the stairs and kills himself, it's quite possible that his circle, being pale, let's say, very pale in itself, won't be able to hold the situation. It's quite possible that a small group of determined people could seize power in the country, because the mood in the country is inflated with this schizophrenic hurray-patriotism. And therefore Putin needs to be entrusted, precisely because he has all the tools in his hands, with dampening these moods.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, the "war correspondents"...
Arty Green: Internal discharge, so that already... America has become buddies already, Europe so, well, got lost, but in principle to hell with them. We fought there with them, and with them, and against them, well, that is, with Germans there, so with Germans, with the British we sort of fought together. That is, lower the degree inside Russia so that determined adventurists don't get chances to seize power in the country.
Now they have such a chance, because the degree inside the country is high. And they can seize and get support. And if the degree is lowered, let's take the Soviet Union of the 80s. If Trotsky comes, what will he do with that Soviet Union? Already nothing. We're already all relaxed with jokes about Brezhnev, all listening to Seva Novgorodtsev from London, well, and so on.
So, so precisely Putin needs to be entrusted with this, to conduct work on degassing this territory from this chauvinistic frenzy. He has the tools for this and he needs to be given motives for this.
So strategically it's right to help Putin get out of this shit. He wants to himself. But here, of course, you'll have to bargain for Ukraine. And this too - Putin doesn't need this Ukraine at all, he needs to save face. Because with a beaten face, his own will eat him there. He needs to sort of enter the capital as a triumphator after the SMO [Special Military Operation]. And Trump helps him with this. And our misunderstanding acts on the contrary. Imagine Mannerheim's model of behavior,
When Finland needed to exit the war in '44. If he behaved the way our country's leader does, yes, if Mannerheim said everything that Zelensky says, only Mannerheim said it about Stalin. All of that. Then what would have happened to Finland, how would it have exited the war, in what form, and whether it would have remained in the European part at all. I think it would have been an autonomous Finnish region, somewhere there where historically Finno-Ugric tribes appeared in the Volga region. Somewhere there, either in the Volga region, or generally beyond the Urals. Everyone who survived from the Finns would have settled there.
Yuriy Romanenko: It would have turned out like Poland.
Arty Green: And they would have made them a capital there, some, not Helsinki, but Birobidzhan-2. So. Therefore, it's obvious that Zelensky isn't a complete idiot, that is, he has some plan, and this plan is to disrupt Trump's peace treaty. That's precisely why he behaves like this. Not because he's such a hothead, young, or there, fist-classics. No, because he extremely doesn't like what's happening.
This leads to the end of the holiday of life for his 5-6 managers and him personally. And they wouldn't really like that.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, what's the alternative, actually? I told you, can Ukraine independently conduct war? Well, we understand that no. European support. Well, today Kallas stated, well, who is the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that they're working out a plan there to provide military assistance to Ukraine for 40 billion euros.
Direct quote regarding Ukraine: "There is broad political support for the defense initiative of 40 billion euros. Of course, now the discussion is around details, but at the last meeting of the European Council on March 6, we received conclusions that we need to move forward with this initiative, we've done some work on this issue." Well, from Germany too, signals are coming that the new administration, the new coalition will give 3 billion euros, sort of there they'll resume supplies, although they honestly admitted that the IRIS-T air defense system, for example, they won't give now, because it will take another year to manufacture.
But Europe, on the one hand, is starting to twitch and very interesting constructions are arising, because, for example, we see how Turkey has become more active and actually if Europe remains without US support, then they're already, I think, close to thinking about how to include Turkey in their construction safely and, in connection with this, even give Turkey EU membership, which it couldn't get for several decades there. But, sort of, I think you yourself, being there, knowing Europe well from the inside, think how much, in principle, can Europeans become a serious such support point for Zelensky?
Because one more quote today - Keir Starmer, the British PM, announced in the Times that thousands of British peacekeepers could be deployed in Ukraine for an indefinite period to protect the country from further Russian invasion. On March 20 in London, a meeting of defense chiefs of coalition countries of the willing will take place, they'll discuss in detail issues of possible deployment of peacekeeping forces in case of reaching a ceasefire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Negotiations on deploying troops in Ukraine after organizing the London Online summit of the coalition of the willing are being conducted by about fifteen countries, including Great Britain, France, Turkey, Canada, Australia. They plan to send up to 30 thousand military personnel to Ukraine, and other coalition countries will help with weapons and logistics.
Well, if you look, you can see that conditionally the Brits are playing with their allies, and Turkey is, by the way, one of such closest allies. Plus France and, actually, smaller Northern European countries. How do you see our possibilities if we lose US support?
Arty Green: Well, everything would be beautiful if, I repeat, everything in Russia was happening as it was happening until now. But, unfortunately, this ball is ending. That is, Putin will be forced to transition to a new stage. He's run out of quality mercenary material. He's already got final garbage going. And to drive quality troops, there won't be any more, you need to take quantity.
To take quantity, make North Korea out of Russia. And then there will already be not a 600-thousand-strong grouping at his disposal, but already several million, and as many as he wants. Moreover, the economy will get on military rails, war communism. The thing is that he's a rat driven into a corner. In the mode of relatively sluggish war, that is, without Russia's mobilization, Ukraine will drink blood for a long time yet, might hold out maybe another year or two until it dries up. We also have something growing, the drone front, real technologies of all sorts. We can deploy recruitment of mercenaries too, abroad, connect PMCs, well, something like that, grapple for another couple of years.
But the problem is that Putin already has no choice. If the war rolls over six months and doesn't have tomorrow's prospect of ending, he'll be forced to transition to war communism mode. And already with a 5-million army, not only we, Europe won't cope, they won't have time to mobilize. With that complement of politicians who are currently in power, war in Europe will look like the German army campaign in France in 1940. Two weeks. And then Putin will say that now Orban will be your president. "I like him." He'll appoint the governor of Spain, Portugal, and France.
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: So, and that's it. "Or then I won't go, my soldier won't advance, won't wash his foot, so to speak, in the Bay of Biscay. And if you disagree, he'll go and wash it." So. Well, approximately such a situation. And the only one who can save them is the States. But this will already be precisely salvation. This will be such a Wilson ultimatum, well, in such a sense.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, in this sense...
Arty Green: And this ultimatum, believe me, you know where it will pass? This one will already pass...
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, that's what... I just wanted to say about this. Well, actually, Trump can calmly play into this logic, because he's interested in fat, sort of, Western Europe, which can be milked and which will be a recipient of security. And Putin acts as such a convenient... convenient monster with which you can scare, like how the States dealt with Hitler...
Arty Green: He's not scaring, this is the real development of events in case you leave him to his own devices. If you keep scaring Putin further, don't give him the opportunity to exit the corner with banners, then it will all be like this. And Trump will only sit and think at what moment to seat him. At what moment?
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes. So that's why, I agree with this logic, it's basically win-win for Trump from the point of view of his national interests, sort of. Although on the other hand, in principle, the approach he's destroying, let's say, both NATO in its previous form, and generally the system of relations of the States with their strategic allies. Because, for example, Japan today announced that they're deploying missiles in the south in the Okinawa area to protect Okinawa, their southern islands. Yes. And, actually, both Japan and Koreans are asking the question, well, in principle, will the States fulfill their agreements at all?
We see news from Portugal regarding the fact that they're reconsidering the possibility of purchasing F-35s for the simple reason that information appeared that the States aren't updating the firmware, and F-35s are becoming visible to Russian radars, and, actually, sort of, the French are fussing around and saying, buy Rafales or Eurofighters built by European industry. And this is such a very dangerous game for Trump including, more precisely, for the United States, because you can overplay such geopolitical blackmail to the level that the entire imperial infrastructure of the USA that was formed after World War II starts crumbling. More precisely, it's already crumbling. Trump is just trying to create a new architecture where Putin is one of such elements, such a stick, in order to force Europe, force his allies into obedience. So. Well, here you can overplay your hand.
Arty Green: Not only into obedience, to make them pay for themselves. And by the way, you say Rafale, yes, no problem, and how many Rafales can be produced per year? And how many can Lockheed produce? Just for a minute. How many centuries will it take to re-equip the EU's aviation on Rafales? Therefore, they won't go anywhere, they'll buy F-35s.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, that's if they don't go into this militarization trend, because we see that Germany is starting to slowly restructure, there in Dresden Volkswagen is closing an automobile plant, and in its place there will be weapons production. That is, the gloomy Teutonic genius, it's starting to wake up, I think that many in Europe will shudder when it wakes up...
Yuriy Romanenko: Perhaps it had so much contact with Russians that it became like Ilya Muromets, there, lying for 33 years.
Arty Green: Germans have become herbivorous. Germany... Well, I recently had surgery on my shoulder, did it in Frankfurt. But Germany there is no longer a state of Germans. It's already multicultural. Understand? These are already completely different people. This is a herbivorous nation, which sort of for them to become combat, they really need to fight. And then maybe, with a change of generation, they'll become a warlike nation. No, it's not that history anymore. Germany has nothing to do with the current state of this state. It's impossible to make a predator out of a person who grew up herbivorous. You need to grow new people in new conditions. Therefore, definitely not. The gloomy Teutonic genius is already a historical artifact.
Yuriy Romanenko: In this regard, Ukraine in the European security contour, it could be a significant element if Europe decided on subject security policy. But based on what you're saying, I also see across Europe, there will be huge problems with awakening this European warlikeness that made Europe Europe in world history. Or what do you think?
Arty Green: Well, essentially, expressing readiness to defend their country with weapons in hands, Scandinavians, a bit Dutch and Danes. Well, Danes are already Scandinavians anyway. A bit Dutch, a bit British. That's it, no one else. The rest there, onto the nearest watercraft, if they don't row to America, then at least to Africa. And that's it, and so on. Ukraine produced a million people. Out of 30 million, a million people produced.
Probably would have produced one and a half if the government wasn't so thieving and cynical. Well, generally so petty even. Understand, that even though they steal a lot, they somehow look petty. If not for this, then probably Ukraine's resource could have been up to 5 million. And the rest of Europe, all the other 550 million, I think wouldn't even produce half of this. Well, and moreover, the entire European army would consist half of Canadians, a quarter of British, and a quarter of everyone else. Approximately like that. And only a couple hundred thousand of them would gather in total. I mean those who will fight. Well, that's the story now. And what will they do with the Horde that he mobilizes? If you gathered the Horde, you need to go on a campaign.
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: If Putin gathers the Horde, he needs to go on a campaign. Well, at minimum, he'll tear off the Baltics, all that stuff there, and then he'll say he didn't do it. No, guys, well, sort of, because he'll need to exit this phase later, it will be even harder for him. Therefore, it's better that he doesn't go there. And this Europe with these strains, it can ensure the previous war mode, but the new one, not a single chance. Not a single chance.
And the States need to strain hard yet to somehow stop them at least in the morning. That is, he won't just stand and say, "ah, I can't." And Putin will be like, "ah, okay, understood, I won't go further." No, there will be a serious fight. And it will really smell like World War III.
Yuriy Romanenko: Ukraine in this construction, where it ends up, I mean, if the ceasefire is signed, then it starts. In your understanding, what are Ukraine's pluses, what are the minuses?
Arty Green: Well, look, Ukraine, first of all, we need to figure out who our power is. If it's the same crooks who were previous government rotations, then our prospects aren't very good. If we have, first of all, demographics will go away, well, sort of, a country that will continue to rob will never be investment-attractive, and a territory where people will want to live.
Therefore, it's doomed to degradation, such total stagnation. And if a government comes that will deal with the right things, then the prospects are very strong. Very strong.
Yuriy Romanenko: Even in neutral status, essentially.
Arty Green: Yes, yes, and what is neutral status? If we preserve the population, at least 30 million, well, what is neutral status? We'll have the strongest army in the world, the most combat-capable this population will be. The most Swiss of all Swiss armies in the world together with the Israeli one. Understand, who will... And our command will no longer be these, let's say, weak ones that are now - I don't want to use harsh terms while the war hasn't ended. But it will already be different. Yes, the devil himself isn't brother, yes. That is, well, sort of, the rest of NATO compared to the combat capability of the Ukrainian army, the mobilized Ukrainian army. Well, so it will be. Well, better hardware, all things. But now the war has changed.
Understand what? All the hardware that's now in NATO, it was oriented toward World War III. This is gigantic avalanches of armor, hardware there and so on. And now you see the tactics of small infantry groups. What will you do with this armada, this aviation and so on? How will you fight with aviation against the tactics of small infantry groups. There, the distance between threes will be several hundred meters. What will you bomb? A ton of missiles for each three.
Yuriy Romanenko: That's the thing, yes.
Arty Green: And here, when there are no stationary positions, this is precisely where the trouble is. Or you can't see where you are, understand? There are holes, there's a lot of sand, gravel, stones, some holes there and so on. In this area where you can in principle deploy a battalion, yes, somewhere there 10 people are hiding. Somewhere there. Well, where, where to strike?
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: Actually, in this war, camouflage is the main weapon, because if the enemy knows where you are, he'll always find a way to reach you eventually and kill you. And when they don't know where you are, or there are many of you, and you're all in holes, and you also move around chaotically, then there are chances to survive, preserve combat capability, and meet the enemy worthily if he suddenly wants to visit.
Yuriy Romanenko: Even despite drones and firepower that they now provide, for strikes, on manpower.
Arty Green: Tell me, how many drone operators are in Europe? Precisely those with combat experience, there hundreds of combat sorties, at least hundreds, we have some with thousands of combat sorties, thousands.
Arty Green: I assure you, an untested fighter is worth not even 1/10, but 1/20 of a tested one. Vice versa, a tested warrior is worth 10, or even 20 untested ones, despite the fact that he was trained on ranges, that is, not just some guy who was put in formation. No, this is a career soldier, a contract soldier there. But 10 untested contract soldiers are worth one tested, mobilized one. Well, so we have such tested ones...
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: Now 1.5 million. I mean those who are battle-tested at the front. Precisely them, not just participants in combat operations - clerks. Well, because many have already dodged. Most of my friends have already, sort of, dodged due to various ailments. How? Someone had disability since 2015, someone had three children back in 2022, someone there some other soldier's reason.
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Arty Green: So. Someone, sort of, just had enough, went and achieved dismissal through health, like me. So. Although they didn't really bother me much, honestly. If they bothered me, of course, they wouldn't have let me go. And so, it was beneficial for the contract soldiers, I was dying off, so there would be no more questions about me. So they, essentially, let me go. They could have drained more blood. And I would have lied in hospital for years.
So, actually quite many Ukrainians who simply got tired over 3 years of war and decided themselves that it's time for me. And everyone has grounds, there are quite many of them, we're brothers-in-arms. Plus those who rotated, who had really formal reasons for this conditional retreat.
And they also rotated or transferred to some new units somewhere closer to home to see the children. So the children don't grow up without you at all. Years are passing. I also [left] my little one. I left when he was... Now he's 16. I left him at 13. So three years I didn't see him. Cool. Saw him a couple times on leave.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, you also had 14-15, we don't forget that either.
Arty Green: Well, 14-15 then my wife came, I was a freer Cossack then, understand. Then we were still volunteer battalions, and these generals, which now, the main one, they tucked their tails, didn't interfere in our affairs. We decided ourselves who goes where on leave. My boat went for repairs, I went to repair the boat. Debaltseve started, I came there from the boat at the ship repair yard to Debaltseve.
Arty Green: And here no, here it's a different story.
Yuriy Romanenko: And tell me, how do you...
Arty Green: Like a slave on a galley, chained to an oar.
Yuriy Romanenko: That's it, that's what you said, let's say, from this follows another very interesting point for our near-term prospects. This is the subjectification of such military, well, let's say, political elite. So how do you think, will this happen right after the end, when the election campaign starts? And how many such conscious people will be ready to go into this politics?
Arty Green: Oh, well, the demand for justice will be greater, that is, there will be more political activity. Well, look, among my brothers-in-arms, close ones, yes, I have there, well, person, let's say, I'll speak in percentages, otherwise you need to understand what circle. Percent, probably 25, Poroshenko supporters. Just straight up "Petro Alekseyevich," there, all my arguments there, they don't listen. This is not a question of logic, this is a question of faith.
Petro Alekseyevich, that's it. Despite the fact that he tried to surrender Debaltseve as German prisoners, my arguments, they respect me, love me like a brother, but this is a question of faith. Logic doesn't work here. So, then Svoboda supporters. I have several guys there, well, conditionally speaking, 15%. These are Svoboda supporters. Although Svoboda as a party lost points after they came to power after Maidan, their functionaries really screwed up. Their reputation in their native Lviv region collapsed, below the plinth there. But nevertheless, I have several Svoboda supporters who still there Tyahnybok and all.
Then there are even those who there...
Well, the party... Well, look, there's such a very cool commander, now already of a unmanned systems regiment "Achilles." The surname, it always amuses them. 92nd brigade, in short. I constantly fought with them, and my drone operators who were engaged in preparing ammunition, trained precisely there. That is, it was convenient for me, they had a whole workshop there, a whole such mini-factory, and I sent mine there, and they there sort of learned...
Yuriy Romanenko: Azov?
Arty Green: Well, Azov is, despite the fact that Biletsky is now white and fluffy, and pretends that he doesn't even think...
Arty Green: Yes, we're all divided by parties already, even before this war.
Yuriy Romanenko: No-no-no, I didn't mean the party, I meant precisely activity in different parties. That's what I meant.
Arty Green: No, the activity will be radical. That is, radical activity. That is, people will have mass, well, first of all, PTSD, don't forget. That is, everything is perceived archipainfully. It's like salt on a wound. Any sort of injustice, yes, or there hatred like that. If they don't like Zelensky there, it means they don't like him so much that it's better for him to stay away from them. If they don't like Poroshenko there, then the same.
Although nobody touched Poroshenko lately. First of all, he demonstratively helped there, really spent some money. Probably about ten percent of what he stole during his term, he probably spent and also lost weight, apparently worried on nerves a lot. So nobody touched him. When he brought a plane to my brigade...
I sent my Poroshenko supporters to lick their saucers from childhood. I naturally didn't go, because I wouldn't have extended my hand to him. Despite everything. Why do I need it the hell...
Therefore, actually considering the army as some kind of subject at all is impossible. It's approximately, conditionally speaking, a million subjects, each of which is completely not a cast of the neighboring one. But they're capable of uniting into groups to solve specific tasks. For example, if Maidan happens, then it will take, I think, about three-four hours instead of three-four months earlier. That is, if they decide, then it will all be fast.
Yuriy Romanenko: Uh-huh.
Yuriy Romanenko: Effectively.
Arty Green: And sort of radically. Therefore, God forbid this power brings it to Maidan. They won't even have time to understand how it ended. Well, I mean their power. The other one. And moreover, both Poroshenko supporters, and Azov people, and Svoboda supporters will unite here in one unit.
Well, I mean, in one assault group. That is, situationally unite against the enemy, as we now against the Russians, absolutely. And the fact that nobody in the army likes Zelensky, that's absolutely accurate. Let's say, they despise him to varying degrees actively. The further from the front line, the less they might despise.
And the closer to the front line, they despise very actively. Therefore, Zelensky is sort of an enemy to people in uniform, we all hate him. Just to different degrees we voice this. Commanders can't voice it, they'll immediately be removed. They've invested soul, time, heart into this unit. They're afraid that some butcher will be sent to their unit who will start throwing their brothers into the furnace like firewood.
And so on. They all have a motive to stay silent. This creates the illusion that Zelensky has some kind of reputation. He has such negative attitudes toward him that few can imagine this for themselves. I can imagine.
Yuriy Romanenko: And when did this turning point happen? Well, because maybe there was no love, but after the 22nd, 24.02.22, when he didn't run, at least respect that he manifested himself so...
Arty Green: There was no respect. Everyone remembers perfectly well when he went around disarming these Right Sector people and so on. There was no respect. There was just understanding, well, they elected him, elected him, well, we'll elect a better one next time, maybe. Or maybe not. That's it. That is, there was no love. Well, I'll remind you, the vote was 50-50. In the army. In polling stations where the majority were military voting, that is, these are military towns there and others, where precisely 50 plus percent were military, this Poroshenko-Zelensky thing was 50-50, even where 51-49. That is, Petya lost there too, in the army, but it's such purely, well, because there were two of them there, well, "I don't like Petya, well, then Zelensky," that is, nobody particularly liked Zelensky in the army ever, and he didn't do anything for this love to appear at any moment.
The fact that he didn't run, yes, to hell with it. If he had run, it would have been better. Well, there would have been Zaluzhny, acting my supreme duties. Well, and all the love there. That is, a leader would have been found in the country. Yes. The fact that this one didn't get lost, it's even actually, well, sort of, could have been better. He would have fled beyond the border and sat there, and Zaluzhny would have remained here. Maybe. Yes, not maybe, but most likely.
Yuriy Romanenko: And Zaluzhny now in this situation, when he's an ambassador, in your understanding, did his positions remain in the army? Strong perception as a leader? Or did something change when he went to civilian life?
Arty Green: You know, very contradictory. I can say that I would strongly not recommend him to go into the election campaign. He'll learn a lot of bad things about himself. Well, I mean he'll learn how badly many people think of him. And this could torpedo his rating very strongly.
Therefore, I wouldn't do this in his place. The thing is that he's a representative of that very caste, like Syrsky, and so on. That is, look, Zaluzhny is all such, polished there, very characteristic in communication, talkative, friendly, yes, and so on. And who did he take as his first deputies? Moisyuk, a first-class butcher, completely finished. That is, Moisyuk is precisely the punitive hand.
It's like Malyuta Skuratov in his time, precisely punitive. So Moysyuk is also precisely punitive for us. Because he was Zaluzhny's first deputy, and Zaluzhny is all such cute, white, fluffy, yes. But when someone needed to be sent on assaults and come and tell everyone that you're all cowards, one vigorous tank, and this, and they're driving the wrong unit, because he's a blockhead. He may be a lieutenant general, he doesn't understand anything in military affairs. Yelling, raising dust with profanity, banging heads - this isn't knowledge of military affairs. So this fierce face with bulging eyes there and the so-called "command voice," this isn't an indicator for a professional military man.
Yes, let him read, whoever's interested, let him read "Volokolamsk Highway" by Alexander Bek. General Panfilov's portrait is quite well revealed there. This is absolutely not Moysyuk. And his second deputy Zabrodsky Mikhail, this is also a patent butcher. Just a butcher. I also don't really want to voice some things, because well, in short, one of the most negative characters in the history of the Ukrainian army.
Yuriy Romanenko: This one was a deputy under Poroshenko, I think?
Arty Green: Yes, yes, yes, this is the commander of the Airborne Forces. He, by the way, is a hero of the Chechen war, he has an order signed by Putin. True, it was cleaned from the internet. I saw with my own eyes a scan of his order book, but now it's gone. Apparently, someone helped him clean all this from the internet. There was a time when they were proud until 2013, until 2014. They were proud of these things.
Well, whoever fought somewhere there, there in Chechnya fought, sat with an order there. The order book, no thief came, photographed it, he threw it somewhere there. And it went further there. We had such a combat guy there this, commander. Now everything's cleaned, well, apparently when Petya took him, Petya's technologists there know how to clean the internet. So. And so in general he's a butcher, the most real one, the psychology of a war criminal, a moral invalid. And it's precisely with him that Zaluzhny, this cute one with hearts and so on, wrote an article, took him as his deputy from "Petya's" deputies, asked Zelensky then, he was still on, well, in relations. I mean Zaluzhny. And then again he sent this Zabrodsky as a Stavka representative there, to the south, already to the southern direction, this is for our so-called counteroffensive.
That is, who is Zaluzhny? He's a whitewashed representative of the same clan. The same clan. That is, he has such positive external attributes, but actually he's a representative of that very clan that almost stole victory from us.
More precisely, he almost stole victory from us, and almost destroyed all of us. By expending precious priceless material, you know, like pouring water on a garden.
Yuriy Romanenko: You mean, probably, first of all, the offensive of summer 2023.
Arty Green: Yes, not only, this is permanent. Now they appointed as commander of "Pivnich" AC, there one such Shander, utilizer of battalions. This is a complete disaster what we have, these. There Sodol caught this eye, yes, and after Sodol there crawled out. Yes, we have enough such Sodols there. And Valera is one of them, unfortunately.
Only he didn't run around himself, yell with bulging eyes. He had Cerberuses for this. Moysyuk and Zabrodsky. But he wrote. And the operation in the South, and it so happened that he's responsible for the fact that the dumbest, simply dumbest and such a martinet too, you know, like the sergeant from "Full Metal Jacket," General Zubanich was generally the main boss in this offensive. I'm talking about the corps commander who was advancing. The 47th brigade, 33rd, there, and 3rd, I've already forgotten, 60th or what. Zabanich commanded this. Yes, his IQ is less than 90, understand? Plus...
Well, like in "Full Metal Jacket," remember the film?
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes, yes, yes.
Arty Green: Well, the sergeant - that's Zubanich. He has such a behavior model. But at the same time, he also knows how to smuggle and so on. At least he's not a corrupt official, but this one made his career on smuggling. He's a smuggling champion there. Competed with Nikolyuk at the front. I mean the Khmelnytsky front, yes.
Yuriy Romanenko: And this new Chief of General Staff, Andriy Hnatov, who was appointed literally yesterday, Bargilevich was sent to the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense. And now Andriy Hnatov, how do you characterize him? Is he ours or not?
Arty Green: Obedient, obedient young guy. Who knows him, I'm on good terms with him. He has such a behavior model, not arrogant. He doesn't make himself out to be something greatest. That is, he doesn't put on airs. His behavior model is, well, how to say it, sympathetic sort of. But this doesn't make him a good commander, unfortunately. Because he loves the leadership most of all. And therefore he's already a young general. That is, he made his career under Sodol. He's Sodol's favorite. And they appointed him when Sodol was removed under the influence of public resonance, they put him in Sodol's place.
I was under his command in ATO Kherson when we were storming the Kherson-Berislav bridgehead. Well, it's hard for me to describe in literary expression the quality of command that was there then. I won't now, while the war hasn't ended, voice many things, but precisely the low quality of command. That is, what it did was just terrible. And it cost us thousands of lives. Thousands. We broke superbly prepared assault brigades there just with our foreheads against a concrete wall. Just foreheads against a concrete wall. Because we were commanded by... A good guy. But no commander at all.
Then he was at Khortytsia, how long was he there, until they changed him to Drapatyi there. A year, probably, yes? The same. That is, he turned out to be no better than the same Sodol there, yes. So.
Therefore, he's a sweet calf that sucks from all mothers, volunteers are friends with him, he behaves humanly, but he's zero as a commander. That is, he's a good guy. I have a bunch of friends, several hundred such guys whom I would gladly hug, including in the army. But among them there aren't so many who can be a good commander or Chief of General Staff. He's such.
Yuriy Romanenko: Look, in this context, how do you relate to Maryana Bezuhla, who very harshly criticizes the generals and in principle raises such waves of harsh criticism. Because I even look at the audience reaction, and many are, of course, so shocked by what you're saying.
Arty Green: Really? And what there? Well, military people and not, because they all know this. But they keep quiet in a rag, because if you yap something extra here... Look, Maryana, 90% of what she says, she tells the truth. But the problem is who she's pushing. For her, a model, so, of a good commander is Moysyuk or Budanov. She stated this directly. I think, she mentioned someone else, but it doesn't matter. Moysyuk or Budanov.
Moysyuk, I repeat, and Budanov the same, these are some of the most despised generals in the army for their attitude toward blood, for their arrogance. Budanov, he doesn't have such behavior, not with bulging eyes, like about to be a sergeant from "Full Metal Jacket." And Moisyuk is such...
Arty Green: Moysyuk is a martinet, a classic martinet. And when Zaluzhny said that "I don't like martinets, I" - the very thing, then he was being hypocritical, because his closest assistant whom he took was Moysyuk, who is this very martinet.
And Budanov, first of all, he's incompetent, he's incompetent as an intelligence officer, as the head of GUR [Main Intelligence Directorate], he made GUR into a PMC.
Such, precisely a PMC. Plus everyone knows perfectly well that his hands aren't clean. And moreover very unclean. That is, he grabbed for himself a bunch of flows there, supposedly he needs this for military affairs, but who counted it? How much goes where. In short, Budanov has a very negative reputation in the army. Precisely in the army.
There various volunteer girls can sigh and gasp when he invites them to talk. Well, a tall handsome guy, special forces, he really fought there, he really left Crimea having shot a couple of SBU officers, well, as a group commander. But that's a group commander, it's a group of 8 people. Well, I know oh-so-many such several hundred people. This isn't a reason to make them the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate.
Well, that's it. So, appointing Budanov as head of GUR reminds me, imagine such a picture. A bank is driving, more precisely a bank vehicle, so, carrying some money somewhere, inside is an expediter, so, and they were attacked by some bandits there, so, he shot back at them well, so, and saved this money. There the bank arrived, and here the Board of Directors gathered, more precisely shareholders. "We have the best bank employee, here he is, the expediter" and made him the bank manager. But he's, damn, an expediter. And even if you don't hang him with gold there, he won't develop strategic and operational thinking. And understanding what it is in general. So he made this bank into an expedition firm. Collector's firm more precisely. Instead of a bank. They transport valuables. What they can do, they do.
So Mrs. Bezumnaya [Mad], that is Bezuhla [Angleless], that accidentally happened, I don't like such slips. Bezuhla, she thinks that precisely Moysyuk or Budanov are the future army. So, she doesn't understand anything about what she's talking about. She listens about how this one is bad, that one is bad, why is he bad, that is, she's like, you know, like a retranslator, she retranslates this. But she draws conclusions - hug and cry. I, for example, if they told me now that we should put Syrsky or appoint Budanov? Put Syrsky or appoint Moysyuk? With all my negative attitude toward Syrsky, I put Syrsky. That's it. And she wants to change him to Budanov and Moysyuk.
Yuriy Romanenko: Logical question in this situation, is there anyone in the army whom they respect or is it better not to talk about this until the war ends? Well, someone from the generals whom they respect?
Arty Green: Yes, of course. Drapatyi. Drapatyi is generally authoritative. Among generals he... No, there's also Krasylnikov, by the way, they respected him quite strongly, but not everyone. He has... I sort of assess him as a good person and a decent general. That is, let's say, I would put him in the top five. But considering that we have a garbage level of generals, even the fifth general is already so, better to change. So. And Drapatyi, yes, he's generally without questions. For me it's a big mystery how he managed to become a general at all in this system of negative selection. Just a mystery. Well, he's now the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces, obviously his appointment was under, how to say it, electoral influence. Some positive appointment had to be made. Such that somehow to dampen a bit. Like the Supreme Commander still cares about personnel changes, well, I mean, about improvements. Well, you see, he removed Krasylnikov. Supposedly he's apparently guilty of something there, in Kursk or I don't know. I don't know the details why they removed Krasylnikov. In his place they put a finished deputy commander of the Airborne Forces. Finished simply, battalion utilizer. Well, let him sit better in Chernihiv and away from troops.
Shuffle papers and bulge his eyes at staff clerks rather than sitting in troops. So I sort of assess this appointment even more in the plus. The army that's at the front simply got rid of one martinet and butcher by his promotion. Well, not promotion, it's an equivalent position. Commander of operational command and commander of AC.
Maybe not the same rank. I don't really orient myself in these ranks.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, such a harsh picture in oil. Tell me, in the context of everything you said, what's your internal feeling about what awaits Ukraine in the coming months, well, in the coming year, because, well, I think it will be very turbulent processes inside the country and around the country?
Arty Green: But around this I still hope that they won't force Putin to transition to that phase. Everything is heading toward this, at minimum. And he doesn't want to, and Trump doesn't want to, and they have a controlling stake of force in this. And the Chinese aren't particularly getting into this, trying by their old tactic to sit on the shore and see how it all ends. Well, somewhere there they're playing their game, of course, but I don't see them being very active. They're too dependent on Europe and the States. Under 70% of their economy is export to the civilized world. And you can't restructure this just like that. Therefore, they're simply tied. And upheavals aren't needed for them, because they're the most vulnerable economy in the world in this.
Therefore, they don't need any sharp movements at all. And Trump and Putin... Putin doesn't want to become Kim, he wants to be a respectable head of a world power, not a world pariah. Therefore, there are chances. And chances quite fast, I repeat, because there's little time, Putin's troops are running out. Precisely those before total mobilization.
Arty Green: And inside Ukraine, well, it depends on whom we elect, that is, obviously, on the political field now there's not a single player who will play a significant role in the next parliament and the next president, that is, it depends on whom we elect. Obviously, it won't be Poroshenko, obviously it won't be Zelensky, obviously it won't be Tymoshenko. And everyone else isn't organized yet, not structured. It's clear that Lyovochkin is fussing around, creating some political projects, Yermak is trying to create something there. All that stuff. Obviously, the parliament will be fragmented, but it's quite possible that still the increased demand for justice and so on will overcome the media monopoly of oligarchs, and power can be received by people who will come to perform work, not to earn.
I don't know. How will it work out?
Yuriy Romanenko: Also, you know, I thought about a very important question. In this context, how do you see the possible future of conditionally pro-Russian forces, if Putin manages to push through the agenda that, well, there should be some amnesty, or, well, conditional Muraev returns to Ukraine and participates in the political process. Do you generally see, well, sort of, that this is in principle possible after everything that happened? That there... OPZJ [Opposition Platform — For Life] some plus, well, like there, or Muraev, there, or someone there, Azarov, well, Azarov, clearly, there, won't return, but... Well, such an attempt to implement into the political system such figures that are unambiguously, sort of, tied to the Russians?
Arty Green: Well, one way or another, demand creates supply. Whether it will be Muraev or Sidor Polykarpovich whom nobody knew yesterday. Pro-Russian politicians will be represented in the next parliament. Because the pro-Russian electorate in Ukraine remained. I think about 10% of it remained in this part of the country. Somewhere like that. I mean in this part, which first of all isn't occupied, secondly, didn't emigrate and won't travel 300 kilometers to vote.
I mean foreign voting. I always traveled. I even from Lithuania, from Latvia traveled to Estonia. Because that's how I masked where I am. And then it was still possible to come, show a passport, say, I want to vote here. A week before write an application, register precisely in Estonia, but live in Latvia.
I hid like that from Yanukovych's gang then. So... Definitely pro-Russian parties will exist. And whether it will be Muraev there or not Muraev, what difference? This is definitely, the spectrum will be represented. Because there's demand, there's an electoral base. This, by my estimates, is about 10%. Well, depending on whom to call pro-Russian. Here we're speaking Russian with you now, someone will call us pro-Russian too.
I have staff bots assigned to me who crawl after me everywhere, including in yacht chats. They remind me that I'm a Kremlin preserve. You too, by the way.
Yuriy Romanenko: I see. But at least I have a criminal case in Russia, Article 282.
Arty Green: Yes, listen, there were criminal cases in Russia for obvious collaborators too, who were clearly FSB agents. There this deputy mayor or something, this collaborator. That is, he was also on the sanctions list, there was a criminal case in Moscow for something. That is, they mask their agents by the fact that he has supposedly...
He has a certificate from Putin that Putin doesn't like him. That is, this actually isn't a 100% argument. And so there's demand. By my estimates, it's 10-15%. Mainly old people. Secondly, some embittered ones, maybe the SBU was chasing someone, understand. That is, this inclines, of course, the population toward opposite political views.
Yuriy Romanenko: I see.
Arty Green: That is, both fear from being driven into these political thickets, but I mean penates, there are also probably some like that. Well, we'll see. And Muraev, not Muraev? Here it would be good, of course, depending on whom we elect, whether we elect those who will sort things out, because I'll vote exclusively for a tribunal. I'll vote and campaign for those people who promise a tribunal over this total disgusting marauding that's been these three years of war. I want blood, because without this blood you can't cleanse the country. That is, if everything that happened with this large-scale mobilization, which is actually the most large-scale criminal business, if its organizers aren't punished publicly and very harshly, then I don't see the point of being in the citizenship of a country where such things go unpunished.
Yuriy Romanenko: Will you return when elections start, will you return to Ukraine or not? They're asking here.
Arty Green: I'm not a citizen of another country. Understand, I during Yanukovych's times was forced to relocate. Yes, and my younger son studied, not a day studied in Ukraine, studied in foreign English schools, and now he's going to university, American. Yes, that is, he's forming his life. But imagine, he lived in Ukraine until he was three. And that's it. And didn't live anymore.
But he has no other citizenship. We weren't very concerned with this question, got concerned, let's say, and didn't worry. I since 2012 have nothing except roots in Ukraine, except brothers-in-arms. Neither economic, nor family and so on. But I have no other passport. My circle of friends are Ukrainians. That is, my brothers-in-arms are Ukrainians.
Arty Green: All my children are Ukrainians. But I'm planning already further, now I'm formalizing the end of my business. There I need to finish one startup and bring it to the level of stable business already and that's it. My plans are at sea. That's it. I have a yacht ready there. It's a round-the-world trip. And a long one, for about 10 years. Unhurried.
Yuriy Romanenko: Great.
Arty Green: I give my honest Pioneer word. The next elections, generally these coming elections are the last thing I'll actively participate in regarding Ukraine. I just, well, that's it. Well... I'm done.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, many people actually. Look, I agree, because it's the last chance. I just know a bunch of people who have exactly the same mood, that this will be either the last chance, when a period will be put to this fucking mess over 34 years, sort of there...
Arty Green: Especially the quintessence was the last three years, that is, by level of cynicism.
Arty Green: Well, there hasn't been anything yet. If it's not punished, precisely punished, not just changed, but punished, then I don't want to know about this state. Don't want to know. I'll get Chilean, I don't know, Panamanian Grenada citizenship. Just out of influence, so I don't even think about it. Because if this is forgiven, then...
that's it, without me. I sort of my... What I could do, I did. Further there... It's for the young people.
Yuriy Romanenko: Well, from this, a low bow to you from all our viewers and all our audience, not only ours, because a lot of people respect you. Huge thanks for what you did for Ukraine and are doing for Ukraine. We simply take off our hats, as they say. Arty Green was with us. Thanks for such a frank broadcast, which... You never know which direction it will go with you, but that's how it is. We've unfolded like this, and it seems to me that what they heard will be very valuable for our viewers.
Therefore, I advise everyone to put maximum like, spread all this, write comments, shorts that will go, and cuts that will go, also spread. Because what Arty told us is extremely priceless in our situation. And most importantly, thank you for the position, which, it seems to me, is sincere, humane. And this is what Ukraine needs, because if we don't just have a position, don't have conscience in the end, and there's no punishment for what happened in these 34 years, especially as you say during three years of war, then I agree with you, I personally have nothing to do in such a country either. Well, not in the country, in such a state, it's not needed at all, sort of. Therefore, it will be the last chance, the last exit for many, I think.
Arty Green: Many, I can say, if what was going on these three years isn't punished, if the fried rooster pecks like this again, then after the next February 24th there will be no one at the military commissariats.
Yuriy Romanenko: Yes.
Arty Green: There will be no one to defend.
Yuriy Romanenko: That's it, thanks for the broadcast, we hug you, thank you once again hugely. Arty Green was with us, bye. We're ending with this, once again I ask everyone to get involved, spread this broadcast maximally, it seems to me it turned out just powerful. We're working, it seems to me... It seems to me, I'm sure that this is what many of our citizens need to hear now and look in the mirror, no matter how bloody and worm-eaten it is. Bye, until tomorrow.